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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 1979, the United States suffered one of its greatest geopolitical losses of the Cold War era. 
The country’s long-time ally in the Middle East, the Shah of Iran, was overthrown after a 
series of tumultuous events. Following a period of rebellion, the Shah was eventually forced 
to leave his country, and strongly anti-American forces, under the leadership of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, triumphed in the ensuing power struggle. Barely a month after the Shah’s 
departure, Khomeini’s followers had seized power, and Khomeini, an Islamic cleric and long-
time opponent of the Shah, ascended to become the dominant figure in the new Iran. These 
events came as a great surprise to almost all observers, as the notion of the Shah falling from 
power had widely been considered impossible just months before.
1
 The unthinkable had 
occurred, only a year after President Jimmy Carter had hailed Iran as “an island of stability”.2  
Washington had long viewed the Shah as a key ally. In 1953, a US-backed coup had helped 
the Iranian monarch to greatly strengthen his internal position. Since that time, the Shah had 
suppressed all opposition that threatened his regime, and ruled Iran with a firm hand. Despite 
a number of fierce opponents, his rule did not appear to be in any significant danger when 
Jimmy Carter entered the White House in January 1977, and the sheer scope of the rebellion 
that broke out in Iran in 1978 was a total surprise, both to the US government and to the world 
at large. As the crisis unfolded, Washington often struggled to get a clear picture of the 
chaotic situation in Iran. After the fall of the Shah, America’s relations with the new regime 
were rocky from the start. The sweeping deterioration of US-Iranian relations culminated in 
the hostage crisis of November 1979, after which diplomatic relations between the two 
countries soon effectively ceased. 
This study will explore the course of events that led to this situation, by analyzing US foreign 
policy towards Iran from January 1977 to November 1979—that is, the first three years of the 
Carter administration. It will begin in the early days of Carter’s presidency, when the situation 
in Iran was still calm and the American-Iranian alliance stood strong, despite some difficulties. 
It will end with the hostage crisis, an obvious watershed in the history of US-Iranian relations. 
When analyzing this period, the study will aim to answer the following questions: What were 
the primary interests of the Carter administration in Iran? How did the US government 
                                                          
1
 Gasiorowski, Mark J. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran: xi. New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1991.  
2
 Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter with Iran: 30. London: I.B. Tauris, 1985.  
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attempt to further these interests during this period, and why? What factors in the US policy 
towards Iran contributed to Washington’s difficulties in protecting its interests there?   
A point of clarification with regards to the last of these (interrelated) questions: this study 
does not attempt to determine whether different policy choices would have led to a different 
outcome. Doing so would be counter-factual, as well as outside the scope of this research. The 
third question will thus be confined to an analysis of the challenges that arose because of the 
choices that were taken by the administration. When considering subjects such as this, it is 
important to keep in mind that historical studies must necessarily be written with the benefit 
of hindsight, and that what may appear obvious years later was typically not so during the 
actual course of events. It is therefore very important not to impose post facto moral 
judgments in this kind of study, and the thesis does not render a verdict regarding whether 
Washington should have known better in its decisions. Instead, it will focus upon how and 
why these decisions were made.  
The Middle East Policy of the United States in the Cold War Era 
America’s position in the Middle East would grow and solidify early in post-war era. Before 
that time, the United States had not traditionally regarded the Middle East as central to its 
national interests, and its presence there was not large in the decades leading up to World War 
II. Yet within a few years of that war’s conclusion, the US would be the most influential 
Western nation in the region. This was due in part to the weakening position of the United 
Kingdom, the once dominant Western nation in the Middle East. Its influence in the area 
declined in the post-war years, a decline which accelerated in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez 
Crisis. Britain’s loss of great power status led it to gradually withdraw from the area 
altogether. Additionally, the influence of France, earlier a significant factor in the region, was 
also critically weakened after the Suez Crisis. All of this contributed to a power vacuum in the 
Middle East, and opened up for a larger US role.
3
 
Of course, the United States was not the only superpower interested in filling that vacuum, as 
the Soviet Union saw opportunities in the Middle East as well. American leaders feared that if 
                                                          
3
 Levey, Zach and Podeh, Eli (eds.). Britain and the Middle East – From Imperial Power to Junior Partner. 
Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2008. This study gives, in part, an overview of the decline of British 
influence in the Middle East, and of the United Kingdom’s subsequent role as “junior partner” to the US; Shlaim, 
Avi. “The Middle East: The Origin of Arab-Israeli Wars” in Explaining International Relations since 1945: 223 
(Woods, Ngaire, ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Shlaim argues that the United Kingdom and France 
were the dominant “Great Powers” in the region until approximately 1956, after which the United States and 
the Soviet Union would assume this position. The Suez crisis thus clearly represented a watershed.  
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they did not fill the void that had been left by Britain, the USSR might do so.
4
 So it came to 
pass that the Cold War rivalry played a significant role in shaping the politics of one of the 
most economically, strategically, and geographically important regions of the world. Both 
Washington and Moscow thought it vital to have allies in the region, to which they sold vast 
amounts of arms, and extended sometimes substantial economic aid.
5
  
While the superpowers clearly had great influence over the policies of their allies, the 
influence in the opposite direction is not to be underestimated. The “client” states frequently 
used the strength of their superpower allies to their own advantage, exploiting, for example, 
the tendency of the superpowers to see even very localized conflicts in a larger Cold War 
context. Certain “client” government would use this leverage to secure increased economic 
and military support, or shore up their domestic position.
6 
As will be demonstrated in what 
follows, this was manifestly true of Iran’s relationship with the United States, both during the 
Carter administration and before it.  
The international rivalry between the United States and the USSR influenced the Middle East 
in significant ways, directly and indirectly.
7 Though the policies of the United States would 
sometimes shift due to changing conditions, both internally and externally, some features 
remained constant for decades. Three factors particularly impacted its Middle East policy 
during the Cold War era, according to William Quandt, an American scholar and former staff 
member on the National Security Council. One was the containment of Soviet influence, to 
stop the spread of communism and limit the power of Soviet allies in the region.
8
 These allies 
at times included radical and Arab nationalist forces, and the effort to contain these groups 
should also be seen as part of this important feature of US foreign policy.
9
  
Another key factor was the protection of US oil interests in a region that contained more than 
two-thirds of the known oil reserves in the world by the 1970s. All American presidential 
                                                          
4
 See for instance, Yaqub, Salim. Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East: 1. 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. 
5
 Halliday, Fred. “The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War” in The Cold War and the Middle East: 
15 (Sayigh, Yezid and Shlaim, Avi (eds.)).  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
6
 Sayigh, Yezid and Shlaim, Avi. “Introduction” in Sayigh and Shlaim (eds.) 1997: 3; Halliday in Sayigh and Shlaim 
(eds.) 1997: 11, 15; Tal, Lawrence. “Jordan” in Sayigh and Shlaim (eds.) 1997: 102, 111. Chubin, Shahram. “Iran” 
in Sayigh and Shlaim (eds.) 1997: 216, 231; Yaqub 2004: 19  
7
 Halliday in Sayigh and Shlaim (eds.) 1997: 14, 19.  
8
 Quandt, William B. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967: 11-13. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. 
9
 For more on US opposition to Arab nationalism, see Yaqub 2004. That study focuses on the latter half of the 
1950s, but also includes information that is relevant for a longer perspective; See also Halliday in Sayigh and 
Shlaim (eds.) 1997: 10, which notes the alliances between Arab Nationalists and the USSR.    
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administrations in the post-war era have been concerned with maintaining US access to oil 
supplies, and with keeping prices relatively stable, so as to avoid turmoil in the world 
economy.
10
 This defining feature of US policy also helps to explain why its leaders have been 
so focused on preserving good relations and alliances with oil-rich states in the region.  
The third main factor in the Middle East policy of the United States has been to support the 
state of Israel, by standing up for Israel’s “right to exist,” sending it extensive economic and 
military support, and defending the state on the international scene. That does not mean that 
Washington has backed all aspects of Israeli policy, of course, but this general tendency has 
long been clear. Along these lines, too, American leaders have encouraged neighboring Arab 
countries to accept the legitimacy of the Jewish state. It has been a long-term interest of the 
United States to decrease the tensions in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and bring the parties to the 
table for negotiations, all the while ensuring that Israel’s interests and safety are protected.11   
These three key factors often overlapped, of course, but they also harbored very real 
contradictions, so that, at times, advancing American goals in one of these areas could cause 
setbacks in another. Such complications necessitated difficult compromises and balancing acts 
for US policymakers. It should also be noted that though the goals were quite constant, the 
means with which to pursue them varied.
12
 This was both due to differences between, and 
within, various administrations, and because of changing circumstances on the international 
scene.  
In light of these key features of US Middle East policy in general, the development of 
American policy towards Iran becomes easier to understand. The Shah tended to share similar 
interests with the United States in these areas, and even when he did not, his influence and 
status as a key ally allowed him a certain leeway with Washington. The bottom line was that 
Iran possessed massive amounts of oil, becoming a vital oil supplier to the US and many of its 
allies; it had strong connections to Israel; and its anti-communism and growing regional 
strength made it very helpful to the United States in its struggle with the Soviet Union. This 
study will expand upon each of these aspects in subsequent chapters, in the interests of 
shedding light upon their impact on US policy towards Iran.  
                                                          
10
 Quandt 2001: 12-13. 
11
 Quandt 2001: 13-14; Countless studies analyze the development of US policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
See, for instance, Christison, Kathleen. Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S Middle East Policy. 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999; Spiegel, Steven L. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making 
America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. 
12
 Quandt 2001: 14, 12.  
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Theoretical Perspectives on US Foreign Policy  
The use of phrases such as “Washington’s view” may indicate a reductive approach that is 
often necessary in historical writing, for sake of both readability and clarity of information. 
As such, similar terms have also been used frequently in this study. However, these kinds of 
expressions can also at times risk giving a misleading impression of the actual intricacy of US 
foreign policy-making. 
In this regard, a central question is how US foreign policy is made. There have been 
numerous academic studies on this subject, and equally numerous (and various) conclusions 
drawn. Most scholars agree, though, that the sitting president plays a vital role, and, if he so 
chooses, can impact virtually all aspects of foreign policy in the role of Commander-in-
Chief.
13
 Yet the president’s ability to dictate foreign policy is restrained by several factors. 
Importantly, the legislative branch of the government, the US Congress, has the ability to put 
strong restraints on his agenda.
14
 The choices made by previous administrations represent 
another constraint, particularly for reform-minded decision makers who are interested in 
changing or updating an otherwise long held policy inclination.
15
  
In light of this, it becomes clear why certain priorities in US policymaking tend to be rather 
constant, even if the means of pursuing those priorities may vary. This reality aligns nicely 
with the so-called rational actor model, also known as the strategic model, of US foreign 
policy.
16
 According to William Quandt, this model holds that “policies flow from a cool 
deliberation of national interest. [It] assumes that decisions are made by rational 
decisionmakers. Such a perspective implies that it does not much matter who occupies the 
Oval Office.”17  
                                                          
13
 See for instance, Steiner, Zara: “Decision-Making in American and British Foreign Policy: An Open and Shut 
Case” in Review of International Studies. Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1987: 6; Brown, Seyom. The Faces of Power: 
Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994; Quandt 2001 also puts a large emphasis on the foreign policy role of US presidents, in a study 
dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, while also acknowledging a multitude of other factors, similarly to other 
literature.   
14
 For a very basic introduction to foreign policy role of the legislative branch, see Johnson, Toni: “Congress and 
U.S. Foreign Policy”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. http://www.cfr.org/united-states/congress-us-foreign-
policy/p29871 Accessed May 7, 2015.  
15
 As indicated in Brown 1994: ”Preface”, xii.  
16
 For a thorough introduction, see Allison, Graham T.: Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis: 
Chapter 1. New York: Little Brown, 1971; Quandt 2001: 7 briefly discusses the model, using the latter term.  
17
 Quandt 2001: Ibid. While Quandt specifically discusses such models in light of the Arab-Israeli conflict, they 
can clearly just as easily be used for the study of other areas of US foreign policy.  
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In some ways, the emphasis of the rational actor model on continuity in foreign policy also 
aligns with the findings of this thesis, which does locate such continuity in several aspects of 
US policy towards Iran over different presidential administrations. Yet, on balance, most of 
what this study uncovers does not fit particularly well with a theory that reduces all decisions 
to the “cool deliberation of national interest.”18 It seems clear, in fact, that vital choices must 
sometimes be made quickly, under stressed circumstances, with little certainty of the ensuing 
result.  
Perhaps more relevant here is the bureaucratic politics model, as introduced by political 
scientist Graham T. Allison.
19
 In the words of Quandt, this model holds that “different 
agencies compete with one another, fixed organizational procedures are hard to change, and 
reliable information is difficult to come by. This perspective places a premium on 
bureaucratic rivalries and the “game” of policymaking. Policy outcomes are much less 
predictable from this perspective.”20 While such theories can never provide a full picture of 
the complex historical reality, this model provides an outlook that is useful to have in mind 
when analyzing US foreign policy.  
The United States government does not always speak with one voice, nor is there a clear 
single objective to many of its decisions. Instead, its choices are often the result of 
compromises among numerous interests applying pressure through different government 
agencies with sometimes contradictory endgames. The agencies can be internally various as 
well—their actions are often the result of a process through which the divergent views of 
several policymakers shape their proposed policies. Both individual and institutional factors, 
then, contribute to this complex policymaking process.
21
 
Historian Zarah Steiner has illustrated this complexity, in her research on the making of US 
foreign policy. She emphasizes the president’s dominant foreign policy role, but also focuses 
on the bureaucratic infighting that to a large degree counterbalances it. The process Steiner 
describes involves multiple policymakers and centers of influence competing to persuade the 
ultimate decision maker, the sitting president, to agree to their particular proposals.
22
 Those 
attempting to influence the president may not only include his closest advisors in the White 
House, and institutions like the Defense Department or State Department, but also the CIA, 
                                                          
18
 As shown in the above paragraph, this quote is taken from Quandt 2001: 7.  
19
 For an extensive introduction, see Allison 1971, which is an influential study on this topic. 
20
 Quandt 2001: 7.  
21
 As illustrated in Steiner 1987.  
22
 Steiner 1987: 6-9.  
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Congress, and a range of others. In this type of system, Steiner concludes, “Bureaucratic 
infighting is endemic […] and frequently produces conflicting and erratic policies”.23  
All of this must be borne in mind when analyzing the foreign policy of the Carter 
administration, where internal policy differences likewise contributed to a complex, and 
sometimes contradictory, foreign policy line. Carter’s closest advisors pulled him toward what 
some scholars, such as Seyom Brown, have boiled down to three main lines of foreign policy 
within the administration.
24
 
The first line was most prominently represented by Andrew Young, an African-American 
pastor and politician who served as US ambassador to the United Nations. While Young did 
not affect day-to-day policy to a great degree, his human rights focus and idealism had a clear 
impact on President Carter’s foreign policy ideas.25  
This idealism stood in profound contrast to the line of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National 
Security Advisor, whose foreign policy views had been strongly shaped by a Cold War focus. 
While Brzezinski had had some sympathy for privileging human rights in US foreign policy, 
he would always place the nation’s geopolitical interests ahead of its idealistic principles, and 
he considered that keeping the USSR in check and supporting anti-communist allies was 
absolutely vital. Over the course of the Carter presidency, Brzezinski often clashed with the 
president’s other principal foreign policy advisor, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who 
represented a third, rather more flexible foreign policy line. Vance preferred for decisions to 
be made on a case-by-case basis, rather than though adherence to certain set principles.
26
  
Some observers have described Vance as a “dove”, in contrast to Brzezinski’s hawkishness, 
but this is a simplification, and in fact the two did work well together on occasion. Still, there 
were clearly central differences between their worldviews. This contributed to frequent 
                                                          
23
 Steiner 1987: 9.  
24
 Brown 1994: 312-314. Brown is currently a Professor Emeritus of Politics at Brandeis University, and he has 
also held positions at Harvard; Lundestad, Geir. Øst, vest, nord, sør: Hovedlinjer i internasjonal politick: 209. 
Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2010. 
25
 Brown 1994: 312; Young will not appear further in this study, but as the Carter Administration’s tough 
balancing act between advancing humanitarian interests and strategic interests will often feature, it is still 
relevant to note him, as he had played a significant role in influencing the president’s outlook. 
26
 Brown 1994: 313; Kaufman, Scott. Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration: 3, 240. 
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008. 
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disagreements between the State Department and Brzezinski’s National Security Council, 
which would bedevil the Carter administration.
27
  
Such differences would at times be very apparent in the Iran policy of the United States, 
particularly during the final months of the 1978–79 revolution. Washington’s actions during 
this period can also serve as an indication of how a complex policy process can lead to 
equally complex policy choices. This study does not aim to examine this process in great 
detail, nor do these factors explain all of the internal divisions that would often characterize 
the Carter administration’s work in this area. However, they do provide an important 
backdrop for the conflicts that emerged within the US government.  
Sources and Literature 
This thesis relies extensively on primary sources to answer its motivating research questions. 
Many once confidential documents have been declassified during the last decade, and they 
have proven very useful for analyses of the policies of the Carter administration. These 
documents include State Department telegrams, US intelligence analyses, minutes from White 
House meetings, and more.  
Certain government sources dating from the Carter era can be accessed online, including a 
collection of documents captured by Iranian hostage takers during the occupation of the US 
Embassy in November 1979. The veracity of these sources has never been in question, though 
the name of the collection, Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den, says much about the 
Iranians’ motivation for publicizing them.28 Some of these documents have been used here, 
though sparingly. Due to the extensive amounts of relevant primary source material now 
available, some prioritizing was necessary, and a choice was made to focus on documents 
originating from elsewhere. The bulk of the online primary sources used for this thesis derives 
from the US National Archives. The Central Foreign Policy Files of the National Archives 
covers a period up to 1978, and includes mainly telegrams that were sent either to or from the 
State Department.
29
 Still, the majority of such sources from later years have not yet been 
                                                          
27
 Kaufman 2008: 3, 240; Skidmore, David. Reversing Course: Carter's Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the 
Failure of Reform: 29. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996. 
28
 Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den. Available online on the Internet Archive: 
https://archive.org/details/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen Accessed May 7, 2015 (all access dates refers 
to when they were last retrieved. All such links were double-checked a few days before this thesis went to print, 
hence the similar dates).  
29
 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) - http://www.archives.gov/ Accessed May 7, 2015. As 
its published source material in the Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF) collection only covered up to the year of 
1977 until recently, it has seldom been used in chapters that cover later years. In mid-March 2015, the CFPF 
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published, either online or elsewhere, and much other relevant material is unprinted or not 
easily accessible. While State Department historians currently plan to declassify and release a 
vast collection of documents concerning the Carter administration and Iran on its website, this 
will come too late for this study.
30
   
Therefore, it was necessary to work with primary sources in the United States itself. The 
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia, contains a large number of records 
from his administration, and I went there in the fall of 2014. Many of the primary sources 
gathered for this study were only declassified as late as 2013–14, and have not yet been 
analyzed by other researchers, to my knowledge.  
Examining unedited papers and source materials provides a view of history that is not 
obscured by the benefit of hindsight or the personal biases of the historian, but there are 
problems regarding the use of primary sources as well. As indicated, though much material 
from the Carter administration has been published, there is still a significant amount of 
documents that remains classified. It seems logical to assume that some documents have not 
been released due to their controversial nature.
31
 As such, it may well be that important 
material which could shed further light on this topic will be released in the future. 
Furthermore, even primary sources can contain biases of a sort, and the information provided 
in these documents should not be uncritically accepted. This is particularly the case as far as 
US analyses of the situation in Iran are concerned, which may at times be colored by the 
perceptions of those who wrote them. Such sources should thus preferably be supplemented 
with other material, where possible.   
Another potential problem is that the historical or political context of a given primary source 
may be unclear, and much triangulation is necessary to construct a coherent narrative. It also 
helps to have some preexisting knowledge of US-Iranian relations. To gain this knowledge, 
this study has drawn from a significant amount of literature as well, including the memoirs of 
those who personally took part in the making of American foreign policy in this period, and 
the scholarly accounts of historians and other academics.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
was updated to cover 1978 as well. While a fair share of these newly publicized documents might well have 
been of interest for this study, this update came too late to be of more than relatively limited use.   
30
 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/status-of-
the-series Accessed May 7, 2015. 
31
 This became very apparent by looking at various collections in the Carter Library from which significant 
amounts of material have been removed or censored. It is possible to request seeing such material, but it 
would often involve a wait of several years before these requests are even reviewed, according to library staff.  
10 
 
These are numerous issues to be aware of when using such literature. While memoirs can be 
very useful for understanding the motivations of historical figures, they are deeply affected by 
their authors’ personal roles in the era in question and can even be apologias, written to 
defend certain actions and/or outcomes. This is particularly true with regard to a case such as 
Iran, where US policy was regarded as an unquestioned failure in hindsight. It is perhaps only 
natural that policymakers would try to absolve themselves of the blame for all of this, and 
even argue for the culpability of others. According to the historian James A. Bill, this is very 
much the case when it comes to these memoirs.
32
  
For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s autobiography strongly defends his own stance during 
the Iranian revolution, insisting that a tougher line against the opposition might have saved the 
Shah, and that the State Department had a naïve view of the nature of the situation.
33
 The 
other side of the coin is represented by Ambassador William H. Sullivan’s memoirs. He is 
very harsh in his judgment of the Carter administration, which he accuses of not grasping the 
seriousness of the threat to the Shah and of foolishly neglecting to make more contacts with 
oppositional elements, despite his own advices.
 34
 Other memoirs tend to be equally one-sided 
when describing this period, and all must thus be weighed very carefully.  
A great amount of scholarly literature has been written about the rule of the Shah, and his 
relationship with the United States. The literature used for this thesis does not mainly concern 
the Iran policy of the Carter administration, although some books and articles have parts that 
discuss the topic. Some of the literature focuses on Iran and the Shah from a more Iranian 
point-of-view, rather than dealing with the US perspective, as is done in this study.  
Particularly useful for understanding Iranian society and the Shah were Amin Saikal’s The 
Rise and Fall of the Shah and Nikki Keddie’s Roots of the Revolution. Literature that was 
valuable for gaining an understanding of the historical context of US-Iranian relations 
included Barry Rubin’s Paved with Good Intentions and James Bill’s The Eagle and the 
Lion.
35
 These expansive studies attempt to deal with the entire history of modern American- 
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Iranian relations. They share many similarities, but differ in that Bill appears to be 
significantly more critical of Washington’s conduct in Iran. Other research on Iran and US 
foreign policy has also often been useful, not only in providing background information, but 
also by supplementing primary source material.  
Neither Bill nor Rubin, of course, had access to the recently declassified documents that 
informed the present study so profoundly, and this is also true of the other scholars that are 
cited here. The wealth of such declassified material thus provides new opportunities for more 
in-depth studies on this subject.  
Although the scholarly literature related to this subject is clearly more balanced than the 
memoirs, it too shares the problem of possible bias, which is always difficult for historians to 
overcome.
36
 While these scholars may not have been personally involved in American foreign 
policy, their research can still be affected by their own political outlooks. It is therefore 
always best to draw from a wide variety of literature, written by authors with differing views, 
and to contrast the information provided in such accounts with findings gathered from 
primary sources. By following such principles, this thesis will hopefully represent a valuable 
contribution to the existing research on the topic of US-Iranian relations.  
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Chapter 2: The History of US-Iranian Relations 
Following the end of the Second World War, American influence over Iran steadily grew as 
US policymakers came to see the nation as increasingly important to their interests. What 
were the central political developments in modern Iranian history? How did the American-
Iranian relationship develop after World War II?  Why would Washington regard Iran as an 
increasingly important ally? 
A Broad Look on Modern Iranian History  
Over the years, the area known today as Iran has been ruled by a large number of dynasties, 
both local and foreign in origin.
37
 By the end of the nineteenth century, the country was ruled 
by the Qajar dynasty, and Iran was, in many respects, a relatively weak and underdeveloped 
state. While the central government did have tax collecting powers, its bureaucracy was very 
limited. There was still no effective police force or strong army at this point, and there were 
no railways crossing the realm.
38
  
Foreign powers would exploit this weakness to their advantage. Britain and Russia both 
viewed Iran with interest, and the impact of these two rival imperial powers upon the 
government there had long been evident, particularly from the mid-nineteenth century. Each 
sought to control Iran for economic and strategic reasons, at the expense of the other, and this 
stalemate may have been what allowed Iran to remain independent. However, this was often 
independence in name only, and the Qajar monarchs were regularly forced to accept trade 
agreements that were not in the national interest.
39
 The subsequent discovery of large oil 
reserves, mainly in the British-dominated areas of Iran, exacerbated this situation further. In 
1907, the two imperial powers agreed to formally split Iran into spheres of influence, with a 
British zone in the south and a Russian zone in the north, under the shroud of Iranian 
independence.
40
  
This foreign dominance prompted strong reactions in Iran. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, a constitutional movement emerged, with the twin goals of weakening the country’s 
monarchial power and limiting foreign influence upon it. The so-called “Constitutional 
Revolution” had widespread support in Iran, among all social classes, and, significantly, from 
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the powerful Shia clergy, long an influential force in a country that had ascribed to Shia Islam 
for centuries as its state religion. The revolution forced the Qajar shah (king) to accept a form 
of constitutional government in 1906, but it would appear that Iran’s rulers had no real 
intentions of actually implementing these changes, and so they languished, as foreign powers 
continued to play an important role in the nation’s politics as well. Nevertheless, the 
constitutional movement’s rise indicated a burgeoning desire for change in twentieth-century 
Iran.
41
 
A new era in Iran arose following the 1921 coup d’état that brought  army commander Reza 
Pahlavi to power, amid the political chaos that had come to characterize a nation beset by a 
poor economy and weak governments. After dominating Iranian politics for a few years, 
Pahlavi had the Majles (parliament) anoint him Shah of Iran in 1925, establishing a new 
dynasty with near absolute powers. Iran’s new ruler suppressed all opposition, and though the 
parliament still existed, its influence became negligible at best.
42
 
At this time, Iran was still a backward country from a Western perspective, with a low literacy 
rate, few government services and little centralization, tentative industrialization, a weak 
economy, and a very influential religious hierarchy. In some ways it was virtually a semi-
feudal society—big landowners controlled most of the real estate, and peasants had a very 
subservient position. The new king wanted to modernize Iran and implemented a large 
number of reforms, expanding government services and bureaucracy, centralizing political 
power, and strengthening the military.
43
  
He also wanted to increase Iran’s independence, to help it withstand pressure from the 
imperial powers. As part of a strategy to decrease British influence in particular, he attempted 
to expand contacts with other nations, such as the United States and Germany. By the late 
1930s, in fact, the Germans were Iran’s biggest trade partners.44 In 1941, during the Second 
World War, the monarch refused a British request to transport Soviet-bound weapons through 
Iran, wishing to maintain Iran’s neutrality and preserve its good relations with Germany. The 
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union feared increased German influence in Iran, and this 
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soon led to a joint Soviet and British invasion of Iran and the forced abdication of Reza Shah. 
He was sent into exile, but the Allied powers agreed to let his son, the twenty-one-year-old 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, succeed him as the nation’s new monarch.45 For the rest of the war, 
Iran remained occupied by the United Kingdom and the USSR. 
The Post-War Era: America Looks to Iran  
American leaders started to show great interest in Iran only in the early years of the Cold War; 
up to World War II, Washington simply did not see Iran as relevant to its interests.
46
  
Additionally, The United Kingdom retained its influential position in Iran, and the United 
States had not wanted to alienate the British by interfering in “their” area.47   
Several factors contributed to the post-war US change of heart, beginning with the emerging 
Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union. Iran bordered the USSR, which, to the Americans, 
appeared to have rather aggressive plans for this particular neighbor. After the war was over, 
the Allies had agreed to withdraw their forces from Iran, a pledge which the Soviet Union 
refused to uphold. Even after British forces had left, Soviet troops remained, prompting a 
major international crisis. While this incident was clearly part of a general deterioration of 
relations between the superpowers following World War II, it still represented one of the 
earliest crises in their long-lasting ideological and strategic struggle.
48
  
One reason for Moscow’s actions was likely the desire to support the growing communist 
movement in Iran, represented by a political party called Tudeh. The Truman Administration 
grew worried about the prospects of a coup by Tudeh and a subsequent Soviet occupation of 
Tehran, and was adamant in its demands for an immediate Soviet withdrawal. Adding to the 
tension, the USSR had also influenced the establishment of autonomist governments in the 
Iranian provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, and Washington feared that these would soon 
become Soviet puppet states.
49
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Following a long diplomatic struggle, the Americans succeeded in persuading the USSR to 
withdraw its forces, after which the provincial Soviet-backed governments soon fell. 
Following these events of 1945-46, the Iranian government
 
was wary of the Soviet Union’s 
intentions, and began to encourage increased US influence in Iran. The American presence 
was seen as a bulwark against not only the Soviet Union, but also against British 
imperialism.
50
  
The emergence of the Cold War significantly increased US interest in Iran, as a Western-
allied Iran was seen as obstructing Soviet expansion in the Middle East. This regional political 
agenda dovetailed nicely with the fact that the US economy would become increasingly 
reliant on oil in the aftermath of the war, as comparatively vast oil reserves were located in 
Iran.
51
 In the post-war era, Iran eventually emerged as one of the most significant suppliers of 
oil to the United States and many of its allies in Western Europe. Washington’s economic 
interests were closely intertwined with its strategic interests, as Soviet dominance in Iran 
would likely exclude Western access to its oil fields.
52
  
Acknowledging Iran’s strategically vital location between the USSR and the oilfields of the 
Gulf, Washington wanted to keep radical or pro-Soviet forces from gaining power there, and 
soon found itself providing support for the nation’s young ruler. The Shah made his first visit 
to the United States in 1949, when he successfully pressed the American government for 
military and economic aid to Iran.
53
 In 1950, in turn, the United States started to greatly 
increase its presence in Iran, which was considered both vulnerable and unstable.
54
 This 
would lead to strengthened ties between Washington and the Shah.  
The Rise and Fall of Mossadegh 
The early 1950s represented a dramatic period in the history of Iran, as a large conflict 
erupted over the nationalization of Iranian oil resources.
55
 Up to this point, the oil was mainly 
controlled by the West, with the British-run Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in a 
dominant role, and Iran’s oil agreement with the AIOC meant far less oil revenue and less 
influence on oil policy than Iranians felt their country deserved. Resentment against the AIOC 
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and British influence was thus widespread in Iran, and various governments had 
unsuccessfully tried to persuade London to give them a better agreement. Nationalist leaders 
took the opportunity to vigorously oppose the foreign oil companies.
56
 
In 1951, the nationalists had gained much support in the majles, and the Shah found himself 
with no option but to accept its choice of Mohammad Mossadegh, an anti-British member of 
parliament and leader of a political party called The National Front, as his new prime minister. 
Mossadegh promptly forced the Shah to relinquish some of his powers and became a 
dominant figure in Iranian politics.
57
 He also confronted the oil companies, nationalizing the 
AIOC. This angered the British government, which then took several steps to undercut the 
Iranian economy, including an economic boycott.
58
  
The Shah had bad relations with the prime minister as well, and dismissed him in 1952, but 
massive popular demonstrations forced the monarch to reinstate Mossadegh soon afterward.
59
 
London also desired the removal of the Iranian prime minister, but was reluctant to intervene 
on its own and spent several months appealing to Washington for help.
60
 The United States 
held back at first. From an economic point of view, Washington disliked nationalization, as it 
could prove damaging to the economies of the West, and so inclined towards the British 
agenda. Still, the Truman Administration asked the British government to make some 
concessions so as to calm the situation in Iran, as it was feared that further turmoil might 
result in some sort of Soviet intervention. The administration also had some sympathy for the 
views of the Iranian nationalists—in particular, Secretary of State Dean Acheson was 
regarded by the CIA as entirely too sympathetic towards Mossadegh.
61
  
Such sympathies would not be shared by the next US administration. After winning the 1952 
presidential election, Republican Dwight Eisenhower would enter the White House in January 
1953. Both the new president and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, soon agreed with 
London that something had to be done about Mossadegh.
62
 Seven months later, the United 
States and Britain were instrumental in a coup against the Iranian prime minister in August 
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1953, which was very helpful to the Shah, who had been on the verge of fleeing Iran in the 
midst of his struggles with the increasingly powerful Mossadegh. The Cold War mentality of 
the Eisenhower administration strongly influenced its stand. The risk of a communist takeover 
in Iran, though greatly overestimated by Washington, played a major part in its decision. In 
addition, the US government feared the economic consequences of oil nationalization.
63
 
Internal Iranian conflicts were important to the removal of Mossadegh as well, and the coup 
could not have succeeded without the complicity of his domestic opponents.
64
 Still, Iranians 
harbored little doubt that US intelligence agents played a significant role in its orchestration, 
and the CIA officially admitted as much in 2013.
65
  
After the 1953 coup, the Shah completely dominated Iranian politics, micromanaging or 
otherwise interfering with government policy to a great extent.
66
 A strong crackdown on his 
political opponents followed, including those in Tudeh and the National Front, which were 
practically crushed.
67
 In the years to come, the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK (helped set up 
by the CIA, among others), persecuted and terrorized opponents of the regime. Dissent was 
rarely indulged, and the two new parliamentary organizations created by the Shah were 
satirically referred to as the “yes and yes, sir” parties.68  
The coup was decisive not only for the Shah himself, but also for US relations with Iran in the 
years to come. First of all, it greatly exacerbated anti-Americanism in Iran.
69
 Though the 
United States came to play a much larger role in Iran after 1953, the Shah’s opponents often 
exaggerated American influence on day-to-day Iranian affairs.
70
 The growing US presence in 
Iran, coupled with suspicions about Washington’s role in Mossadegh’s overthrow, 
encouraged many Iranians to frame the United States as simply the latest imperial interloper 
in their country, assuming the position previously held by Russia and Great Britain. This was 
a great contrast to the attitudes of only a few years previous, when America had represented a 
potential partner for the Iranians in their struggle against foreign influence.
71
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In 1954, Western oil companies formed an Iranian oil consortium, in part tasked with 
restoring production to normal levels after the past few years of upheaval. US companies 
controlled a 40 per cent share in this consortium, roughly equal to the share of the AIOC (then 
renamed British Petroleum), a clear indication of the Americans’ significant economic 
interests in Iran.
72
  
Also in the years following the coup, the United States demonstrated its commitment to the 
Shah by selling him arms in large amounts. By 1956, in fact, the largest US military aid 
mission in the world was situated in Tehran, and this significant military aid, alongside other 
assistance, helped solidify the Shah’s internal position.73 Iran’s alignment with the West had 
been further buttressed in 1955, when the country became a founding member of the Baghdad 
Pact, an anti-communist defense alliance modeled on NATO. Though the United States was 
not an official member of this alliance, its influence there was profound. Washington 
contributed considerably to the Baghdad Pact’s budget, sold significant amounts of arms to its 
member states, and took part in the organization’s military planning.74  
While no disagreements between the two governments actually challenged their strong 
relationship in the Eisenhower era, one in particular may be noted. Even as Washington 
persisted in selling weapons to Iran, the US government believed that the Shah should 
prioritize social spending at the expense of his large-scale military expenditure, since Iran’s 
vulnerable economy was feared to cause internal unrest.
 75  
US-Iranian Relations in the 1960s 
After John F. Kennedy was elected president in 1960, US policy towards Iran began to 
encompass a greater emphasis on socioeconomic and political reforms. Kennedy was worried 
about the state of affairs in Iran for strategic reasons, and the new administration attempted to 
press the Shah to implement reforms and ease the repression of political dissidents. US 
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officials felt that there was a risk of revolution, unless the Shah implemented large-scale 
changes.
76
  
Though the Iranian communist party, Tudeh, was weak at this point, there were other issues 
that worried Washington. The Shah had bad relations with several Middle Eastern states that 
the Americans regarded as potential threats to his regime. Radical and Arab nationalist forces 
saw the Shah as supporting “imperialist” interests in the region. His status as a de facto US 
ally, his role as a near-absolutist monarch, and his good relations with Israel made him an 
enemy in the eyes of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser.
77
 And, of course, the USSR 
also strongly disapproved of the alliance between the United States and Iran, so that the 
Soviets often joined Egypt in harsh criticism of the Shah. While it is very unlikely that either 
country had any plans to depose of Iran’s longtime ruler, the Shah used the alleged threats 
represented by hostile states to strengthen his relationship with the West. That had proved a 
successful strategy, with the Americans often being willing to increase economic and military 
aid. This support was then used by the Shah to strengthen his role in Iran as well, in order to 
combat domestic threats.
78
  
While the United States might have regarded the Soviet Union as a concern, the Shah’s 
domestic opposition represented the real danger. The Shah was deeply unpopular amongst 
many Iranians, particularly due to the corruption and inefficiency of his regime and the harsh 
oppression of political dissidents. Many also saw him as an American puppet, and came to 
associate Washington with his repressive policies. At times, the Shah’s close relations with 
the United States played into the hands of his opponents, who would accuse him of serving 
American rather than Iranian interests.
79
  
The early 1960s saw numerous signs of public unrest and several demonstrations against the 
Shah’s rule, and this, combined with the growing US pressure for policy changes, likely led 
the Shah to instigate a reform program in 1963 called the White Revolution. By actions such 
as introducing land redistribution reforms, making changes within education and health care, 
and increasing rights for women, the Shah hoped to legitimize his rule. A clear goal of the 
White Revolution was to broaden his base of support from the landlord aristocracy into the 
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emergent middle class. Though the White Revolution stripped the large landowners of much 
of their wealth and influence and cost the Shah a lot of support in this group, the reforms did 
not noticeably increase his level of support among the other social classes.
80
 Even as the 
reforms helped to improve the general standards of living in Iran, they were thus not as 
effective as the Shah must have hoped.
81
  
In fact, the White Revolution actually led to a massive demonstration in 1963, when the 
religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini called for an uprising against the Shah. Increased 
political rights for women and non-Muslims, along with the egalitarian land reforms, had been 
very unpopular amongst the influential Iranian clergy, who saw their power threatened as well, 
being large (and socially conservative) landowners themselves. The Shah’s close relationship 
with the West also angered Khomeini, who attacked the United States in particular in very 
strong terms.
82
 Hundreds of protesters were killed in the upheaval that followed the 
demonstration, and many were arrested, including Khomeini, who was later exiled. Still, 
Khomeini benefitted greatly from this ordeal, becoming much more prominent in Iran, 
gaining numerous supporters among those opposed to the Shah, as well as strengthening his 
position within the religious hierarchy.
83
  
While the Shah’s reforms were certainly not all popular, the White Revolution clearly holds a 
significant place in Iranian history. This “revolution” also illustrates the influence of the US in 
Iran. Though it was largely prompted by Iran’s internal problems, it was also influenced by 
the Kennedy Administration’s pressure for reforms. While the Shah did not implement all of 
the sought-after political reforms, US policymakers were fairly pleased with the new policies. 
Additionally, they saw no good alternatives to his continued rule.
84
  
After 1963, however, there was less emphasis on reform in US policy towards Iran. President 
Kennedy was assassinated in November of that year, and his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
stayed generally very supportive of the Shah’s rule in Iran. During his presidency, 
Washington was far less critical of Tehran, and the Shah played his cards well. As the United 
States became deeply entangled in the quagmire of Vietnam during the Johnson years, the 
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Shah was always sure to emphasize his support for America’s actions there when meeting 
with US officials. This gained him a lot of goodwill in Washington.
85
  
Johnson was also greatly impressed by Iran’s friendly relationship with Israel, a rarity among 
Muslim nations. The ties between Iran and Israel were extensive, both economically and 
strategically, and they were crucial elements of what has been called the alliance of the 
periphery. After the Suez Crisis in 1956, Israel had adopted a strategy that in part consisted of 
forming close relations with non-Arab Middle Eastern states, and in this sense Tehran and 
Jerusalem were natural partners, in light of their shared status as non-Arab outsiders in the 
Middle East and their mutual resistance to the spread of radical pan-Arabism and Soviet 
influence in the region.
86
 While these ties were never official, for political reasons, the close 
relationship was practically an open secret.
87
 This undoubtedly reinforced the US view of the 
Shah as a stabilizing force in the Middle East.  
In light of the Shah’s position as a bulwark against radical forces, and his staunch anti-
communism, the improvement of Soviet-Iranian relations in the mid-1960s could be seen as 
unexpected. Trade between the countries expanded significantly at this time, and several 
economic agreements were signed, followed by much industrial and economic co-operation 
between Tehran and Moscow. It appears that the USSR wanted access to the Iranian gas and 
petroleum, and in return it ceased its criticism of the Shah and support of some of his 
domestic opponents.
88
  
Even as Iran remained a steadfast ally of the United States and the West, the Shah also saw an 
improved relationship with the Soviets as a way to counter allegations that he was an 
American puppet, and thereby strengthen his position internally. A relationship with the 
Soviets gave him some leverage with the United States as well—it made Iran less reliant on 
Washington’s help, while making Washington more attentive to the wishes of Tehran. The 
Americans did not want to see Iran turning to Moscow for arms sales, for example, and were 
thus even more motivated to keep the Iranian monarch content. The virtual disappearance of 
foreign threats to his rule also strengthened the Shah’s international position during the 1960s, 
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allowing Iran to play a larger and more independent role on the world stage in the years to 
come.
89
  
Despite the Johnson Administration’s general friendliness with Iran, the Shah was not always 
pleased with the support he got from the United States. He frequently complained to the US 
government about not getting the weaponry that he wanted, and about having to pay too much 
for what he bought. While Washington disagreed, it indulged the Shah’s requests for 
increased arms sales, partly due to Iran’s status as a vital regional ally.90 
The US-Iranian relationship faced other difficulties as well during the Johnson years. Anti-
American sentiments were still widespread in Iran, particularly following passage of a law in 
1964 that gave US military personnel immunity from Iranian law and denied Iranian courts 
the right to try them for any crimes committed there. This legislation caused uproar in Iran, as 
much of the public saw it as an attack on the country’s sovereignty.91  
The Shah would do little to help lessen these anti-American sentiments in the Iranian 
population. On the contrary, he would sometimes actively encourage such views, likely as a 
way of countering the widespread belief that he was Washington’s puppet. US officials paid 
little attention to such developments in Iran. While US-Iranian relations were far from 
frictionless during the 1960s, they were still very solid as the Johnson presidency came to an 
end in 1969.
92
  
1969-76: Stronger Ties—But Also Increasing Conflicts 
The Nixon administration would increase American ties with Iran to their greatest extent so 
far. President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, saw the Shah 
as a vital geopolitical partner.
93
 Kissinger in particular was a staunch supporter, who later 
described the Shah as “that rarest of leaders, an unconditional ally, and one whose 
understanding of the world enhanced our own.”94  
Several factors contributed to these men’s faith in the Shah. Importantly, the United States 
grew gradually more reliant on Middle Eastern oil imports during their time in the White 
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House, and Iran’s growing oil wealth thus made it increasingly vital for US interests. This 
rising wealth also made it a lucrative partner in trade, and it allowed Iran to take on a more 
prominent role as a regional power as well.
95
 Washington was interested in the prospect of 
Iran assuming the position of “policeman of the Gulf”, which touched upon a long-time 
ambition of the Shah to do the same.
96
 The reasoning was that the Shah could provide stability 
for the area, ensuring the flow of petroleum, and protecting it against potential aggression 
from Soviet allies—in part, then, assuming the former role of the British, who in 1968 had 
announced their imminent departure from the Persian Gulf.
97
 Iran would also serve as a 
bulwark against radical Arab nationalist activity in the Gulf emirates states, whose future 
would be uncertain after the British exit.
98
  
The value of the Shah for the protection of US interests in the Middle East was clearly 
demonstrated in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Importantly, Iran opposed the oil 
boycott implemented by the Arab states and continued to provide Israel with oil during the 
crisis, becoming its primary supplier.
99
 On the other hand, Iran also managed to improve its 
relations with leading Arab confrontation states at the same time. After Nasser’s death in 1970, 
Iran’s relations with Egypt improved considerably, and his successor, Anwar Sadat, came to 
be regarded as a friend of the Shah. As part of an effort to gain the goodwill of Arab nations, 
the Shah started criticizing Israel more vociferously. The emergence of Iran as a regional 
power thus coincided with the improvement of its relations with leading Arab states.
100
 As 
Iran had friendly relations with both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it could at times 
function as a moderating force.
101
  
The Shah’s more critical tone towards Israel was largely a matter of rhetoric, and did not 
signify a radical change in their bilateral relations. It simply allowed him to improve ties with 
Egypt, and express support for the relatively moderate Sadat regime, as the Shah feared more 
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radical forces coming to power there. The fear of radicalism also helps to explain why the 
Shah would strongly support US calls for a peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He 
thought the Soviet Union might exploit a Middle East in turmoil and gain influence in the 
region if a peace process failed, which in turn would also challenge Iranian interests.
102
   
The Shah came to play an increasingly important role in international affairs during the Nixon 
years, and Washington appreciated his aid to anti-communist forces in several countries. In 
addition to his role as policeman of the Gulf, the Shah had also helped the United States in 
areas far away from the Middle East, for instance by giving the Americans support in 
Vietnam.
103
 Somewhat paradoxically, he also managed to maintain relatively decent relations 
with the Soviet Union.
104
 This illustrates the successful buttressing of Iran’s international 
position over the preceding decade.  
In order to establish his country as a regional power, and for security purposes, the Shah 
wanted to buy more arms from the United States than ever, even though his military budget 
was already very high. Kissinger was happy to oblige, having informed the Shah in 1972 that 
he could buy unlimited conventional weapons from the United States, and that Washington 
would make no objections to his arms requests.
105
 In the years that followed, Iran bought 
enormous amounts of arms, which a significant number of Iranians regarded as a waste of oil 
income.
106
  
Many US officials worried about the sales to Iran as well. The State Department, the Defense 
Department, and the CIA were all concerned about the possible consequences to the Iranian 
economy, as the arms sales seemingly caused the Shah to overspend. They felt that this could 
cause economic difficulties in Iran, leading to social unrest, and encourage his domestic 
opposition. Regardless, though, Nixon would not limit arms sales to Tehran.
107
 
This was not the only Iran-related issue that proved controversial in Washington during 
Nixon’s presidency. There were also many arguments concerning the price of oil and Iran’s 
role in global oil politics.
108
 To pay for his massive spending, and military expenditure in 
particular, the Shah wanted more oil revenue, and he had extensive influence in OPEC. His 
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push for price increases alarmed many US Government officials after the oil crisis of 1973, as 
price hikes were greatly damaging to the economies of the West.
109
  
Though the Shah’s oil policies met increasing criticism in Washington, Nixon and Kissinger 
persisted in thinking that Iran’s strategic importance outweighed the monarch’s potentially 
problematic agenda regarding oil prices, and declined to pressure him too much on this 
issue.
110
 It is not hard to ascertain why they preferred to avoid a confrontation with the Shah, 
as several sectors of the US economy were quite dependent on Iran. Along with the oil 
industry, both the banking industry and the armaments industry had close ties there.
111
 The 
vital US espionage facilities in Iran monitoring the Soviet Union represented another strong 
reason for maintaining good relations with the Shah.
112
  
After Gerald Ford became President in 1974, the arguments over oil prices grew more heated. 
Henry Kissinger, who for a while served as both National Security Advisor and Secretary of 
State, continued to argue that Iran’s strategic importance necessitated that the US not pressure 
the Shah too strongly. However, this view met much resistance within the Ford administration, 
and others, including Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon, felt that Washington 
should use its leverage to pressure the Shah to change course.
113
  
US policy towards Iran was thus very much a balancing act, but the Ford administration, 
eventually increased pressure on the Shah to change his policy on oil prices, even while 
attempting to maintain the close US-Iranian relationship.
114
 OPEC price increases 
significantly contributed to a recession in the West and particularly harmed the economies of 
certain US allies in Western Europe.
 115
 This could only have increased the tensions between 
Washington and Tehran over oil price levels. Contrary to popular belief in Iran, the Shah was 
not that much of an American puppet at all, and he had repeatedly challenged US interests 
through his policies on this issue.
116
  
                                                          
109
 Rubin 1981: 140-41; Pollack 2005: 107, 120; Cooper 2012: 159-161, 175-179.  
110
 Rubin 1981: 140; Cottam 1979: 9; Nixon, however, seems to have had “second thoughts about his old friend 
the Shah” by the end of his presidency in 1974, perhaps thinking that Iran should be pushed harder on oil 
prices. Cooper 2012: 181. 
111
 Keddie 1981: 177. 
112
 Cooper 2012: 192-93. 
113
 This subject is extensively discussed in Cooper 2012: See for instance, 199-209, 232, 307, 339, 353-356; 
Simon had long held this view, having (unsuccessfully) advised that Nixon should pressure the Shah over this 
issue, perhaps even by threatening to limit arms sales to Iran. See Rubin 1981: 240 and Cooper 2012: 175, 191.   
114
 Cooper 2012: 334, 339, 353-356.  
115
 Pollack 2005: 120; Cooper 2012: 307-310.  
116
 Pollack 2005: 106-107; Gasiorowski 1991: 209. 
27 
 
Iran’s economy faced its own problems because of the Shah’s massive spending, which 
contributed to a rapid rise in inflation and certain other difficulties.
 117
 The Shah had long 
been determined to “modernize” Iran, having in 1965 set the goal of Iran becoming a leading 
economy, with ambitions of having the highest standards of living in the world within 20 
years.
118
 A sweeping process of industrialization and urbanization had been set in motion, 
coupled with massive construction projects. Iran had been able to finance the industrialization 
process, and the Shah’s general large-scale spending, through its vast increases in oil revenue 
during the post-war era.
119 
However, these increases eventually came to a halt, as the Western 
recession in the 1970s soon led to less oil being imported from Iran. This forced the Shah to 
cancel many of his large projects, based as they were on the assumption that oil revenues 
would continue to rise exponentially. These cancellations, in turn, increased unemployment in 
Iran, and resentment towards the Shah promptly followed.
120
 In the midst of this trouble, the 
Iranian monarch looked to more oil income to restore prosperity, and the conflict with 
Washington over price levels would begin to fester.
121
   
A New Man in the White House  
Nevertheless, American-Iranian relations generally remained strong at the end of the Ford 
presidency. While Iran’s long-time ruler certainly had his differences with the president, he 
still hoped for his re-election.
122
 The Shah did not have a positive view of Ford’s opponent, 
Democrat Jimmy Carter, a peanut farmer and former governor of Georgia who had made 
human rights a central theme in his foreign policy speeches. Most likely to alarm the Shah 
was Carter’s statement that the United States should reconsider the amount of arms sales to 
regimes that disrespected human rights. The Shah was therefore displeased with Carter’s 
victory in the presidential election of November 1976. He feared that the new president-elect 
would pressure him to implement reforms, and thought that the US-Iranian relationship could 
encounter difficulties in the years to come.
123
 Little did he or Carter know how dramatic the 
next few years would actually be.  
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Chapter 3: A New Policy—Same as the Old Policy?  
The year 1977 was an eventful one in the history of US-Iranian relations. A new president 
took office at a time when the alliance was facing some challenges, and in its initial year, the 
Carter administration’s policy towards Iran would amount to a tough balancing act. How did 
the president’s human rights agenda affect relations with Iran? To what extent did the new 
administration share the priorities of earlier administrations regarding Iran policy? In what 
ways did the administration attempt to strengthen the US-Iranian alliance during its first year, 
and did it succeed?  
President Carter’s Foreign Policy Agenda  
When Jimmy Carter entered the White House on January 20, 1977, it was seen as signaling a 
new era in US politics.
124
 The former governor of Georgia was an outsider with little 
experience on the national scene and few close allies in Washington. In addition, his personal 
character and political instincts were also regarded as something new. For one thing, he was a 
devout Christian, and his faith shaped his worldview to a large degree. He emphasized 
morality in politics, and on the campaign trail he made his mark by promising the American 
people that he would “never tell a lie” and “never betray [their] trust.”125 Even though such 
statements undoubtedly served tactical ends as well, there is no doubt that Carter’s moral 
beliefs were deeply rooted. He wanted to be seen as someone to whom the average American 
could believe in and relate to.
126
 
The moral dimension of Carter’s politics was not only apparent on the domestic scene, but 
also in US international relations. Several of his speeches during the election campaign 
emphasized that a new direction was needed for American foreign policy, and Carter vowed 
to make human rights a central tenet in his dealings with other nations. In his view, this aspect 
had been neglected for too long. Human rights were clearly linked to arms control, as well, 
and Carter vowed to curb arms sales and limit the spread of advanced weapons.
127
 He also 
indicated that the United States should limit such sales to regimes with poor records on human 
rights, and that tougher pressure was needed to turn those around, even when they were allied 
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nations.
128
 Carter dismissed the realpolitik of Henry Kissinger, which put more weight on 
power politics than morality in foreign policy, and led, in Carter’s view, to American support 
for repressive governments in the interests of containing Soviet ambitions. Carter wanted to 
put less emphasis on the Cold War struggle, a central tenet in US foreign policy for three 
decades.
129
 In his speeches after the election, he continued to stress the importance of human 
rights and arms reduction.
130
  
As the new president settled into office, however, it became clear that changing US foreign 
policy was harder in practice than in speeches. Carter’s goal of bringing a moral dimension to 
foreign politics met with many obstacles. Some were structural, such as the difficulty of 
altering long-held habits or traditions. Others originated from conflicts within the Carter 
administration, which was split when it came to foreign policy, and even within the president 
himself. The idealism of the president’s speeches did not always dovetail with his actual 
foreign policy, and sometimes he reverted to the traditional Cold War-based line of his 
predecessors.  This was particularly the case when a focus on human rights potentially 
conflicted with US strategic interests.
131
 
Forces outside the administration also complicated the implementation of American foreign 
policy during these years. One such force was the US Congress. While foreign policy 
disagreements between the executive and legislative branches of government are not unusual, 
they became even more prominent as a result of Carter’s outsider status. This made it difficult 
to work with Congress at times, because the president found few close allies there.
132
  
A Difficult Start 
As the new presidency was about to begin, America’s relationship with Iran had seen better 
days. Several things worried the Shah, starting with Carter’s focus on human rights in his 
foreign policy speeches. This was a touchy subject, as Iran had to deal with a lot of 
international criticism over this issue. Organizations like Amnesty International often 
                                                          
128
 Ganji 2006: 8; Pollack 2005: 121.  
129
 Kaufman 2008: 5, 12-13, 15; Skidmore 1996: 39.   
130
 See, for instance, President Carter’s speech at the University of Notre Dame, May 22, 1977. “UNIVERSITY OF 
NOTRE DAME - Address at Commencement Exercises at the University”. The American Presidency Project: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7552 Accessed May 7, 2015.  
131
 Brown 1994: 312-313; Kaufman 2008: 5, 16.  The last point will be further documented throughout this 
study; See also Chapter 1, for a further introduction to the administration’s split foreign policy line.  
132
 Kaufman 2008: 236-237.  
31 
 
criticized Iran for its record on human rights, and particularly for its harsh treatment of 
dissidents and political prisoners.
133
  
Iran was regularly criticized in the American press for this poor record, and members of the 
US Congress had voiced similar views as well. The Iranian government bridled at what it 
clearly considered to be foreign meddling in its internal affairs, and in early January 1977 it 
had implored the Ford administration to censor or rebut hostile coverage of Iran. Of course, 
there was little it could have done, even if it had wanted to.
134
  
There was widespread agreement among leading policymakers in the new administration, 
including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
and the president himself, that the Shah was an important strategic ally, with a broad 
geopolitical influence.
135
 Still, US Embassy officials in Tehran feared that the Shah was 
unhappy with the prospects for US-Iranian relations. They accordingly urged that the new 
president should reach out to the Shah, and reassure him that the United States still valued 
their friendship. Carter heeded this advice and sent the Shah a warm letter that stated the new 
administration’s recognition of the Shah’s important role on the global scene. His 
administration wanted to learn from the Shah’s long experience in world politics, the 
president claimed, and valued the solid relationship between their nations.
136
  
Though the Iranian government’s concerns about Carter’s intentions were somewhat allayed, 
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Khalatabari, made it clear that he recommended a meeting 
between the president and the Shah, to sort out any uncertainty in US-Iranian relations.
137
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Oil Price Disputes Continue 
In addition to the new president’s stated human rights focus, there were other issues that 
caused difficulties in US-Iranian relations as well. A major ongoing dispute concerned oil 
prices.
138
 Therefore, the Carter administration had to continue its predecessor’s work in trying 
to convince Iran to support an oil price agenda that was beneficial for the economies of the 
West. Inside OPEC, the Iranian government remained a leading proponent of raising oil prices, 
believing that this was necessary to give the producing nations fair compensation. 
Additionally, price raises were needed to fund the Shah’s military spending and his ambition 
to make Iran a leading industrial nation.
139
   
The United States remained convinced, particularly in light of the oil crisis of 1973, that 
further price increases would cause more problems for the economies of the West. Massive 
price raises had caused great difficulties for allied nations in Western Europe, and 
Washington worried that further increases could cause more instability in these countries. 
Washington felt that the West needed stable oil prices, and thus pushed for a price freeze in 
1977.
140
  
Its closest ally in OPEC on this issue was Saudi Arabia, which shared US concerns about the 
effect on the economies of Europe. The Saudis had earlier threatened to increase their oil 
production in order to bring down prices, straining their relations with Iran. The Shah claimed 
that he would view overproduction by Saudi-Arabia or anyone else as a hostile act. He further 
warned that if Iran suffered large losses in oil revenue, the stability and security of the Persian 
Gulf itself might be at stake, as Iran would have to cut back on military spending and limit its 
regional role.
141
 Other factors likely contributed to the Shah’s reluctance to accept a price 
freeze. Iran had already suffered a fall in projected oil revenue for 1977, leading to several 
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budget cuts.
 142
 An oil price increase might reasonably be expected to raise revenue and ease 
these sacrifices.  
While American officials did not endorse Iran’s agenda on oil prices, they must have seen 
several reasons not to pressure the Shah too strongly. As ever, Iran was thought to be very 
important to US security interests in the Middle East, by virtue of its geographical position 
and military strength. Washington relied on Iran, along with Saudi-Arabia, to secure the 
supply of oil to the West, and especially to protect the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately two-
thirds of the world’s oil supplies passed through, and it was regarded as the most 
economically vital strait worldwide.
143
  
Clearly, the United States did not want the Shah to make good on his threat to reduce Iran’s 
regional role should oil prices fall. And were Washington to force his retreat on this issue, it 
might also have been feared to weaken his position in Iran, thus endangering his rule. In 
addition to the other factors that made the Shah a vital ally for Washington, the intelligence 
co-operation between Iran and the US was also extensive, providing valued information, with 
important American intelligence facilities being located in Iran. All of this would be 
threatened if other forces were to take power there. The Shah’s principal domestic threats in 
recent decades had come from conservative Muslims and the communist-supported left, 
according to the US Embassy in Tehran. As these forces were equally hostile towards the 
West, it was imperative that the Shah stayed in power.
144
 
Last but not least was Iran’s aforementioned close relationship with Israel. The Iranians 
provided Israel with most of its imported oil, there was close technological and intelligence 
cooperation between the two countries, and both Jerusalem and Washington strongly valued 
this alignment.
145
 While Iran had begun to step up its public criticism of Israel, and voice 
more support for the Arab/Palestinian side of the Middle East conflict in recent years, there 
was a clear understanding in Israel that the Shah’s public rhetoric was “just words.”146 As 
long as Iran continued to be a reliable supplier of oil to Israel and the West, refusing to go 
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along with OPEC embargos, and looked after US interests in the region, there were clearly 
ample reasons why Washington did not want to push the Shah too hard on prices.
147
 
American Human Rights policy and Iranian Liberalization Reforms 
In addition to these other balancing acts, there now arose the human rights issue. While the 
president had frequently emphasized its importance, it would be risky for his administration to 
echo the existing criticism of human rights organizations regarding Iran. As a result, it is not 
clear how much pressure Carter actually exerted on Iran here, and analysts disagree in their 
assessment of his human rights policy and its effects. One view is that Carter showed little 
concern for human rights in Iran, preferring to focus such criticism on states that were less 
strategically important.
148
 Another view is that the administration put a lot of pressure on Iran, 
and that the Shah came to believe that he needed to make reforms to preserve a strong US-
Iranian relationship.
149
 Neither outlook provides the full picture, however. It is true that the 
Shah introduced certain reforms in the early days of the Carter administration, but it is 
difficult to verify to what extent this was motivated by its focus on human rights. The long-
time criticism from organizations like Amnesty International may also have affected the 
Shah’s reform process, which was already ongoing at the start of the Carter presidency.150  
Still, US officials clearly had many talks with their Iranian counterparts over the issue of 
human rights abuses. “Fostering greater Iranian support for the Carter administration’s 
emphasis on improved human rights,” as stated by the US Embassy in Tehran, was clearly a 
vital goal.
151
 American diplomats were to tell the Iranian government that its human rights 
problems caused concern in the United States, “both in terms of Iran’s image as a de facto ally 
of the US and for Iran’s own future stability in which the US is interested.”152  
This illustrates that there were evidently larger concerns at play here as well. Significantly, it 
could hurt the Carter administration’s general credibility on the issue if there were human 
rights abuses in an allied nation. It was also thought that some reforms in this regard might in 
fact strengthen Iran’s stability and security in the long run. Still, the embassy made clear that 
the US government should not excessively denounce the Shah on this issue, nor show too 
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much support for his critics’ views. The American diplomats in Tehran remained generally 
cautious, and even partly defended Iran’s human rights record, pointing out that Westerners 
should not expect an Iranian regime to espouse Western democratic and liberal values that 
were alien to that country’s traditions.153  
The embassy also argued that conflicts over this issue could hurt US strategic interests in Iran, 
as worsened US-Iranian relations might make co-operation in other areas more difficult—a 
view that in all likelihood was taken into account by Washington. Still, US policymakers 
often broached the subject with the Iranian government, and were pleased by the response. 
They believed their message was getting through to the Shah and that he was concerned about 
the bad press his government was receiving.
154
 Yet a consistent human rights policy proved 
elusive, given the circumstances. In late 1977, NSC staff member Samuel Huntington could 
still describe Iran as one of the countries with which the United States had not prioritized the 
human rights issue, because of other concerns.
155
         
The pressure Washington put on the Shah was therefore of limited force. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the Shah did make some reforms in early 1977, accelerating these after Carter’s 
election. Freedom of speech was increased and human rights organizations were allowed to 
visit Iranian prisons.
156
 This progress was likely due as much to the Shah’s trepidation about 
the Carter administration as to the administration’s actual leverage with the Iranian 
government. While the US government did not appear to regard human rights as its highest 
priority in Iran, the president’s stated emphasis on the importance of this subject still affected 
the Shah, who feared hurting their alliance if he did not implement reforms.
157
   
Carter’s human rights focus also inspired Iranian oppositional elements to criticize the Shah 
more openly, under the assumption that Washington would not tolerate any more crackdowns 
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in Iran. While this belief was not entirely correct, it still contributed to increased public 
criticism of the Shah and opposition to his rule.
158
  
Negotiations over the Sale of Advanced Military Aircrafts  
In May 1977, Secretary of State Vance made a visit to Iran to discuss a number of important 
issues with the Shah, including certain sensitive subjects. While the issue of human rights was 
not the primary focus of Vance’s trip, he did not hesitate to emphasize Washington’s position 
or bring up the status of human rights in Iran. According to Vance, the Shah was rather 
defensive during this conversation.
159
   
Another difficult issue was the proposed sale of Boeing 707 military planes, known to as 
AWACS, to Iran.
160
 These aircrafts were equipped with advanced radar and communications 
technology. Talks about providing Iran with an improved air defense system had begun 
during the previous administration, and Carter was intent on getting Congress to approve the 
sale.
161
 Cold War factors were likely a central reason why his administration sought to bolster 
Iran’s defensive capabilities. As stated by the embassy in Tehran, one of the primary goals of 
the US government in its Iran policy continued to be “Maintaining a stable, independent non-
communist and cooperative Iran which has the strength and will to resist potential Soviet 
aggressiveness, whether direct or indirect, and to continue its role for stability in the Persian 
Gulf, Middle East, and South Asia.”162 Such considerations must naturally have influenced 
the administration in its decision to support the sale of AWACS planes to Iran.  
In April 1977, the president promised to sell five AWACS planes to Iran. It was a smaller 
number than what had originally been discussed during the Ford administration, and the Shah 
responded by requesting nine planes.
163
 A few days before Vance’s visit, he had sent a letter 
to Carter to defend his response. More planes were necessary, the Shah argued, for Iran’s own 
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security needs and because of its regional role. He noted that America also benefited from a 
strong Iran, which helped to guarantee the stability of the region and of the Indian Ocean.
164
  
Interestingly, there was some disagreement within the Carter administration about the 
specifics of the AWACS sale at the time of Vance’s visit. While the State Department 
supported the president’s decision, the Department of Defense argued that the United States 
should sell nine AWACS, as the Shah had requested.
165
 These differences can be seen in light 
of the administration’s general split foreign policy line, in which balancing US strategic 
interests and humanitarian ideals was often a central dilemma. The State Department seems to 
have been influenced by such ideals to a great extent, affecting its line on many issues, and 
was at times more skeptical about large-scale arms sales than the Defense Department.
166
  
Vance assured the Shah that the administration was intent on selling him these aircrafts, but 
cautioned, as well, that it would eventually reduce arms sales to Iran, which would need to 
meet its security requirements in other ways. A picture emerges of the conflicted and 
sometimes contradictory foreign policy of the Carter administration. On the one hand the 
president had committed to cutting back on arms sales, and he wanted to uphold this pledge. 
However, Carter also saw the need to strengthen US allies, which must have been particularly 
important in light of the Shah’s position as the policeman of the Gulf. In this way, the 
administration’s priorities were similar to that of its predecessors, despite the president’s 
earlier calls for a less Cold War-based foreign policy.
167
  
In general, then, the Shah’s emphasis on his country’s strategic role and security needs likely 
influenced Carter to increase the number of AWACS to be sold to Iran. In a letter responding 
to the Shah, sent shortly after Vance’s visit, the president said that he would now recommend 
the sale of seven AWACS aircrafts. While this was less than what the Shah had requested, it 
was more than what was proposed earlier. Though such numbers may not appear to be very 
significant at first, they illustrate how Carter wanted to have it both ways, simultaneously 
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wanting to show restraint in arms sales and to strengthen Iran militarily. In his own words: “I 
believe [that selling seven AWACS aircrafts] fairly reflects both Iran’s military requirements 
and our basic objective of exercising restraint in the field of arms transfers.”168 The president 
also used the letter to welcome the Shah for a planned visit to Washington in November.
169
  
Congress Creates Difficulties    
While the visit to Tehran included constructive discussions, it did not resolve any of the 
differences between the United States and Iran. While the Carter administration basically 
endorsed the Shah’s position on the AWACS sale, only discussing the details, it would not be 
easy to clear the arrangement with the US Congress. Other problematic issues also persisted, 
including Iran’s human rights record. Even if the Shah had introduced certain reforms, he 
remained skeptical of the Western ideal of human rights in general, and, in a June meeting 
with the American ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, he fiercely defended his country. 
The Shah emphasized Iran’s long history and traditions, and insisted that the United States 
must respect the cultural differences. Sullivan pointed to the use of torture in Iran’s prisons, 
but the Shah claimed that Iran had stopped this practice six months earlier. However, this was 
not believed by the ambassador. The monarch also promised further human rights reforms. 
170
 
Sullivan also brought up oil prices, which remained a very contentious subject, despite earlier 
Iranian signals of an inclination to compromise. The Shah had long been considered to be 
vital in preventing OPEC from implementing a price increase. Iran was still pressing for a 
price raise, hoping to get one in July that year, and the United States clearly wanted the Shah 
to desist.
171 Iran’s difficulties with Saudi-Arabia on prices persisted, and the ambassador 
argued that the Shah’s reputation as a “price hawk” was hurting his image in the West.172  
This poor image, which the human rights issue only made worse, may have made it more 
difficult to get the AWACS sale approved. Unfriendly views in Congress towards Iran caused 
problems for the president when trying to persuade its members to approve the deal. A more 
significant problem though was the general Congressional attitude towards arms sales, which 
had grown quite negative. As Iran was clearly the largest buyer of US arms, the AWACS sale 
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was a tempting target. Sullivan told the Shah that there were other problems related to the sale 
as well, including Carter’s hopes for bilateral disarmament. The president believed that if the 
United States were to take the lead in reducing arms sales, it might encourage the USSR to 
start a disarmament process as well. In response, the Shah observed that if the US declined to 
sell him the arms he wanted, he could easily get them elsewhere.
173
  
As such, the Iranian leader pointed out an inherent dilemma in Carter’s commitment to reduce 
the amount of weapons around the world: unless other countries set upon the same, there was 
little benefit in doing so. While it cannot be conclusively proven that this factor influenced the 
administration’s decisions regarding arms sales to Iran, it is clear that US officials were well 
aware of this dilemma.
174
  
The Shah also attempted to influence American policy in other ways. In the meeting with 
Sullivan he expressed a very gloomy view regarding the situation in the Middle East. He 
expressed doubts towards about the possibility of a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, 
and warned that the Soviets would use the troubled situation in the region to their advantage.  
The implications of these arguments, whether the Shah really believed them or not, were clear: 
regimes friendly to the US could be at risk, and Iran’s military capability should therefore be 
more of a priority for Washington.
175
 Of course, this was not the first time the Shah had 
played the “Cold War card,” as the Americans had in the past shown themselves to be more 
likely to provide support to Iran if they believed the Shah’s rule to be under threat.176 
All of these aspects were undoubtedly in Carter’s mind during the AWACS debate, which had 
grown heated by July. The president was particularly criticized in light of his general 
emphasis on arms restraint. Congressional critics asserted that the proposed sale of seven 
AWACS planes damaged the credibility of the administration, even more so as the 
expenditure of Iran-bound weaponry already accounted for over half of US arms sales in 
1977.
177
 Some opponents of the sale had also expressed their worries that the Iranians were 
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not to be trusted with the AWACS technology, and several members of Congress apparently 
did not consider Iran to be a reliable ally.
178
  
Senator Thomas Eagleton, for instance, expressed his conviction that "logic dictates our 
taking a skeptical look at the proposal to transfer this technology to a semi-literate country 
which does not have the resources to absorb it."
179
 Others argued that the AWACS sale 
overshot Iran’s actual defense needs, and clearly felt that they were “already hostages to 
Iran’s insatiable appetite for sophisticated weaponry,” in the words of Senator John Culver.180 
Opponents also worried that this highly advanced and classified technology could be shared 
with the Soviets, through espionage or outright theft.
181
 CIA director Stansfield Turner shared 
these congressional concerns regarding the physical security of AWACS in Iran.
182
  
During this debate, President Carter sent another letter to assure the Shah that he strongly 
supported the security relationship that had developed between their countries, and 
emphasized that he had personally approved the sales of large quantities of military 
equipment to Iran. Given the ongoing AWACS debate in Congress, however, he cautioned the 
Shah to wait on pressing for any more weaponry, as this might jeopardize both this proposal 
and other arms sales. The president also stated that he remained committed to reducing arms 
sales in general, which would necessarily have consequences for Iran over the next few 
years.
183
 However, he indicated that any reductions of this kind should be made in 
understanding with Tehran, and that they could be implemented “in a manner fully consistent 
with Iranian security needs.”184  
At the same time, the US Congress held hearings regarding the AWACS sale, which had 
received a fair bit of media attention—some stories concluded that the sale represented an 
exception to Carter’s arms restraint policy. In response, US officials argued that the policy 
guidelines had always stated that in special cases, when friendly governments needed 
weapons to maintain the regional balance, this restraint would not be binding.
185
 During the 
hearings, then, Iran’s special situation was emphasized by Senator Barry Goldwater, who 
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strongly supported the sale because of the Shah’s role as a bulwark against Soviet influence in 
the Middle East and Iran’s strategically important location in relation to the USSR. Alfred 
Atherton of the State Department argued along these lines as well, emphasizing Iran’s 
importance for regional stability, and specifically its need for an improved air defense system. 
Secretary of State Vance added his support to similar arguments, in the hopes of getting 
Congress to accept the sale.
186
   
While there was some opposition towards the sale amongst less senior State Department 
officials, the Carter administration in general was strongly in favor, both for Iran’s national 
security and in the interests of continued strong US-Iranian relations.
187
 As illustrated by the 
president’s letters to the Shah, Washington was clearly very wary of aggravating the Iranian 
government, as not providing Iran with AWACS was likely feared to weaken this strategically 
vital relationship.   
Such concerns could only have been strengthened by the Shah’s reaction to the extended 
congressional debate. He found the criticism of Iran, and the doubt expressed towards his 
government, to be intolerable. Thus, the Shah instructed his officials to express his intentions 
to withdraw from the AWACS negotiations and go elsewhere for a similar deal. Ambassador 
Sullivan had noted the monarch’s anger, and managed to persuade him to hold off. Still, the 
Shah continued to profess concern regarding the direction of the relationship between their 
countries, arguing that much more than AWACS aircrafts were at stake.
188
 He may well have 
worried that the administration did not prioritize Iran enough to push this sale through, but 
likely also hoped to put further pressure on the US government at this sensitive time. 
A Pyrrhic Victory?  
Congressional action delayed the AWACS sale. Given the large number of senators and 
congressmen who were opposed, the president did not want to risk a humiliating defeat in the 
legislative branch. As such, there was little progress by late August. Carter clearly worried 
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about the reaction of the Shah, and he sent the Iranian monarch another letter, repeating his 
intention to get the sale through Congress, though events outside his control had caused a 
delay.
189
 Carter expressed confidence that the sale would be approved in the coming month 
and noted that he appreciated the Shah’s “patience and assistance in this difficult matter.”190  
There were many reasons for the president’s solicitousness: Iran’s strategic importance, 
moderate and constructive positions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, and continued oil 
sales to the United States and its allies must all have factored in to Carter’s calculations. 
Furthermore, the US government wanted to encourage Iran to increase security co-operation 
with the Saudis, in the interest of the protection of the Gulf.
191
 The latter point illustrates that 
the Shah’s role as “policeman” was still seen as vital by the US government. Despite Carter’s 
desire for the United States to be less focused on the Soviet Union, traditional Cold War-
related concerns clearly remained a primary emphasis in the nation’s foreign policy.  
The president emphasized some of these points in a letter to congressional leaders in early 
September, in which he strongly encouraged them to approve the AWACS sale. He argued 
that by helping Iran build its defenses, they would also be serving US security interests in the 
Middle East, and he assured them that the Iranians were fully capable of protecting and 
handling this advanced military technology.
192
 Despite Carter’s plea, however, it proved 
difficult to finalize the AWACS sale, and there was even more criticism of Iran in Congress, 
which again disturbed the Iranian monarch.
193
  
Ultimately, the AWACS proposal passed both houses of Congress in October, largely thanks 
to the efforts of the president himself. Still, the process had seemingly shaken the Shah’s faith 
in the United States as a dependable ally, and it would become a central concern for President 
Carter during the Shah’s pending visit to Washington to convince him that his administration 
was firmly in favor of a continuation of the close relationship between their two countries.
194
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As a side note, it is interesting that Carter’s only mention of the AWACS sale in his revised 
and published presidential diary implies that he cared little whether Iran bought these planes 
from the US.
195
 This provides, perhaps unintentionally, a rather misleading idea of his 
significant role in getting the sale approved.  
Increased Dissidence in Iran   
Meanwhile, the Iranian government was experiencing some domestic unrest during the 
autumn of 1977. Open dissidence towards the Shah had increased, and petitions called for 
greater freedom of speech and other civil liberties. Many dissidents had been encouraged by 
American attention towards the status of human rights in Iran.
196
 However, US policy towards 
Iran did not always serve the intended end. If Carter’s interest in human rights brought with it 
certain headaches for the Shah, this was certainly not Washington’s intention. All of the 
principals of the Carter administration recognized the Shah’s strategic value, and though the 
administration was not fond of Iran’s system of government in general, it began to receive 
reports of positive signs.
197
 The US Embassy regarded an increase in real political debate in 
Iran as indicative of the Shah’s intention to liberalize and encourage “constructive criticism" 
of his government.
198
 
The unrest was connected to economic difficulties in Iran that included inflation and housing 
shortages in the cities.
199
 Absent a systematic program of liberalization, the Shah nevertheless 
signaled some policy changes throughout the autumn of 1977. This included the release of 
several political prisoners, likely in response to international pressure regarding human rights 
issues. If he also hoped to quiet unrest in this way, it did not have the desired effect. Student 
oppositionist groups, long a source of irritation for the Shah, continued to make trouble 
throughout the year. Though this attracted the attention of American officials, nothing 
indicates that the US government was concerned about the Shah’s internal position.200 He had 
faced similar opposition and protests in the past, and continued to dominate Iranian politics. 
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Even in late 1977, the Iranian monarch seemed to be as firmly entrenched in his position as 
ever.
201
 
Towards a Temporary Solution on Oil Prices 
A key issue for the president during the Shah’s forthcoming visit would be Iran’s line on oil 
prices. By late October, it was still unclear what OPEC would do, and the Carter 
administration continued to press for a price freeze, because it considered that even a modest 
price increase could damage both the United States and the world economy. The US 
Department of State told its embassies in the OPEC countries to emphasize that any decision 
to increase prices would negatively affect their relations with the United States.
202
  
Probably due to all of this pressure, the Shah had somewhat moderated his earlier position, 
and now seemed more open to a compromise. He may also have assumed more support from 
Washington, on controversial issues such as future arms sales, if Iran backed down on oil 
prices. At a meeting with US Secretary of the Treasury, Michael Blumenthal, the Shah 
indicated that he would not oppose a price freeze if the OPEC nations decided on one.
203
  
While Iran’s new passivity on this issue did not give the United States everything it wanted, it 
still represented great progress when compared to the Shah’s earlier adamant stand. Obtaining 
a price freeze was a number-one priority in the international economic policy of the US, and 
Secretary of State Vance had noted that “For the next two months, the primary concern in our 
relationship with all OPEC countries, especially Venezuela and Iran, will be their behavior on 
oil prices.”204 As such, the Shah’s impending visit to the United States was thought to be a 
good opportunity for Carter to convince him to make further concessions on oil price 
levels.
205
  
While the oil price issue was moving in a positive direction for the Carter administration, 
other factors remained worrisome in advance of the Shah’s visit. One group that had made 
itself heard particularly at this point in time was Iranian exchange students, many of whom 
fiercely opposed the Shah’s rule and protested against his trip to Washington. A number of 
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demonstrations arose in front of American embassies and consulates in several countries, as 
well as in the United States. In these demonstrations, opposition to the Shah was oftentimes 
coupled with a fierce anti-Americanism.
206
 These demonstrations must have contributed to the 
US decision to take “extraordinary precautions” around the Shah’s visit, as Carter would later 
describe it.
207
   
The Shah arrived in Washington D.C. on November 15, 1977. During his reception with the 
president on the White House lawn, a large numbers of demonstrators, both pro-Shah and 
anti-Shah, gathered not far away from the two leaders. Things quickly turned violent, and the 
police had to use teargas to separate the demonstrators. The gas reached the lawn as well, and 
pictures clearly showed Carter wiping tears from his eyes.
208
 This was not the welcome that 
the US government had wanted for the Iranian monarch.   
In the customary toast to a visiting head of state, the president tried to laugh off the tear gas 
episode, congratulating the Shah on his unflappable demeanor during the incident. He then 
praised the Shah’s achievements, highlighting improvements in the Iranian education system 
and the raising of living standards during his rule, and spoke warmly about Iran’s strategic 
importance and close relations with the United States.
209
  
Carter’s private discussions with the Shah partly focused on his regional and international role. 
The situation in the Middle East was discussed, with the Arab-Israeli conflict being an 
important part of their conversation. President Carter saw Iran as playing a unique role in 
contributing to the stability of the region, as it had good relations with all the central countries 
in that conflict, contributing economic assistance to many of them. The wide range of issues 
discussed at the meeting indicates that Carter not only regarded the Shah as a vital regional 
ally, but also as an important leader on the world stage—one whose opinion was widely 
respected.
210
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Their exchange regarding oil prices was perhaps most productive of all, and must be one of 
the reasons why the visit was regarded as a great success by the State Department. US 
pressure had already inclined the Shah to moderate his earlier position on oil prices, and he 
now totally abandoned it altogether. The Iranian monarch stated that he would actively 
oppose a price increase at the upcoming OPEC summit in Caracas. This represented a great 
triumph for the US government, as a price freeze was naturally much more likely with the 
support of both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Washington believed that the Shah was pleased with 
the visit as well, having had his doubts of US dedication to their relationship dispelled.
211
 The 
two leaders had even appeared to come closer to an understanding on future arms sales, with 
Carter assuring the Shah that he would work with Congress to meet Iran’s security needs, and 
the Shah “reducing his wish list in aircraft considerably.” 212 However, no formal 
commitments were made at this time.
213
  
By the end of 1977, US-Iranian relations had apparently taken a turn for the better. Carter had 
pushed the AWACS sale through Congress, and calmed the Shah’s fears regarding the 
intentions of the new administration. He had shown that he would not let a human rights focus 
in foreign policy hurt the alliance with Iran. The president had also succeeded in convincing 
the Shah to reverse his position on oil prices, leading to less sources of friction between the 
two allies. Still, it remained true that Carter’s stated commitment to human rights and arms 
control continued to produce a sometimes contradictory policy towards Iran, and 
policymakers likely anticipated further difficulties over arms sales in the future. As for oil, 
while OPEC did implement a price freeze which postponed difficulties, the issue was 
expected to soon return.
214
 Nevertheless, the president’s policies clearly achieved several Iran-
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related objectives in his first year, and as a means of further demonstrating his commitment to 
the US-Iranian alliance, Carter accepted an invitation to visit Tehran on New Year’s Eve.215  
A Presidential Visit to a Troubled Nation  
Jimmy Carter’s visit to Tehran lasted only one day, so he did not see any increasing unrest in 
Iran as such. Though the situation there was still generally calm, and the Shah appeared to be 
firmly in control, relatively large anti-Shah demonstrations had been organized recently. This 
was noted in November by the US Embassy, which observed instances of openly expressed 
dissidence from students in Iran. At several demonstrations, there were slogans in support of 
exiled religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini, a man fiercely opposed to the Shah and US 
influence in Iran. The recent death of Khomeini’s son, Mostafa, strongly rumored to be the 
work of SAVAK, led to much resentment amongst the ayatollah’s supporters, though the 
Iranian press tried unsuccessfully to suppress the matter.
216
  
This contributed to strengthening religious opposition to the Shah, and several clerics began 
to attack his rule during religious services.
217
 The unrest clearly worried the Iranian regime, 
which clamped down by using used threats to prevent demonstrations and informing students 
that their privileges could be revoked if they continued to cause disruption.
218
  
State Department officials saw the Shah as backsliding from his liberalization around 
criticism and free speech, and Ambassador Sullivan had brought up this issue in a meeting 
with the Iranian prime minister, Jamshid Amouzegar. While the Americans were somewhat 
relieved by the prime minister’s assurance that dissent would be permitted, they still 
expressed concern over developments in the human rights area.
219
  
Still, there were inherent contradictions in Washington’s stance. The US Embassy in Tehran 
argued that the dissidence in Iran had been propelled by the president’s emphasis on human 
rights. Likewise, the Shah’s liberalization program had encouraged demonstrators. The 
embassy thought that the United States should use its influence more carefully, so as not to 
create further difficulties for the Shah. While the US government should work to prevent 
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police brutality and abuses in Iran, it should not appear to seek significant changes in Iran’s 
political system.
220
 Interestingly, US pressure towards the Shah on human rights-related issues 
would eventually decline.
221
 The embassy’s view of how Carter’s policy had affected the 
disturbances in Iran may help explain this turn of events.  
The US Embassy divided the disturbances that were taking place in Iran into two main 
categories: those caused by students at universities, and those caused by oppositionist 
elements. The latter group was again divided between those who were leftist-nationalist and 
those who were religiously oriented.
222
 It is clear that the embassy had trouble understanding 
the nature of the latter faction, stating that “more obscure and puzzling have been the 
circumstances surrounding demonstrations by religious persons or in the name of religion.”223 
The US government wanted to portray the president’s visit as a sign of the importance it 
placed on good relations with Iran. For a planned press release, it was stated that Carter would 
note that “it was symbolic of the special relationship between Iran and the U.S. that he was 
the Shah’s guest in Tehran less than two months after His Majesty’s state visit to Washington” 
and that he “was confident that the same closeness would continue into the coming years.”224  
This closeness was a central theme of the president’s toast to the Shah on New Years’ Eve. 
Here, Carter praised the Shah’s achievements throughout his thirty-six-year reign. He then 
called attention to the widespread changes that had occurred in Iran over the past few years, 
stating his admiration for the reforms that had taken place because of the Shah’s leadership. 
The president also emphasized the geopolitical role of the Iranian monarch, observing that 
Iran could help bring peace to areas like the Horn of Africa that were plagued by wars, and 
might also contribute to a lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
225
  
Due to the events to come, the president’s speech was vividly remembered, and not for the 
reasons he would have wanted. Carter contrasted the disorder in other Middle Eastern nations 
with the situation in Iran, and a particularly famous passage in the toast went as follows: “Iran, 
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because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more 
troubled areas of the world.”226 It would soon become clear that this assessment was rather 
wide of the mark. 
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Chapter 4: No Longer an Island of Stability  
In January 1978, riots and protests broke out in Iran, marking the beginning of what would 
later be known as the Iranian Revolution. For most of the ensuing year, Washington would 
not regard the Shah’s rule as significantly threatened. But by the end of 1978, Iran’s long-time 
monarch had lost all control of the situation, and planned to leave his country for a short 
period. How did it come to that? How did the United States view the situation in Iran as this 
crisis developed? To what extent did the Carter administration attempt to impact the policies 
of its Iranian counterpart, and why?  
The Beginning of the Crisis  
The president’s visit to Tehran on New Year’s Eve demonstrated to all that the ties between 
the United States and Iran remained strong. Washington continued to regard the Shah as a 
vital ally, and Tehran also viewed the state of the US-Iranian relationship positively. The 
Shah felt that his country was to a great extent viewed as an equal partner by the United States, 
particularly given the vast oil resources Iran oversaw.
227
 Both governments recognized the 
mutual benefits of their alliance, and the Shah would even proclaim that the two countries had 
“always been in agreement and rarely in disagreement.”228 The US government had every 
reason to be pleased, as this was quite a contrast to the views expressed by Iran in the early 
days of the Carter administration. 
Though Iran had experienced some unrest in late 1977, the situation was still relatively calm, 
and the gravity of the political tensions there was not yet apparent at the time of the 
president’s visit.229 Despite the increasingly vocal opposition to the Shah, Washington was 
confident that the monarch commanded the support of the majority of the population, as the 
Central Intelligence Agency concluded in January 1978. The CIA did note that religious 
conservatives uniformly opposed the Shah, due to his modernization programs in Iran, and 
that some students and urban intellectuals were also unhappy with his rule. However, US 
intelligence considered these groups, along with the small Marxist contingent, to be in clear 
minority.
230
  
In early 1978, though, opposition to the Shah would grow rapidly. One January event in 
particular contributed to creating a situation of turmoil in Iran. The exiled clerical leader 
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Ayatollah Khomeini had long been feeding Iranians with anti-Shah propaganda from abroad: 
after his exile in 1964, many dissidents had embraced him as a leader in their struggle against 
the Shah.
231
 In an effort to counter Khomeini’s popularity, the Iranian regime attacked him via 
the government-controlled press, and an article published on January 7 in the newspaper 
Ettela’at made some particularly harsh allegations. The article, personally approved by the 
Iranian Minister of Information, Daryoush Homayoun, accused Khomeini of being a British 
agent and a pawn of both imperialist and communist forces, as well as a homosexual and an 
alcoholic. This widely-read article backfired massively, however.
232
 
In response to the article, Khomeini’s followers organized a demonstration that quickly turned 
violent. Some four thousand, many of whom were religious leaders or students, joined the 
demonstration, which was held in Qom, a holy city for Shia Islam. Several people were killed, 
in related clashes between protesters and security forces. As with all deadly incidents during 
the Iranian Revolution, the estimates of fatalities varied greatly, so all numbers must be 
interpreted with some caution. The Iranian opposition estimated up to three hundred deaths in 
Qom, and this total spread quickly among the Iranians, even if the truth was likely closer to 
two dozen, perhaps less.
233
  
Either way, of course, the impact of the Qom demonstration is clear. From there, things only 
escalated, as more and more of the Shah’s opponents joined protests against his rule. Many 
riots followed, and Khomeini encouraged them. Despite his exile, he had little difficulty in 
getting messages through to his followers, who had been strongly motivated by the 
inflammatory article.
234
  
The Carter administration followed the situation in Iran with growing concern. National 
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski informed the president that these events were the most 
serious that had transpired in Iran for over a decade. State Department analysts concluded that, 
though they did not regard the Shah’s regime to be under immediate threat, he was facing 
pervasive problems that would be difficult to solve: the Islamic opposition was now in its 
most powerful position since 1963, when Khomeini and other anti-Shah clergy had instigated 
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massive demonstrations against the Shah. The State Department did wonder whether the Shah 
was in danger of losing control of the clergy in Iran altogether, which could produce a real 
confrontation between religious fundamentalists and the Shah’s secular modernizing forces. If 
the government did not take harsh measures to quell the demonstrations, the protesters could 
be emboldened. However, if the Shah was too forceful, he might damage Iranian relations 
with the United States, according to the State Department. This was clearly connected to 
President Carter's stated commitment to a human rights focus in foreign policy.
235
   
Parts of the Iranian opposition had gained encouragement from this focus. They believed that 
it would prevent the Shah from cracking down on the opposition, due to his fear of losing US 
backing. As such, they were emboldened by Carter’s human rights agenda, illustrating some 
of the unintended consequences of American policy towards Iran.
236
  
In February, the situation in Iran took another turn for the worse. After the Khomeini incident, 
the religious opposition came to dominate the protest movement. The clergy was well aware 
of the anger felt by many Iranians over the deaths in Qom, and it organized memorial walks in 
several cities that functioned as massive demonstrations against the Shah. The first of these 
walks took place forty days after the January incident, on February 18, 1978, in accordance 
with traditional Shia mourning customs.
237
 It would prove to be a day of near unprecedented 
rioting, with the most dramatic incidents occurring in the city of Tabriz in northwestern Iran. 
State-owned buildings were attacked and destroyed, and the city was left in a state of chaos. 
In response, the army was sent into Tabriz, and between six and thirteen demonstrators died in 
the upheaval that followed.
238
 The US State Department would note that “the degree of 
organization and power [in the demonstrations] must be troubling indeed for the Shah”.239 
The department’s analysts saw no reason to believe the Shah’s claim that communist or left-
wing forces had played a decisive role in these demonstrations, stating instead that the true 
threat to the Shah’s regime could come from “the reactionary Moslem right wing.”240 
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The situation in Iran stayed tense after the upheaval in Tabriz. Opposition to the Shah was 
now out in the open, and the religious alignment of the protests struck observers as foreboding, 
because of the clergy’s expansive influence in Iran. According to the CIA, this influence was 
particularly widespread in the lower classes, but the religious hierarchy also had close ties to 
the bazaar merchant class in Iran.
241
 The latter class generally supported the religious 
opposition, partly thanks to a shared a dislike for the Shah’s modernization programs.242  
It was no surprise, then, that memorial marches organized on March 30, forty days after 
Tabriz, once again got out of hand, and at least twenty people died in clashes with the 
police.
243
A pattern was emerging. So far, the Iranian government had been content to disperse 
most of the rioting crowds, and few protesters were arrested. However, the Shah soon 
concluded that tougher action was needed and ordered SAVAK, Iran’s secret police and 
primary intelligence organization, to use more force against dissident leaders. In early April, 
there were severe beatings inflicted by SAVAK agents, as well as bombings of the homes of 
several prominent dissidents.
244
  
Amongst those attacked were leaders of the National Front (NF), the political party founded 
by Mossadegh that had been strongly suppressed after his overthrow. It had recently 
reemerged, voicing strong support for constitutional rule in Iran and demanding that the Shah 
implement further political liberalization. As a relatively liberal, Western-inspired movement, 
it had different priorities from the religious demonstrators.
 
 However, SAVAK’s actions may 
have helped unify the opposition, and the Shah’s response to the unrest did not make it go 
away.
 245
   
Washington’s View of the Shah’s Crackdown  
While the Americans had kept a low profile in Iran in early 1978, Washington did take notice 
of the Shah’s harsher policy against the dissidents, seeing it as a potential reversal of the 
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liberalization that had been implemented during the past year. National Security Council 
(NSC) staff concluded that if the crackdown continued, the United States would “not be able 
to ignore this trend.”246 The Carter administration was clearly well aware of the awkwardness 
of a prominent ally like Iran using harsh measures against the demonstrators. The president 
might be forced to either criticize the Shah’s actions publicly, thereby damaging close 
relations with Tehran, or stay silent and hurt the administration’s credibility on human rights.  
To make matters worse, Shah’s crackdown could not prevent another outbreak of large-scale 
violence in Iran, this time in several cities on May 8-9. Secretary of State Vance noted that 
alongside the omnipresent religious conservatives, “moderate leftist nationalists and students 
who also oppose the Shah have joined in some of the recent demonstrations.”247  
Though SAVAK had used very harsh methods against opposition leaders in April, the Shah 
appeared wary of totally reversing Iran’s liberalization process. As such, he did not order a 
widespread crackdown on the demonstrations, despite feeling that he perhaps needed to do so. 
According to Vance, this reluctance primarily arose from a fear of damaging his image in 
America.
248
 Although the United States had not expressed any overt concern to the Shah, or 
indeed given him any advice at all about how to handle the crisis, his caution was warranted. 
After all, Iran was also under pressure from international human rights organizations, which 
had strongly criticized the beatings of the opposition leaders. The entire situation had led to 
the Shah appearing tired and depressed, according to Ambassador Sullivan.
249
 
By now, some US analysts begun to worry about the Shah’s viability as well. The occurrences 
of massive demonstrations every forty days led them to conclude that the problems in Iran 
might not be a passing affair. The NSC staff developed two theories. One saw the religious 
hierarchy as simply an interest group that could be placated by the Shah if he accommodated 
to some of their concerns—that is, the regime was not under serious threat but would have to 
make some compromises to normalize the situation. The other claimed that the problems in 
Iran were structural, and that the riots had exposed widespread animosity regarding the 
corruption, unchecked privilege, and economic difficulties caused by the Shah’s 
modernization program.
250
 If the second theory held sway, the NSC staff concluded, then “the 
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demonstrations represent a true political threat that could topple or cripple the present 
regime.”251  
For the first time in years, American officials were seriously questioning the overall stability 
of Iran’s regime. However, this did not mean that the Carter administration considered there 
to be a strong chance of the Shah being overthrown, as the vast majority of intelligence 
reports concluded that he was not in any immediate danger. The president, secretary of state 
and other prominent members of the administration would therefore prioritize other issues.
252
 
US officials monitoring events in Iran likewise saw no reason to intervene, clearly preferring 
to let the Iranian government sort out its internal affairs. By June 1978, few observers were 
questioning whether the Shah would survive this crisis, and the US government even allowed 
Ambassador Sullivan to go on home leave for the entire summer.
253
 This signaled that it was 
not unduly worried about the situation in Iran.    
And indeed, though the situation had been relatively dire, the Shah’s prospects seemed to 
improve during the summer of 1978. The monarch had taken some steps to accommodate the 
opposition, such as replacing the head of SAVAK in early June, presumably upon the 
realization that its brutal methods had caused great anger among the protesters.
254
 At first, the 
Shah’s “stick and carrot” approach to the opposition appeared successful: June 20, the arrival 
of the fourth forty-day cycle in the demonstrations marking the deaths of protesters, passed 
with little commotion.
255
 This could only have reinforced Washington’s view that the Shah 
would weather the storm.  
Renewed Debate over Arms Sales to Iran  
It is noteworthy that during the summer of 1978, much of American policy discussion on Iran 
was not focused on the impending crisis there. Rather, the central debate concerned the 
question of arms sales to the Shah.
256 Yet again, the Carter administration would be torn 
between its commitment to arms limitation and its wish to bolster the US-Iranian alliance.  
Earlier in the year, the administration had sent Congress a Persian Gulf study that indirectly 
appeared to make a case for extensive arms sales to Iran. The report emphasized the Shah’s 
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role as policeman of the Gulf, ensuring the security of the area and being a bulwark against 
Soviet-friendly forces, and pointed yet again to the significance of continued access to Iranian 
oil and vital military and intelligence installations in Iran. Obviously, Washington had reasons 
for keeping the Shah content. Nevertheless, the study did note a downside to his large-scale 
military spending as well. If it continued, this could be at the expense of social spending, 
possibly leading to further political discontent.
257
 
Despite such concerns, it was also clear that Iran’s military strength enabled it to remain an 
anti-communist force in regional politics—a role that the Shah was more than willing to play, 
given his fear that Moscow would expand its influence in the Middle East through proxies. 
Iran had been working to contain the influence of the USSR in places outside of the region as 
well, sending arms to states that were involved in conflicts with Soviet allies, such as Somalia 
in its war against Soviet-backed Ethiopia.
258
  In 1978, the Shah had grown particularly 
concerned about increased Soviet influence in Afghanistan, following a communist coup there 
in April. He also worried that the USSR might try to gain a foothold in Pakistan, exploiting its 
bad economy and political disarray.
259
 His concern about these neighboring states clearly 
arose from a fear of being encircled by the Soviets. While Washington may have shared some 
of his trepidation, officials also thought that the Shah was exaggerating this particular threat, 
and that Ambassador Sullivan “may find it useful to calm him down a bit.”260  
One eventuality was certain, though: the Shah’s fear of Soviet encirclement meant that “his 
appetite for weaponry will be whetted even more.”261 And right on schedule, the Iranian 
military presented the US government with a significant list of arms that it wanted to buy, 
including new and advanced aircraft technology, as well as more naval equipment to 
strengthen Iran’s position in the Persian Gulf.262  
The Carter administration, however, had been anticipating a large-scale review of Iranian 
military needs, and its arms sales to Iran, in light of the general aim of arms restraint. While 
the administration saw some virtue in strengthening the Iranian military, the Shah’s arms list 
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led to extensive debates. It was particularly controversial in the State Department, and inter-
agency divisions on this issue made it difficult to set on a clear course.
263
  
The NSC staff reportedly valued Iran’s arms request list at a whopping nine billion dollars, 
the largest portion of which was derived from the aircrafts. At this point, Iran wished to buy 
thirty-one F-4Gs, to be equipped with sophisticated anti-radiation missiles.
264
 The proposed 
sale of these modified aircrafts, known as “Wild Weasels” in the US Armed Forces, was 
controversial because they appeared to be designed for attack rather than for defensive 
purposes and therefore ran counter to Carter’s professed interest in arms limitation. The 
president had called for a halt to the spread of such advanced weapons, but an exception to 
this policy had already been made during the sale of AWACS aircrafts to Iran in 1977.
265
 A 
Policy Review Committee (PRC) meeting was therefore scheduled in the White House, to 
settle upon the administration’s attitude towards these sales. A theme of the meeting would be 
how the United States could “balance the two important goals of arms transfer restraint and 
continued close political ties with strategically important Iran.”266 
One argument against granting Iran further exceptions from Carter’s arms limitation policy 
was that other allies would then have less incentive to moderate their own demands for more 
weaponry, making this policy virtually toothless. This was the view of some of Brzezinski’s 
advisors, who therefore called for clearer restraints on Iranian arms purchases.
267
 NSC official 
Gary Sick strongly disagreed, however, arguing that these weapons were imperative for the 
security of Iran, and the national security advisor himself seemed to concur.
268
 
On July 5, 1978, the PRC meeting took place, chaired by Vance, and attended by Brzezinski, 
CIA Director Stansfield Turner and other leading policymakers. In light of the regional 
situation in the Middle East and the Shah’s support of US policies on the world stage, it was 
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soon agreed that Iran should receive most of the weaponry it had requested. Without solid 
defenses, Iran would be more likely to be threatened by the Soviet Union and its allies, and it 
would be harder for the Shah to maintain his regional influence. Furthermore, the Shah was 
more likely to back US anti-communist policies in Africa and Central Asia, as well as 
American efforts to achieve a peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, if Washington 
satisfied his arms requests.
269
 The Carter administration also wanted to demonstrate that it 
“supports Iran’s emergence as a strong regional power.”270   
Even the sale of the controversial “Wild Weasels”, was approved, though with caveats. As 
selling such aircrafts stood in conflict with Carter’s arms restriction guidelines, it would have 
to wait until a special exception had been granted.
271
 Still, it was decided that the aircrafts 
would be “installed with wiring which would allow the subsequent inclusion of more 
sophisticated anti-radiation equipment.”272 Evidently, the administration had again gone far in 
making exceptions for Iran in its arms limitation policy. However, in a reversal of course, 
Cyrus Vance soon decided to draw a line: he would only sell the F-4Gs without the wiring, 
perhaps feeling that this could preserve some credibility on arms restraint. This illustrates the 
Carter administration’s often muddled foreign policy—Vance’s revised decision, coupled 
with other contradictory information, led to confusion among those US officials responsible 
for communicating with Iran.
273
  
The Shah was greatly displeased about the secretary of state’s position, arguing that the 
absence of anti-radiation equipment would weaken his armed forces.  Still, those who 
supported large-scale arms sales to the Shah had largely carried the day, as the PRC agreed to 
sell Iran vast amounts of other weaponry.
274
 When Carter was asked to endorse the PRC’s 
final decision, he wrote: “[O]k this time. PRC is too much inclined to approve every arms 
request.”275 The president seemed uncomfortable with the PRC’s circumventions of the 
administration’s arms restraint policy, yet he likely did not wish to risk the strategically vital 
relations with Iran. Moreover, Carter may have been mollified by the PRC’s effort to 
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implement his arms restraint policy in a long-term perspective. There had been made plans for 
comprehensive discussions with Iran on arms sales for the next three to five years, which 
would lead to a more consistent policy and presumably ensure that Iran requested arms in 
numbers that met the proposed limits. Significantly, the administration appeared to assume 
the Shah’s continued rule when planning this long-term measure.276  
After much back-and-forth, it was eventually made clear that the United States would only 
sell F-4Gs without the wiring to Iran. Though some prominent officials such as Secretary of 
Defense Harold Brown argued in favor of including the wiring, the president sided with 
Vance.
277
 The Shah tried to make the administration reverse this decision, to no avail.
278
 Of 
course, there would soon be other troubles to worry about. Little would come out of the Carter 
administration’s plans for a long-time strategy on arms sales to Iran, as the country would 
soon experience massive upheavals.  
In addition, the arms sales discussion in the summer of 1978 foreshadowed future problems 
for Washington. Splits within the US government and within its various departments had led 
to an unclear policy. Such internal division and lack of clarity would eventually characterize 
the Carter administration’s policy towards Iran, particularly once the Americans realized the 
gravity of the Shah’s predicament.   
The Shah Fails to Appease the Opposition  
After a period of calm in early summer, there were more violent clashes between groups of 
protesters and the police in Iran.
279
 Despite this, a CIA review in August still concluded that 
the country was “not in a revolutionary or even a ‘prerevolutionary’ situation.”280  While 
certain US analysts by now considered the Pahlavi dynasty to be under serious threat—and 
warned the Carter administration in this regard—this was only a minority view that was not 
shared by the US Embassy in Tehran. Still, the Shah likely betrayed some of his own concern 
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when he promised democratization and further liberalization, in the hopes of restoring 
calm.
281
  
When Ambassador Sullivan returned to Iran in late August, he was struck by the changes that 
were taking place. The ambassador reported that the Shah had decided to “transform his 
authoritarian regime into a genuine democracy,” but noted that most Iranians continued to 
indulge “in their traditional cynicism” about the prospect.282 In Sullivan’s view, the Shah was 
truly committed to these reforms as the only way the monarchy might survive. The United 
States should encourage this shift, Sullivan argued, because American ideals had always held 
that democracy was the form of government that functioned best in the long run, despite the 
problems that would be encountered during any reform process. And there would be many 
such problems. Iran had no democratic traditions as such, and those in positions of authority 
were afraid of what these new reforms might bring with them. This view was particularly 
strong within the military, the regime’s most loyal base of support.283  
Sullivan also believed that enemies of the Shah, such as “the Soviets, […] the radical Arabs 
and the fundamentalist Muslims,” would attempt to destabilize the regime by trying to 
undermine the reform process—they would cause trouble in the streets and attempt to force 
the Shah to reverse course, so as to betray the insincerity of his commitment and damage his 
position.
284
 
No evidence had emerged of any Soviet involvement in the crisis. While Sullivan also noted 
the threat posed by fundamentalist Muslims, the attention towards the Soviet Union may 
indicate a lack of understanding of events. In an effort to retain good relations with the regime, 
the United States had cultivated few inside sources of information in Iran that were not 
approved by the Shah. Sullivan regretted this and had tried to develop more contacts in the 
opposition, in an effort to get more varied sources of intelligence. While this process had 
started, the Americans had trouble making close contact with the Iranian oppositionists as 
many were distrustful of them because of their long close association with the Shah.
285
 
Sullivan’s analysis above, then, clearly indicates that the US perspective on the situation was 
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still very much influenced by the Shah’s inner circles. This helps explain the focus on the 
Soviets, whom the monarch himself feared to be behind the disturbances in Iran, and the 
belief that the Shah sincerely wished for democracy.
286
  
As part of his effort to quell the persistent demonstrations, the Shah tried to placate the 
religious hierarchy through his new prime minister, Jafar Sharif-Emani, who was told to 
implement changes. For instance, the Islamic Calendar was reinstated in Iran to dispel a fear 
that Westernization had turned the government away from Islam. He also demoted several 
generals who followed the Bahá'í religion, a non-Muslim sect widely despised by the Shia 
clergy. These attempts to accommodate the religious opposition had little effect on the 
continuing unrest.
 
CIA analysts observed that the anti-Shah forces seemed quite united, being 
held together by opposition to the Iranian monarch despite a lack of common goals amongst 
themselves. Although secular and moderate oppositionists may have been uncomfortable with 
some of the clergy’s demands, they nevertheless refrained from criticizing Khomeini, who 
emerged as the de facto leader of the Iranian opposition. Sharif-Emani’s approaches towards 
the religious opposition thus proved unsuccessful. Even moderate religious leaders who 
seemed open towards a compromise solution had given support to Khomeini, including the 
influential Ayatollah Mohammad Shariatmadari. The latter requested that Khomeini be 
allowed to return to Iran and further wanted the monarchy to relinquish almost all of its 
political powers, demands which were clearly unacceptable for the Shah.
287
  
This left the Shah with his erratic “stick and carrot” strategy, and even as he experimented 
with conciliatory measures, he also continued to clamp down on demonstrations through force. 
For this purpose, the Shah had wished to import tear gas to use for crowd control, and asked 
Washington to supply it to Iran. American officials, who had earlier been skeptical towards 
the Shah’s decision to use harsh methods against opposition leaders, now agreed that 
something needed to be done to control the riots. Despite its low profile in the Iranian crisis, 
then, the United States agreed to sell this equipment in September 1978.
288
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Though the export of tear gas was not as controversial as the sale of military arms, some 
within the State Department were critical of the move. Officials in the Human Rights Bureau, 
for example, felt it went against the values of the Carter administration. Ambassador Sullivan 
demurred, claiming that if the Iranian forces did not have tear gas available, they might 
instead resort to lethal weapons for riot control. After much debate, Vance had interceded to 
endorse the regular export of tear gas to Iran, unless evidence emerged that this equipment 
was being misused.
289
 With this latest decision, the administration showed that it would not 
prioritize the humanitarian concerns of the Human Rights Bureau at the expense of American 
strategic interests.  
This US assistance must have been of limited comfort for the Shah, who had grown 
increasingly desperate as demonstrations against his rule abounded. On September 7, the Shah 
declared martial law, imposing a ban on demonstrations, but this could not prevent a large 
protest from taking place in Tehran’s Jaleh Square the next morning. In response, the military 
shot at the demonstrators, likely killing between eighty to ninety people. The demonstration 
had been relatively peaceful, and the crackdown marked a defining moment of the crisis.
290
  
The Carter administration Emphasizes Its Support for the Shah  
The Shah’s decision to declare martial law may have been influenced by the assurances of his 
ambassador in the United States, Ardeshir Zahedi, who gave the impression that Washington 
would support tougher action. However, nothing indicates that this view was predominant 
within the Carter administration, which had not provided any advice on this matter so far. 
Zahedi’s view was chiefly based on his conversations with Brzezinski, who believed that the 
upheavals in Iran necessitated a tough response.
291
  
US analysts immediately realized that the Jaleh Square deaths were “very serious events.”292 
Despite this, officials largely continued to believe that the Shah would survive the crisis 
relatively unscathed.
293
 The president was not personally involved in the latest discussions 
regarding Iran, as he was busy at Camp David hosting the ongoing negotiations between 
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Israel and Egypt. Ambassador Sullivan recommended that Carter personally call the Shah to 
express concern and regret over the situation in Iran, and in order to “give president 
opportunity to obtain directly from Shah renewed commitment to pursue elections and 
liberalization”.294  
On September 10, in the middle of the Camp David negotiations, Carter followed Sullivan’s 
suggestion and called the Shah. Around the same time, a letter was sent to the Iranian 
monarch, because the ambassador had earlier concluded that something needed to be done to 
strengthen the morale of the Shah. He had drafted a warm letter, praising the Shah’s 
leadership, which he advised should be sent in the president’s name. It was revised slightly 
after the Jaleh Square incident, but sent nevertheless The Shah subsequently released its 
contents, leading to great anger towards the United States among the opposition in Iran.
295
  
While Sullivan clearly joined all of his American colleagues in supporting the rule of the Shah, 
he had continued to seek contact with the opposition. While the embassy had managed to 
reach moderate and secular oppositionists, there had been no interaction with representatives 
from the Khomeini camp, and US officials were clearly skeptical towards the idea of 
establishing such contacts. In mid-September, a Khomeini associate residing in the United 
States, Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, contacted an official on the NSC staff, Gary Sick, to propose a 
meeting between himself and US Government representatives. Sick tried to arrange a meeting 
between Yazdi and State Department officials, but the idea was vetoed by higher levels of the 
department. The rejection likely furthered Yazdi’s and the Khomeini-led opposition’s distrust 
of the United States.
296
  
This negativity towards such a meeting arose from fears of what the Shah would think of it. 
The monarch had frequently speculated that foreign forces were behind the events in Iran, and 
sometimes even seemed to fear American involvement. It was thought that a US meeting with 
Yazdi might reinforce this erroneous belief.
 297
 For the same reason, the Carter administration 
was wary of making much contact with others in the opposition. In the words of Cyrus Vance: 
“The president and I feared, under the circumstances, that such conversations [with opposition 
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leaders] might further weaken the shah’s confidence and feed his fears that we were 
attempting to position ourselves with a successor regime.”298  
The Jaleh Square incident had aggravated anti-Shah sentiment in Iran to the extent that even 
the moderate opposition, including the National Front and others wishing for constitutional 
government, clearly stated that the Shah would need to abdicate. The moderates believed that 
he retained power principally through US support, and that if the Americans were to withdraw 
that support in the name of human rights, it would lead to his fall.
299
 But the Carter 
administration had no wish to support the Iranian opposition, despite the Shah’s suspicions. 
Iran strategic value was too high, in light of such factors as its role as policeman of the Gulf 
and the US intelligence stations there that were vital for monitoring the USSR. It was very 
unlikely that this close relationship between Tehran and Washington could be retained if the 
Shah was overthrown. Moreover, the loss of this strategically vital ally could also, in 
Washington’s view, open up the region at large to increased Soviet influence.300  
The Americans believed that all of the Iranian political factions “tend[ed] to exaggerate their 
own importance as well as U.S. influence in Iran.”301 Some officials also believed that if the 
Shah actually fell, then radical and extremist groups would stand the most to gain: NSC staff 
member Gary Sick asserted that “The moderates […] would probably be swallowed up in the 
power struggles following the Shah’s departure--even if they should be the ones who 
engineered it.”302 It is clear, then, that the United States did not place much faith in the 
opposition moderates at this point.  
The Carter administration did place its faith in the Iranian military, however. It was widely 
thought that the United States should continue to retain close relations with this institution, 
which the CIA believed would play a decisive role in any succession struggle. These relations 
would in such a scenario help protect US interests, and this conviction in turn helps explain 
the continued large-scale arms sales, which were seen as vital for retaining good relations 
with the Iranian military leaders.
303
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The Shah’s predicament did not improve through the month of September, despite his rather 
erratic policy of mixing concessions with martial law.  The opposition remained strong, and 
Khomeini’s popularity continued to increase. In an attempt to undermine Khomeini’s 
influence on Iranians, the Shah pressured the Iraqis to remove him from his refugee in their 
country. Khomeini, whose influence only continued to grow, eventually surfaced in France in 
early October.
304
  
Meanwhile, Iran had fallen prey to a series of politically motivated strikes, leading to 
significant economic difficulties. Strikes had spread throughout the oil industry, and the result 
was a drastic decrease in production. The Shah began to weigh the drastic possibility of 
appointing a military government to restore order. When he asked the American and British 
ambassadors for their views on this option, they replied that it might be seen as a sign of 
weakness or loss of control. The ambassadors also argued that while the situation was serious, 
the Shah’s prospects were in fact better than it seemed.305  
The monarch also informed the ambassadors that Iran was cancelling all military cooperation 
with Israel. This was clearly a blatant attempt to appease his religious opposition, which had 
long resented the government’s close connections with Jerusalem. In addition to the military 
ties, 70 per cent of Israel’s oil imports were supplied by Iran.306 
The Shah’s deteriorating position worried the Carter administration, which clearly saw that its 
interests in Iran were now threatened. When Iranian Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi visited the 
United States at the end of October, Brzezinski wanted him to “convey to his father how 
concerned we are for Iran, a country which is terribly important for the U.S., and assure him 
of our continuing strong support.” 307 
Washington remained convinced that the Shah would be best able to guide Iran through a 
transition period to a more democratic form of government, but Ambassador Sullivan felt the 
monarch needed to do much more to obtain public support. In particular, he thought the Shah 
needed to engage with the opposition, and especially those moderate ayatollahs and groups of 
people who were prepared to accept a continuation of the monarchy, albeit a constitutional 
one with more limited powers. The ambassador would advise the Iranian prime minister to 
include these moderate forces in a process leading towards a democratic election, but felt that 
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the communist Tudeh party should still be banned from participation.
308
 Sullivan opposed any 
US overtures to Khomeini, whose statements suggested to the ambassador that “he would 
wish to lead the country in a Nasser-Qadaffi direction,” and he concluded that “our destiny 
here is to work with the Shah.”309 
Intelligence Failure Contributes to Unclear Policy  
The Carter administration had always backed the Shah and believed that he would survive the 
crisis. But by the end of October 1978, US officials began to confront the possibility that Iran 
could face significant further turmoil. Would the safety of Americans in Iran be threatened in 
such a scenario? How should the security of advanced and sensitive US military technology 
be protected if the Shah were to fall? How would the Soviet Union and its allies in the Tudeh 
party attempt to exploit the new situation? There were no clear answers to these questions.
310
 
It was glumly noted that the United States had suffered from a massive intelligence failure 
regarding the seriousness of the situation up to this point. A memorandum written by the NSC 
staff stated: “Certainly this must go down as one of the most dramatic recent failures in CIA 
political analysis!”311  
Thanks to this failure, there had been no real discussion of contingency plans, so few officials 
had any clear sense of how the United States should respond to a collapse of the existing 
Iranian government.  One of the first major meetings devoted to the Iranian crisis was held on 
November 2 in the White House, and it illustrates the reigning confusion. This was one of the 
first major meetings within the US government that dealt with the Iranian crisis. It was 
attended by several influential policy makers, including Brzezinski, Secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher (who represented the State 
Department in Vance’s absence), and CIA Director Stansfield Turner.312 
The meeting was held in response to a telegram from Sullivan that reported on a meeting with 
the Shah, who had proposed three alternative courses of action. One course was a coalition 
government incorporating moderate parts of the opposition, such as the National Front. This 
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was tricky, however, as even moderate opposition leaders were calling for the Shah’s 
abdication. Sullivan had cultivated some contacts within the moderate opposition and would 
try to argue for a continued role for the Shah in a potential agreement, as constitutional 
monarch and head of the military. The second course was a military government under the 
control of the Shah. In the ambassador’s view, this would hopefully be a short-term measure 
that could restore orderly conditions while preparing for democratic elections. The final 
option was the Shah’s abdication, which would probably lead to a military takeover, as the 
ambassador saw it.
313
 Sullivan regarded the last option as disastrous, since “a military 
government without the Shah would be repressive, brutal and totally unimaginative […] and 
would set the clock back on democracy.”314   
At the meeting, there was widespread agreement that a military government under the control 
of the Shah was preferable to one outside his control. As for the idea of a coalition 
government with the opposition, many US officials were skeptical, including Secretary of 
Defense Brown and Brzezinski. The national security advisor worried that the United States 
had pressured Iran too much on the issue of liberalization and that this proposal was the result. 
He wondered whether the Shah was only considering this route because he believed it would 
please Washington, and argued that they should not do anything that could lead him in this 
direction, as a coalition government would be instable and prone to infighting. Brzezinski 
further noted that Zahedi, the Iranian ambassador to the United States, had stated that Sullivan 
was seen to be somewhat ambiguous in his support of the Shah.
315
 He wanted to counter this 
trend by indicating the unreserved support of the United States and its recognition of the need 
for “decisive action to restore order and [the Shah’s] own authority”.316    
Brzezinski’s views about the viability of a military recourse were not shared by Christopher, 
who argued that a military government could only be a short-term solution that would do little 
to solve the underlying problems in Iran. The Deputy Secretary of State believed that a 
coalition government might be more successful, and he defended the ambassador against 
Zahedi’s accusation, saying that Sullivan had always been clear in his support for the Shah. 
He also questioned Brzezinski’s wording of a proposed letter of support for the Iranian 
monarch, which he thought encouraged military action of some kind, though Brzezinski 
denied that this was his intention. After a few revisions, President Carter approved the letter 
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and its rather mixed line: support for the Shah in any action he needed to take to restore order, 
alongside encouragement to continue his liberalization program. This turned out to be 
indicative of the administration’s general approach towards the Iranian crisis.317 
No specific advice was given regarding the Shah’s three alternative courses of action, which 
bothered CIA Director Turner: he thought this would indicate that the United States either 
“might not know what it wanted, or [was] afraid to take responsibility for its choice.”318 The 
Shah had sought recommendations from the Carter administration and instead received the 
sort of non-decisions that would characterize US policy. 
Appointment of a Military Government 
The Shah’s problems continued to mount into early November, with riots causing widespread 
destruction to Iran’s urban centers. Cinemas and banks were burned, and the unrest had also 
taken a decidedly anti-foreigner turn that included the burning of the British Embassy. 
Meanwhile, Washington remained split on what advice to give. While Brzezinski implied 
support for a military government in a phone conversation with the Shah, State Department 
officials dismissed this option in favor of showing support for a broad coalition 
government.
319
  
The Shah eventually told Sullivan that while he appreciated the president’s assurances that the 
United State would back any course that he decided upon, including the installation of a 
military government if need be, he would prefer for the moderate clergy and National Front to 
support a coalition government that accepted his monarchial role. The Shah hoped that 
negotiations with these groups would stop the riots and halt the strikes that were causing 
havoc in every sector of the Iranian economy. Unfortunately, it was clear to all that these 
moderates would have to openly break with Khomeini and his large following in order to join 
a coalition, and they showed no inclination to do so. A State Department paper then 
concluded that there was little hope for such negotiations without Khomeini’s support.320 
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After failing to make any sort of deal with members of the opposition, the Shah announced 
the installation of a military government on November 6, 1978. In a speech to the Iranian 
people he claimed that this was a temporary move in advance of a government that could 
oversee free elections. The Shah surprised many with his conciliatory tone. He not only 
acknowledged the revolution, but also claimed that he had always supported it and promised 
to make amends for past mistakes. Rather than increase support for the Shah, this speech 
probably encouraged his opposition, which came to believe that it was succeeding.
 321
  
US policymakers had the overall impression from the Shah that it would be best for them to 
steer clear for the moment, and not show overt support, lest he again be viewed as 
Washington’s puppet. Consequently, the Carter administration did little to affect the situation 
in Iran. This low profile was also likely influenced by an unclear view of the situation, which 
made it difficult to set on a clear course. At another White House meeting, in which several 
high-level officials took part, there was widespread concurrence that the intelligence that the 
administration was receiving from Iran was very poor. The Americans’ reliance on the Shah’s 
men for information and lack of contacts with the opposition had strongly contributed to the 
intelligence failure and, in turn, to the biased view with which they all worked.
322
 As such, 
interest again arose in making further contact with the opposition, even as Vance pointed out 
that the United States must not give the Shah any indication of waning support for him by 
doing so.
323
 Evidently, the same considerations that had contributed to the initial intelligence 
failure were still affecting US policy.  
The Carter administration did assure the Shah of its full support of his decision to install a 
military government, seeing this as a temporary measure that could restore order while 
eventually paving the way for a process of liberalization. Both political aspects and economic 
considerations motivated the American reaction, as Washington viewed the growing strikes in 
the Iranian oil sector with great concern. The reduction in oil production, now at only one-
fourth of the normal levels, threatened Western interests as well as Iran’s entire economy. As 
such, it was seen to be urgent that the Shah take steps to return Iran to normal conditions.
324
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This return to normality was a central goal for the new prime minister of Iran, General 
Gholam Reza Azhari, as well. As a result, he implemented harsher measures against the 
demonstrators and strikers, thereby forcing employees in important sectors of the economy to 
return to work. The government also took stronger actions against certain opposition leaders. 
Prominent figures in the National Front were arrested, after characterizing the Pahlavi dynasty 
as “illegal” and officially backing Khomeini’s demand that the Shah must abdicate.325 Yet 
there was no comprehensive crackdown in the weeks that followed his appointment. While 
parts of the military leadership had supported such a solution, it should be noted that General 
Azhari did not lead a “true” military government. Most ministers were civilians, which kept 
the military from becoming totally dominant. In addition, the US Embassy did not see Azhari 
as someone who would be inclined towards a harsh crackdown.
326
  
Meanwhile, the Shah’s hopes of making a deal with the opposition continued to dwindle. The 
National Front, as well as the other moderate oppositionist groups, had thrown in with 
Khomeini, possibly seeing no other choice in light of his popularity.
327
 Still, there was some 
good news for the Carter administration in November. The oil situation improved, as stronger 
action against strikers proved successful in getting employees back to work and increasing 
production.
328
 While the United States itself could manage without Iranian oil, several NATO 
allies, as well as Israel and Japan, were seen by Washington as quite reliant upon it. Relatedly, 
Iran protected the Strait of Hormuz, through which over 70 per cent of the oil supplies to 
these countries passed. If the Shah were to fall, this supply would also possibly be 
endangered.
329
 As such, the crisis in Iran attracted ever-increasing attention on the world stage.  
The Soviet Threat in Iran 
The internationalized aspect of the Iranian crisis was well-illustrated on November 17, 1978, 
when the leader of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, sent a letter to President Carter about 
the situation in Iran. Brezhnev warned Carter strongly against any US interference in the crisis, 
claiming that his sources had told him that Washington was even considering military 
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intervention. Any such activity in a country that bordered the USSR would be regarded as 
impacting Soviet security interests, Brezhnev announced.
330
  
While it is not known whether the Soviets’ fear of US military intervention was genuine, there 
is nothing that indicates that such plans were considered. In any event, Washington found 
Brezhnev’s letter troublesome. Brzezinski interpreted the warning to extend even to US 
advice to the Shah on the handling of the crisis. The national security advisor subsequently 
advised Carter that restoring order in Iran would demand “unequivocal support for the Shah, 
not diluted by conditional references to elections or liberalization.”331 In his reply to Moscow, 
the president chose to give what he got. He denied the suggestion of US interference and 
warned in turn that if the “incorrect reports to which you refer might be used to justify Soviet 
interference in Iranian affairs” it would be “a matter of the utmost gravity to us.”332  
Indeed, there had been much speculation about possible Soviet involvement in the Iranian 
crisis, particularly from the Shah himself. While US intelligence had yet to find evidence of it, 
the belief would gain traction in US Government circles, and Brzezinski even gave some 
backing to this view.
333
 The failure of US intelligence with regard to the whole crisis should 
also be linked to such concerns with the Soviet threat towards Iran. As this potential threat 
had always been Washington’s main fear, US intelligence had not in the past given much 
attention to the threat posed to the Shah’s rule by the religious opposition. The events of 1978 
thus caught the Carter administration unaware.
334
  
A State Department analysis soon concluded that there was no evidence of Moscow having 
played any role in the Iranian crisis. It also argued that Brezhnev’s letter did not in fact imply 
such involvement, but rather sought to distance the USSR from any accusations of 
interference. The analysts even contended that the Soviets might not want the Shah to be 
overthrown. Though it represented an “enemy” from a Cold War point of view, Iran had solid 
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economic relations with the Soviet Union that could be endangered if other, as yet 
indeterminate, forces gained power. The alternatives included an extremist Muslim 
government or military rule, both of which might be more hostile towards the USSR.
335
    
Widespread Disagreement within the US government 
Brzezinski did not appear to subscribe to the State Department’s analysis, as he continued to 
believe in the possibility of Soviet involvement. In addition, whether Moscow had earlier 
interfered or not, NSC staff members thought that the USSR and its Iranian allies might 
exploit a chaotic situation to improve their leverage in Iran. These beliefs may have 
contributed to Brzezinski’s continued lobbying for the United States to declare its support for 
harsher measures by the Shah against the opposition. The national security advisor had 
become convinced that only a crackdown by the Iranian military could save the Shah’s rule.336  
Brzezinski’s hardline position, which he would hold throughout the Iranian crisis, dovetailed 
with his general foreign policy line, which privileged Cold War factors and US strategic 
interests above all else. Tough military action was thus seen as necessary to retain Iran as a 
Western ally, and he seemingly believed that even though such a solution might have its costs, 
it would save Iran from further damage and turmoil in the long run.
337
   
His fiercest opposition, as ever, came from State Department officials, who largely thought 
any kind of crackdown broke with the Carter administration’s human rights policy. Brzezinski 
clashed most with the department’s Iran desk, led by Henry Precht who felt that Washington 
needed to reevaluate its strategy towards Iran. State Department advisors were increasingly 
doubtful as to whether the Shah could survive the crisis in any capacity and pressed for more 
flexibility from the administration’s Iran policy. If the Shah could not make a deal with the 
moderate opposition, it was argued, the United States should help with an agreement between 
the military and the clergy, so as to prevent Iran from collapsing into disorder.
338
 The military, 
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after all, had been regarded as an essential aspect of any post-Shah alignment with the West, 
and the clergy retained enormous influence in Iran.
339
 
In a controversial cable dated November 9, Ambassador Sullivan also seemed to back the idea 
that the United States should start to plan for the possibility of a post-Shah Iran, in apparent 
contradiction to his earlier stand that Washington had to be adamant in its support for the 
Shah. The ambassador had come to believe that the Shah was neither willing nor capable of 
initiating a brutal “iron fist” strategy against the opposition, and he wondered whether the 
monarch might soon end up leaving Iran, along with his senior military leaders. If that 
happened, Sullivan predicted, the Khomeini camp and the remaining military would soon 
reach an accommodation. The ambassador felt that relatively pro-Western moderates in the 
opposition would thereby gain influential positions, and that Khomeini himself would likely 
agree to a symbolic leadership position in the new Iran. As he saw it, the influence of 
moderates and the military would enable the US to preserve most of its strategic and 
economic interests. Though Iran’s ties to Israel would be broken, it would remain anti-
communist, because Khomeini and the military were hostile to this ideology. Sullivan also 
assumed that any new regime in Iran would recognize the value of retaining close economic 
ties with the West.
340
  
It is not entirely clear why the ambassador changed his views on the Shah and the opposition, 
though the deteriorating situation may have prompted him to allow for a new strategy. 
Regardless, this only annoyed officials in the Carter administration, who had no wish to 
prepare a change in policy. Furthermore, Sullivan was rather vague as to on whether he really 
felt this scenario would occur or a new strategy was needed. When his proposal was not taken 
seriously, he did not press the issue for a while.
341
 
The United States stuck to its unconditional support of the Shah, as the arguments from the 
likes of Sullivan and Precht got little backing within the Carter administration. This was partly 
related to Vance’s lack of expressed support for the ideas of his subordinates, with the 
secretary of state not playing a very active role on Iranian issues at this point. He was entirely 
preoccupied with other issues, such as the peace negotiations between Israel and Egypt, and 
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State Department officials had little hope of changing US policy without his explicit 
backing.
342
  
The Carter administration believed that its backing of the Shah was crucial to the survival of 
his reign, even as worries persisted that the monarch was not doing enough to survive the 
crisis.
343
 While the administration emphasized its support, partly to ease the Shah’s concerns 
that the US was less than steadfast in its backing, it also wished to make clear to him that “the 
decisions are his and that the leading role in this crisis cannot be shifted to another party.”344 
Its reluctance to influence the Shah in any particular direction was likely affected by the 
continuing problem of poor intelligence reports, which led policymakers to have an unclear 
view of the situation in Iran.
345
  
Proposed Changes of Course  
The lack of knowledge about the situation, and the widespread disagreements within the US 
government, led Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal to suggest bringing in an outside voice 
to analyze US policy. The president agreed to this proposal, and the man chosen to perform 
this task was George Ball, a veteran American diplomat.
346
 Ball started his work in late 
November 1978, at a critical point in the crisis. General Azhari’s efforts to restore order had 
proven only temporarily successful, and there was renewed violence, and many casualties, in 
the beginning of December. The US Embassy received reports of up to two thousand deaths, 
in fact, though the actual totals many have been in the hundreds. Simultaneously, anti-
Americanism was spreading as a result of the close US alignment with the Shah. Anti-
American slogans were now a constant feature in demonstrations, and, though no Americans 
had yet been killed, Washington began to fear for the safety of US citizens living in Iran.
347
 
Meanwhile, politically motivated strikes were again causing havoc in the economy, and Iran’s 
banking system was largely paralyzed, according to the US Embassy.
348
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George Ball took part in his first White House meeting focused on Iran on December 5. The 
first half was dedicated to the discussion of the Americans in Iran and resulted in widespread 
agreement that their lives were at risk if the situation escalated further, as appeared likely. 
Skepticism remained regarding the withdrawal of US personnel, however, as it was thought 
that this could contribute to the fall of the Shah. A withdrawal could be interpreted as a lack 
of belief in his leadership, or an abandonment of Iran under these tough conditions. Ball 
argued against this skepticism, stating that the United States could not risk the lives of its 
civilians for these reasons—it would be devastating, morally and politically, if anything were 
to happen. His arguments played a vital part in the decision to start a withdrawal of US 
dependents from Iran.
349
   
Ball chaired the second half of the meeting and used the opportunity to propose a new 
solution to the Iranian crisis. He suggested that the United States recommend to the Shah that 
a “council of notables” be chosen, consisting of well-respected, moderate Iranians from both 
sides of the political divide. This council’s task would be to choose a new government that 
would work for stability in Iran, and Ball recommended that the Shah pledge not to use the 
military as a consequence of any disagreement with the decisions of the council or the new 
government. In effect, his proposal indicated that the Shah would be relinquishing almost all 
of his political powers, even though the monarchy would be retained. It was a far-reaching 
proposal, and its implementation would have marked a clear change of course in US policy.
350
  
It was therefore controversial and sparked much debate within the US government. State 
Department advisors, one the one hand, were pleased that such a high-ranking official had 
endorsed the need for change in US policy. On the other hand, Brzezinski felt that Ball’s 
proposal amounted to handing power over to the opposition, likely leading to radical 
opposition forces prevailing in Iran. The national security advisor stuck to his view that the 
US should do all it could to encourage the Shah to reassert his authority, ideally through a true 
military government.
351
 
On December 13, Ball presented his full proposal at another White House meeting. He also 
added that the window was closing for the United States to try to save Iran from total chaos, a 
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view that was supported by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
352
 Ball advised 
that the US government should “press the Shah for an early dramatic announcement that he 
would relinquish power to a civilian government, retaining his position as Commander-in-
Chief of the military with some constraints.”353 Brzezinski then led the charge against this 
proposal, but others were also skeptical, including Defense Secretary Brown and Secretary of 
Energy James Schlesinger, who seemingly felt that the United States should not push the Shah 
into doing anything that had such an uncertain outcome. In the end, the president did not 
accept Ball’s suggestion.354 While he claimed to sympathize with parts of it, he was not 
willing to “tell another head of state what to do.”355  
As the discussions went on in Washington, the problems mounted in Iran, as demonstrations 
grew even bigger, indicating that Khomeini had massive support among the population. The 
Shah continued weighing his options, which remained the same. Ambassador Sullivan 
advised him that a military solution would not be workable in the long run, and that the Shah 
should continue his efforts to form a coalition with moderate opposition leaders.
356
 Sullivan 
thought that the opposition forces might still come to terms with the Shah, “Khomeini to the 
contrary notwithstanding”, if he could convince them that he was willing to become a 
constitutional monarch alone.
357
  
The ambassador’s continued faith in the possibility of such a compromise was likely sustained 
by signals of moderation from parts of the opposition. Representatives of the National Front 
had told US officials that any government it led would be anti-communist and would retain 
good relations with the United States and the West. Such a government would even continue 
to supply oil to Israel, they claimed—though Khomeini was opposed to this eventuality, he 
would eventually have to come round to it. Nevertheless, though, the National Front clearly 
felt that a coalition government under the Shah was impossible.
358
 Sullivan’s faith also 
indicates that he somewhat underestimated Khomeini at this point. Given the latter’s influence 
and popularity, it is difficult to imagine that any moderate opposition leader would have dared 
to make an agreement with the Shah without the ayatollah’s approval.  
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Khomeini continued to leave his imprint on the crisis. On December 18, 1978, he called for 
more strikes, leading to a significant drop in commercial activity. By this point, important 
sectors of Iran were in disarray: schools were forced to close; the Central Bank had stopped 
functioning; and nightly power blackouts were being used to undermine the Shah, thanks to 
revolutionaries working in the electric power plants.
359
 Most dramatically, the situation in the 
oil sector deteriorated further, eventually leading to a cessation in production. Meanwhile, 
violence on the streets increased, contributing to a very tense situation.
360
  
In these circumstances, the Shah grew desperate for advice. His talks with the opposition had 
failed, and he now thought that installing a hardline military government might be his only 
option, bringing order by “brutal oppression.”361 When the Shah asked Sullivan whether 
Washington would support this choice, the ambassador told him that “the U.S. could not make 
such a decision for Iran.”362 While there was widespread agreement in Washington that the 
Shah’s indecisiveness was damaging, the US government gave him no concrete guidance.  
This was partly because of Washington’s unwillingness to assume responsibility for the 
Shah’s choices, and due to Carter’s reluctance to tell a foreign head of state how to handle his 
internal affairs. But it is also very likely that the vast policy differences within the 
administration were contributing to the Americans’ reticence. Brzezinski was uncomfortable 
with Sullivan’s reply to the Shah, which he clearly thought should have been an emphatic 
“yes.” Other prominent officials, such as Defense Secretary Brown, also thought that a 
military solution might eventually prove necessary, though none of them shared Brzezinski’s 
adamant belief.
363
 
On the other side of the debate, State Department advisors had argued that the United States 
should seek contact with all parts of the Iranian opposition, including Khomeini’s followers. 
They felt that Washington should arrange an accommodation between the powerful religious 
opposition and the military, to ensure the stability of Iran and protect US interests. In light of 
the Shah’s increasing difficulties, there was a strong feeling within the State Department that 
Washington should prepare for a future without him. The Iran desk of the department 
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supported this idea, and its head, Henry Precht, argued that the US should stop backing the 
Shah so adamantly, as this could only hurt its position in Iran after his fall.
364
  
Though Cyrus Vance clearly preferred that the Shah remain in power, he eventually supported 
some of these next steps, including the establishment of contacts with all of the influential 
opposition groups in Iran. He apparently wanted the United States to be in a position to 
protect its interests there if the Shah fell. The secretary of state also dismissed Brzezinski’s 
support for a crackdown. First of all, he thought that the military would be unable to 
implement one, as the army, consisting largely of conscripts, would be unwilling to confront 
its fellow citizens.
365
 Secondly, he felt that “support for the iron fist would be antithetical to 
what I believed the Carter administration stood for.”366 Here again, the administration clearly 
needed to walk a fine line between advancing a humanitarian agenda and protecting US 
strategic interests.
367
  
The rising conflict between Vance and Brzezinski was apparent at a high-level policy meeting 
on December 28. Vance’s view that the United States should engage actively with the 
opposition in working toward a viable coalition received little support. The other attendees, 
including Brzezinski, Brown, Turner, and Schlesinger, opposed this option. Instead, 
Brzezinski wanted to send a message to the Shah that clearly encouraged a military solution. 
Vance argued strongly against this, and the meeting produced a compromise message to Iran 
that was ambiguous enough that both the national security advisor and the secretary of state 
felt that it represented their own views.
368
 It did not go into specifics, only “emphasizing that 
the current uncertainty was destructive and urging the Shah to decide upon an appropriate 
course of action.”369   
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The End of the Year—and the Beginning of a New Era?  
Around this time, the Shah announced that he would appoint a new government. It would not 
be a hardline military government but rather a civilian government led by Shapour Bakhtiar, a 
once-prominent member of the National Front. After long negotiations, Bakhtiar had agreed 
to serve as Prime Minister. It represented a last-ditch effort by the Shah to save his position, 
after the crisis had continued to escalate. On December 31, the US Embassy reported that Iran 
was in a state of anarchy, with large-scale violence on the streets and a paralyzed economy. It 
was not seen as safe for US citizens to remain there under these circumstances, given the 
increasing anti-Americanism, and Washington was forced to start making plans to bring large 
numbers of people home from Iran.
370
  
Apparently, the Shah did not deem it safe to stay in Iran either and the US Embassy was told 
that he would soon be leaving for a vacation. Ambassador Sullivan had told him that he would 
be welcome in the US, and the Shah considered staying away until the crisis abated.
371
 As it 
turned out, the situation would not return to normal. 1979 would see the emergence of a new 
Iran and large upheavals in its relations with the United States.  
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Chapter 5: The Beginning of the End 
Forces led by Ayatollah Khomeini assumed power in Iran in 1979. This meant the end to the 
US-Iranian alliance, and a massive conflict arose between the two former allies in November 
of that year, when officials at the US Embassy in Tehran were taken hostage. After this, 
bilateral diplomatic relations were soon broken. In what ways did the Carter administration 
attempt to influence the situation in Iran after the Shah had left, and why? Who did the 
Americans see as likely to dominate Iranian politics following this? How did Washington try 
to retain ties with Tehran after Khomeini installed his new government?  
The Captain Prepares to Leave the Sinking Ship 
On January 1, 1979, it was becoming clear that the Shah would soon leave Iran, with the 
Palace officially confirming that he would be going on vacation for “medical treatment.”372 
Otherwise, however, the future was entirely uncertain. General Azhari had resigned as prime 
minister, to be succeeded by Shapour Bakhtiar, a onetime member of the National Front. 
Bakhtiar’s decision to serve was condemned by his former colleagues in the NF, as they were 
strongly opposed to taking part in any government under the Shah.
373
 Without much of a base 
of support, many thought Bakhtiar’s time in office would be short. The US State Department 
did not see how he could form a viable government, and the Shah himself indicated to 
Ambassador Sullivan that he expected Bakhtiar to fail.
374
  
As such, the decision to appoint him was obviously a last-ditch, long-shot attempt of easing 
the country’s political and economic crisis. The Shah hoped that Bakhtiar could increase 
production in the oil fields and restore order in the population, working in tandem with the 
military. Ambassador Sullivan shared this view, stating that the United States needed to hope 
for Bakhtiar’s success and for the continued cohesion of the armed forces. An intact and 
obedient military was crucial to Iran’s stability and alignment with the West.375 Sullivan also 
warned the Carter administration at this time that the United States should start preparing for 
certain contingencies in its policy, because “if the Shah leaves, he may never be allowed to 
return.” 376 
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Duly informed of the potential risk, President Carter nevertheless promptly encouraged the 
Shah to depart the country as soon as possible. The Shah had started to vacillate on when he 
should leave, perhaps wanting to keep his options open, and Ambassador Sullivan wrote to 
Secretary of State Vance that Bakhtiar would surely fail if the Shah did not leave, thanks to 
the enormous popular resistance to the Shah's rule. Vance and the president were persuaded, 
and Carter sent the Shah a letter to remind him that America would welcome him with open 
arms. He also indicated Washington’s support for his decision to appoint a civilian 
government that would serve under a regency council appointed by the Shah. While the 
administration hoped that the military would support Bakhtiar, it also wanted the military to 
be ready to restore order if the prime minister failed to do so.
377
  
The White House was also concerned that the military would disintegrate when challenged by 
Khomeini’s forces. Though the military leadership was regarded as pro-Western, many of the 
troops were assumed to sympathize with the Khomeini camp.
378
 As such, Washington wanted 
to ensure that the military leaders stayed in Iran even after their commander-in-chief, the Shah, 
had departed. For this purpose, the Carter administration decided to send US General Robert 
Huyser to Iran, to act as a liaison between the Iranian military establishment and the US 
government. The nature of Huyser’s mission has been disputed—some accounts of the Iranian 
Revolution give the faulty impression that the general had been tasked with pushing the 
Iranian military towards a coup.
379
 US Government sources, on the other hand, demonstrate 
that his primary job was to keep the military united, and convince its leadership to support 
Bakhtiar.
380
  
Bakhtiar was also trying to secure all the support he could get. While Washington saw him as 
likely to follow a mostly pro-Western policy, and preserve Iran’s close relations with the 
United States, he also took steps to distance himself from the Shah. He promised reforms and 
pledged to release political prisoners, prosecute corrupt officials, and democratize Iran. In an 
effort to appease the opposition, he also stated that Iran would probably cease all oil 
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shipments to Israel under his leadership.
381
 None of these promises, however, had any effect, 
and the opposition continued to view him as an illegitimate puppet of the Shah. Khomeini 
also made it clear that Bakhtiar had to go, and that there was no room for compromise—even 
among the ayatollah’s more moderate allies, such as the National Front, there was consensus 
around this view.
382
 
Day by day, then, things got worse for Bakhtiar. Strikes continued to cause havoc—on 
January 10, 1979, the US Embassy reported that the economy in Iran remained paralyzed, 
with the banking sector shut down. Also, the widespread riots had gotten so bad that the 
regular police had simply abandoned the streets in several towns.
383
 It was a desperate time 
for the government. 
A Deal with the Devil? 
It had become clear to all US policymakers that their interests in Iran were profoundly 
threatened. No one knew what would happen, but most assumed the worst in terms of 
American interests, unless drastic steps were taken. The central problem was that there was no 
agreement on which direction the United States should go. At this point in early January, 
Ambassador Sullivan had begun to urge for direct contact with Khomeini. Though he had 
previously hesitated to do so, he was now clear: to prevent Iran from descending into a civil 
war, the two most influential institutions in the country, the military and the clergy had to 
come to an understanding. This would only happen with Khomeini’s blessing, and the United 
States should therefore work to secure it. Otherwise, Sullivan warned, the Soviet-backed 
Tudeh party would likely exploit the deteriorating situation. As both the military and 
Khomeini wanted to minimize the influence of the communists, this might represent common 
ground on which to base an arrangement.
384
  
Sullivan’s hope for such an arrangement was likely inspired by the fact that the ayatollah’s 
inner circle had been sending out signals of moderation by assuring US officials that a 
government installed by Khomeini could have friendly relations with all nations, including the 
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United States.
385
 Though this contrasted with some of the ayatollah’s more vitriolic statements 
about their country, it seemed to encourage US analysts who hoped that his personal anti-
Americanism would not prove to be decisive. Many US officials even believed that if 
Khomeini triumphed, he might agree to assume the role of spiritual leader and stay clear of 
the day-to-day running of government and making of foreign policy. This view got much 
support at a White House meeting, particularly from Henry Precht and other State Department 
Officials, on January 11.
386
 While such analysis later proved mistaken, it is probable that this 
contributed to Sullivan’s hope for a negotiated solution.  
Sullivan’s proposal was at first attractive to the Carter administration, but in the end the 
president rejected it. He simply did not see the ayatollah as someone who was capable of 
compromise, and he thought that a meeting would only offer him an opportunity to attack and 
otherwise embarrass the United States. Instead, it was decided that the US would send 
messages indirectly to Khomeini, using French intermediaries.
387
 In response to this decision, 
Ambassador Sullivan sent a “plea for sanity” to Cyrus Vance, telling him that “[the] president 
has made gross and perhaps irretrievable mistake by failing to send emissary to Paris to see 
Khomeini as previously agreed.”388 He argued that Carter’s decision could permanently harm 
US interests in Iran, and that contacts through French middlemen would not work: a solution 
could only arise from direct contact by US officials with Khomeini. Sullivan also pointed out 
that Huyser agreed with him on the necessity of meeting the ayatollah.
389
 The unusually 
strongly worded letter received much attention in Washington, and President Carter was set to 
fire Sullivan for insubordination. Vance managed to persuade him that it would be impractical 
to change ambassadors under such volatile circumstances.
390
  
Discord also continued to be apparent amongst the president’s closest advisors. Whereas 
Vance had principally supported Sullivan’s proposal, Brzezinski had been firmly opposed. 
The national security advisor instead argued for a coup, and that General Huyser should 
advice the military in this direction, if Bakhtiar failed to restore order within ten days.
391
 As 
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ever, Brzezinski’s hardline position likely arose from the Cold War factors and US strategic 
interests that guided his foreign policy tendencies.
392
   
On January 12, Huyser sent a letter to Defense Secretary Harold Brown to indicate that he 
understood his mission. The general stated that he was discouraging military leaders from 
pursuing a coup, telling them that they first must give Bakhtiar a proper chance to succeed by 
working together with him and staying united. Huyser also ranked the possible outcomes he 
saw for Iran, and Bakhtiar’s success was clearly the best alternative among them. Barring that, 
Huyser allowed for the possibility of an alternative civilian government that would perhaps be 
more tolerable to Khomeini. Only if these successive civilian governments failed should the 
military carry out a coup.
393
 Brown was uncomfortable with Huyser’s summary, and clarified 
for the general that he “needed to walk a narrow line in preventing a military coup against the 
Bakhtiar government, but not to encourage the military to stand idly by if the situation 
deteriorated continuously.”394 He also warned Huyser that he needed to help ready the 
military for action, in case it was needed. The general replied that he was doing so, though the 
primary task at the moment was to ensure the military’s loyalty to Bakhtiar.395  
However, it was not clear what would need to happen for Huyser to actually encourage a 
military takeover, which worried Brzezinski. He advised the president that they should make 
clear to the general that “if Bakhtiar falters, we must make a decisive choice and [a coup] will 
have to be implemented with U.S. backing.”396 Carter did not agree: as Brzezinski himself 
recalled, the president “found my advocacy of a coup morally troublesome.”397 
Preparing for the Return of the Ayatollah 
Bakhtiar’s new government was officially approved by parliament on January 16, 1979—the 
same day that the Shah left Iran.
398
 The US government was very concerned about the 
stability of Iran under these circumstances, and General Huyser was asked to help establish 
contacts between the leadership of the clergy and the military in Iran, so as to preserve order 
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and prevent a civil war.
399
 On January 16, Brzezinski informed the president that Huyser’s 
efforts had been fruitless, to which Carter simply replied “Keep trying.”400 The president’s 
idea of establishing such contacts without directly involving Khomeini was seemingly 
doomed to fail, because the ayatollah’s pervasive influence as de facto leader of the revolution 
clearly made it near impossible for other religious leaders to sidestep him.  
Meanwhile, Khomeini’s supporters were calling for him to return to Iran, and the ayatollah 
signaled that he would soon do so. The Carter administration feared that this would lead to 
further conflict and bloodshed. Though the president still did not want to contact Khomeini 
directly, the administration tried to use unofficial channels to his associates to prevent him 
from returning to Iran. Washington wanted any such return to come after an understanding 
had been reached with the military and Bakhtiar. One of Khomeini’s close associates, 
Ebrahim Yazdi, gave US diplomats in France the impression that the ayatollah was wary of 
the military’s reaction and wanted to avoid a confrontation if possible. Sullivan recommended 
that these officials should emphasize the danger of a military coup, to forestall Khomeini’s 
imminent return. The ambassador said that Yazdi should be informed that Huyser had 
discouraged the military from such action, but that it might not be possible to hold it off if the 
ayatollah decided to come back to Iran.
401
  
The installation of the Bakhtiar government provoked more fierce attacks from Khomeini, 
who also declared that he would soon announce a provisional government of his own—one 
that would have popular legitimacy. He urged the people to continue their strikes and 
demonstrations against the government, and he asked the military to abandon its loyalty to the 
Shah.
402
 The scene was set for exactly the type of confrontation that Washington feared, and 
US diplomats would warn Yazdi that the Iranian communists could exploit the chaotic 
situation in Iran.
403
 While this was undoubtedly a genuine fear, these warnings were probably 
also seen as a means of convincing Yazdi to try to delay Khomeini’s return. There was, 
however, a significant flaw in the premise of any such strategy. The Iranian communists were 
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not nearly as strong a force as US officials believed, and Yazdi dismissed these fears by 
stating that “The US government knows better than we that the Tudeh is not strong.”404  
However, while US officials realized that that the communists were only a minor part of the 
opposition, it was still thought that they might be able to exploit the unrest and pave the way 
for Soviet and leftist influence.
405
 While the Khomeini camp feared and distrusted the USSR, 
it clearly did not see Soviet-backed forces in Iran as being capable of exploiting the 
revolutionary upheavals to their advantage. The ayatollah remained set on soon returning, 
even if it meant a confrontation with the military.
406
   
Ambassador Sullivan feared that the military would come apart upon Khomeini’s return, and 
that Bakhtiar would not stand a chance. Carter was skeptical, by now tending to dismiss 
Sullivan’s assessments in favor of Huyser’s reports, which presented a more optimistic picture 
of the military’s morale. In this way, the president cultivated his hope that the military might 
be able to save Bakhtiar in the advent of a confrontation with Khomeini forces.
407
 Though 
there was great skepticism in the administration towards the idea of a coup, all leading 
policymakers did want the military to take decisive action if the revolutionaries attempted to 
overthrow Bakhtiar’s government.408 
An optimistic view of the military’s strength likely contributed to the Carter administration’s 
decision not to initiate direct contacts with Khomeini, despite being advised to do so by both 
Sullivan and Huyser. In late January, they also implored that the United States rule out 
support for a military coup under any circumstances. Huyser’s instructions had included the 
eventuality that if the civilian government were to collapse, Washington would support any 
action that the military would take to restore order.
409
 Hoping for a new plan, the ambassador 
recommended to Vance that “[Huyser] should be instructed to counsel the military, in the 
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event of such a collapse, to maintain their integrity, and negotiate a satisfactory understanding 
with the Khomeini forces.”410  
Both Sullivan and Huyser saw this as necessary for preventing a civil war that would lead the 
two principal anti-communist forces in Iran, the military and the clergy, to destroy each other. 
Still, the secretary of state rejected the request. While he agreed that they should make it clear 
that the return of Khomeini alone was not sufficient cause for a coup, the United States would 
not ask the Iranian military to come to an understanding with him if the government fell. The 
fear was that this could weaken Bakhtiar’s position, making the collapse of his government a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.
411
 Khomeini’s widely expressed anti-American views must also have 
contributed to the administration being “doubtful […] that direct approach would either 
change his intentions or make him more amenable to our interests,” as Vance stated.412 
While Sullivan clearly recognized that the prime minister was facing massive difficulties, he 
remained convinced that “the future of Iran and of our interests here lie in the hands of 
Bakhtiar.”413 He likely clung to the hope that Bakhtiar and Khomeini could negotiate a 
settlement that would allow the prime minister to survive and preserve the integrity of the 
armed forces. Desperate for a solution, Bakhtiar had started talks with Khomeini through 
intermediaries, but by the end of January, these talks had collapsed.
414
 Even so, Bakhtiar 
announced that he would not stop Khomeini from entering Iran.
415
 While the Iranian 
government could easily have prevented Khomeini’s return, officials likely feared a public 
overthrow of Bakhtiar in response. All in all, the ayatollah would arrive in a very turbulent 
country that had suffered frequent violent clashes between government forces and Khomeini 
supporters. There had also been massive demonstrations, generally peaceful, in support for the 
ayatollah. Such sympathies were even apparent in parts of the military, and Washington 
worried whether it would ultimately remain loyal to the prime minister.
416
  
On the day before Khomeini’s arrival, Washington acceded to the wishes of the US Embassy 
and decided that Huyser would head home. The general had been threatened by extremist 
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groups and his presence was thought to endanger those around him.
417
 In addition, Huyser felt 
that he “had accomplished his mission in bringing the Iranian military to a position where 
they were prepared to support Bakhtiar,” so his work in Iran was done. 418 Nor was he the only 
one to leave. The embassy strongly advised all non-essential American personnel in Iran, and 
all dependents of US citizens, to temporarily return home. Their safety was clearly seen as 
threatened, particularly in light of Khomeini’s imminent arrival. He returned on February 1, 
setting foot on Iranian soil for the first time in fifteen years.
419
 
The Fall of Bakhtiar 
The return of Khomeini went smoothly, and the police provided for security upon his arrival, 
as the Bakhtiar Government was very worried about the consequences if anything were to 
happen to him. Khomeini did not call for an armed uprising, but he did challenge the authority 
of Bakhtiar by appointing a provisional prime minister of his own, choosing Mehdi Bazargan, 
the widely respected leader of the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI). The LMI was a 
moderate oppositionist group, which was seen as having democratic credentials and as 
relatively secular, but Bazargan also had close contacts with the religious hierarchy. 
Khomeini thus wanted this appointment to create a stronger link between the religious and 
secular parts of the opposition.
420
 Washington worried over this appointment, because a rival 
government increased the chances of armed conflict, yet it also appeared appreciative of 
Bazargan’s perceived moderation. Ambassador Sullivan believed that the political differences 
between Bazargan and Bakhtiar were not that significant. Left to their own devices, they 
might even reach an agreement, he argued, which would prevent the civil war that 
Washington so feared.
421
   
However, it was clear that the two rivaling prime ministers would not be left to sort out an 
agreement on their own. Various factors greatly limited their room to maneuver, the 
ambassador noted. Bazargan could clearly not reach such a deal without Khomeini’s approval, 
given his dominant position within the opposition, and the ayatollah was firmly opposed to 
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any compromise.
422
 Furthermore, the situation among the revolutionary forces in Iran was 
quite chaotic, and there were others whom the US Embassy saw as representing an even 
bigger obstacle to a peaceful solution than Khomeini: “More strident, and more dangerous, 
than the Ayatollah’s men are the armed radicals and terrorists who support them, and who 
exert great pressure on their leadership,” Sullivan wrote.423  
These radical religious groups, despite having pledged their loyalty to Khomeini, largely 
acted on their own accord and were seen to represent a significant security threat. The 
embassy also remained worried about Marxist forces, such as Tudeh, whose actions it 
believed to be controlled by Moscow. While fewer in number than the radical Islamic groups, 
the communists were seen as more sophisticated, and likely to exploit the situation should 
they manage to goad the various camps into conflict.
424
 This US emphasis on alleged 
communist threats must be seen in light of general long-time priorities in American foreign 
policy. Of course, it was not the first time that a Soviet-centric focus had led Washington to 
overstate the Cold War-related aspects of situations in the Middle East.
425
  
The United States continued to publicly voice support for Bakhtiar in the days following 
Khomeini’s arrival, and it even tried to convince the Khomeini camp to acknowledge the 
Bakhtiar Government until new elections could be held. Though Washington failed to break 
the stalemate, there were no serious incidents of violence during the first week of February, as 
all were uncertain about the consequences of an armed confrontation. In particular, no one 
knew how the military would react.
426
  
The standstill abruptly came to an end on February 9, 1979, as units of the Iranian Air Force 
rebelled and declared their support for Khomeini. Heavy fighting ensued between the 
mutineers and the Imperial Guard, whose leadership was still loyal to the government. In 
response, armed radical guerillas and crowds of revolutionaries launched attacks on police 
stations and army barracks, carting away large amounts of weaponry. On February 11, the 
Iranian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces decided that nothing could be done to contain 
the revolution. The military was disintegrating, with many units defecting to the Khomeini 
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camp, and under these circumstances the council declared itself “neutral” in the conflict and 
ordered all personnel to return to their bases. Without the military’s support, Bakhtiar stood 
no chance and soon surrendered. Forces loyal to Khomeini promptly seized government 
buildings, signifying the victory of the revolution.
427
 
Dealing with a New, Chaotic Situation 
The events of February 9-11 had dashed Washington’s hopes. When it mattered most, the 
military leadership had not acted as a pro-Western force, but rather decided upon “neutrality.” 
The Khomeini takeover was both precipitous and confused, and the Carter administration 
struggled to get a clear view of what was going on. As the Iranian military returned to its 
bases, Brzezinski made one final push for a coup in a White House meeting, arguing that this 
might still succeed if the United States encouraged the military in this direction. However, 
this proposal was firmly rejected by his colleagues. Christopher, the highest-ranked State 
Department official at the meeting, considered a coup to be utterly unfeasible, given the 
military’s obvious lack of cohesion. His view was largely supported by Sullivan and Huyser, 
who gave their analyses of the situation by phone.
428
  
The president himself was busy at Camp David, but kept in touch with the White House. 
Carter’s primary worry was for the safety of the Americans in Iran, and other US officials 
shared this fear. Much military weaponry was now in the hands of various rogue guerilla 
groups who acted largely on their own accord, and several Iranian generals were being 
executed by such groups because of their former allegiance to the Shah. Anti-foreign 
sentiment remained strong in Iran as well. The British Embassy had been attacked by 
extremist guerillas, and the Israeli Embassy had been sacked, its officials forced to flee. The 
Carter administration naturally became very concerned about its own embassy, but was forced 
to rely on Bazargan for its protection. On February 13, it was decided that Vance would send 
a congratulatory telegram to the new foreign minister of Iran, to indicate Washington’s 
recognition of the new Bazargan government. The administration felt it had no choice in this 
matter, now that the victory of the revolutionaries was an irreversible fact. While it was 
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obvious that relations with Iran would fundamentally change, such recognition was seen as 
necessary to maintain any kind of American influence at all.
429
   
It was also clear that close military and intelligence co-operation between the United States 
and Iran would not survive. Yet Ambassador Sullivan felt that the new government would still 
need arms supplies, and some kind of arrangement might follow from this. But he warned 
Washington not to put pressure on the Iranians. Given the widespread anti-American 
sentiment in Iran, any active overtures towards Bazargan would likely be counter-
productive.
430
 In the long run, however, the embassy still saw reason to believe that the 
United States could have normal, friendly relations with the new regime, even though “the 
‘special relationships’ will have to undergo changes.”431  
While Khomeini had been victorious in the revolution, he had yet to gain control of it, and 
Bazargan’s government was weak as well. In the days following the fall of Bakhtiar, leftist 
groups in the oil sector continued their strikes, and friction developed between religious 
guerillas and leftist elements.
432
 In addition, armed guerillas were spreading fear on the streets, 
summarily executing those who were seen as traitors to the revolution. One such armed 
guerilla group occupied the US Embassy on February 14. While this occupation was swiftly 
condemned by Bazargan, and Ebrahim Yazdi then managed to convince the guerillas to leave, 
the Americans clearly faced new dangers in Iran. After this episode, Khomeini sent his own 
guerillas to guard the embassy, presumably recognizing the potentially drastic consequences 
should anything happen to it. In light of the hazardous situation, the number of embassy 
officials in Iran had already been drastically reduced, and the remaining ones were largely 
busy with evacuating US citizens.
433
 Sullivan sent a letter to Washington that graphically 
described an embassy where “our personal security is marginal, and dependent on a group 
which had been trained to assassinate us.”434 
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The ambassador reported that Iran was in a state of chaos and that the Bazargan government 
was so far a government in name only. Its authority was constantly being challenged by 
various revolutionary committees that carried out vigilante justice throughout the country and 
instituted what they considered to be Islamic justice. Though these groups formally answered 
to Khomeini, there was little co-operation, as well as unclear jurisdiction among them. As the 
US Embassy now existed in a hostile environment in Iran, Sullivan felt it necessary to keep a 
very low profile and not do anything to provoke the Iranians. Still, US officials felt that closer 
relations with Iran might well be possible in the long run if the new government were to 
survive, as the new prime minister and many of his ministers were believed to wish for 
friendly relations with the United States.
435
 A White House meeting concluded: “There is 
awareness [among them] that good relations with America will be needed, particularly for oil 
production, financial affairs, and other kind of technical support.”436  
A meeting between Ambassador Sullivan and Bazargan on February 21 lent some credence to 
this view. The prime minister noted that while the two countries’ military relationship would 
have to change, a new arrangement would eventually need to follow. Washington insisted that 
Iran remain free of communist influence and must have hoped that some sort of military 
agreement would further their shared interest in containing Soviet ambitions. In light of this, 
Sullivan brought up the strength of the leftist guerilla groups in the streets. The ambassador 
thought that the United States should encourage Khomeini to work with the military—or what 
remained of it—to squash the communists in Iran. Bazargan countered that the other guerillas 
greatly outnumbered the communists, and that while the latter may cause trouble in some 
areas, they had not dared to challenge Khomeini’s direct orders. The meeting also included 
some criticism of the summary executions performed by the revolutionary committees, which 
Bazargan said he regretted. Despite his promise to set up proper procedures for a legal system, 
it was clear that the prime minister had little control of the situation.
437
 
Events would show that the US belief in the threat of the leftist guerillas was exaggerated. As 
Bazargan predicted, they did not dare to directly challenge Khomeini and even issued 
qualified support for him. Other threats to the new regime were emerging as well, though. 
Some of the numerous ethnic groups in Iran had seized the opportunity presented by the 
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upheaval of the revolution to press for increased autonomy or independence. In late February, 
for example, there were clashes between Kurdish groups and forces loyal to the 
government.
438
 To Washington’s surprise, an Iranian government official accused the CIA of 
having orchestrated the Kurdish revolt. He made this accusation in a phone conversation with 
Cyrus Vance, who firmly denied this, and the rest of the conversation went better. The official 
stressed that Iran sought friendly relations with the US, including the continued sale of oil and 
other strong economic ties.
439
 Still, the accusation demonstrated Tehran’s great suspicion and 
resentment regarding Washington. 
The Americans Lay Low  
The Carter administration’s treatment of the Shah in the aftermath of the revolution presented 
clear evidence of Washington’s reluctance to provoke the new decision makers in Iran. 
Though the Shah had earlier rejected an American offer to come stay in the US, he later 
changed his mind, only to find that the administration was now wary of this arrangement.
440
   
In mid-March, Vance followed the recommendation of the US Embassy and advised the 
president that they “inform the Shah […] that regrettably we must recommend against his 
coming to the United States at this time.”441 Carter reluctantly agreed, given the risk to 
Americans in Iran if they let the Shah into the country. It could be seen in Iran as a sign of US 
support for the deposed leader, and possibly undermine the embassy’s cautious efforts to 
make inroads with the new government. The Shah’s closest allies in the United States were 
appalled, and Brzezinski, not to mention influential men outside the administration such as 
Henry Kissinger and the billionaire David Rockefeller, would push Carter to reverse the 
decision over the next few months, to no avail.
442
 The Shah, who had been the primary 
protector of US interests in Iran for decades, was now clearly regarded as a strategic liability.  
Washington was right to be worried about provoking the new regime. While the official 
government seemed open to the prospect of friendly relations and cooperation with the United 
States, Khomeini himself struck a decidedly different tone, attacking both the US and the 
Soviet Union while pledging to rid Iran of foreign influences. He would accomplish this by 
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making Iran an Islamic Republic, which would not have a Western-inspired legal system but 
rather follow what he regarded as the laws of Islam. A referendum had been set for March 30, 
1979, to determine whether the nation would follow this path.
443
  
As Washington had predicted, a Khomeini-dominated Iran was in fact less amenable to US 
interests than before. The new regime announced that Iran would no longer act as policeman 
of the Gulf and was also adamant that the vital US intelligence facilities near the Soviet 
border had to go. This illustrates why the loss of the Shah was so significant from a Cold War 
perspective, and why many in Washington had dreaded his overthrow, even though the new 
Iran would alienate the USSR as well. Tehran had also acted to establish close contacts with 
the Palestinian leadership and had cut off all relations with Israel, toward which it was now 
actively hostile. Lastly, the new regime had already indicated that it would be more 
aggressive on oil prices than the Shah, and far less susceptible to American influence on its oil 
policy.
444
  
Interestingly, most of the US priorities in its Iran policy remained the same. In the words of 
the ambassador, the Americans “wished to see the sovereign integrity of Iran remain intact, 
and the country to remain free from Soviet domination. Its oil too is of immense importance, 
if not to ourselves directly, then at least to our Western European and Japanese allies.”445  
But it was now very hard for the United States to advance any of its interests in Iran, or even 
to determine the proper negotiators. Numerous men with unclear authority claimed to be 
legitimate representatives of the Iranian government. The de jure government of Bazargan 
had relatively little authority, and much power was exercised by the revolutionary committees, 
which officially answered to Khomeini. March 1979 saw many more executions of “traitors” 
to the revolution, including leading officials of the old regime and revolutionaries who were 
found to be disloyal to Khomeini himself. Bazargan struggled to control the committees, 
which led to a rift between the prime minister and the ayatollah. The latter, while formally 
supporting Bazargan and calling for calm in the country, refused to bring the committees to 
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heel, seeing them as helpful to his goal of ridding the nation of Western influence and 
completing the revolution.
446
  
In early March, Khomeini left Tehran and went to live in Qom, a city considered holy in Shia 
Islam that is located 125 kilometers southwest of the capital. It was still clear to all, however, 
that he continued to play decisive role in Iranian politics, and there was much discussion in 
the US government whether it should finally send an envoy to meet with the ayatollah. This 
might make it easier to nudge Iran in an anti-Soviet direction and improve the prospects for 
future co-operation. Yet the Americans stood pat, for one primary reason: officially meeting 
with Khomeini would be seen as granting him legitimacy in his leadership role, and this might 
strengthen his position at the expense of Bazargan’s ministry. The fear of possibly weakening 
the Bazargan government even further led the Carter administration to postpone making a 
decision on whether to arrange such a meeting.
447
  
The relatively moderate revolutionaries in the Bazargan government, after all, were most open 
to friendly relations with the United States.
448
  Washington thus strongly hoped that they 
would prove an influential force, despite the US Embassy’s observation that “Bazargan’s 
prospects for seeing Iran successfully through the post-revolutionary transition to moderate, 
pro-Western republicanism are dubious in the extreme.”449  
Throughout March, the Bazargan government struggled to control the situation in Iran. 
Revolutionary groups continued to execute officials that had been associated with the Shah, 
and had even begun the persecution of several religious minorities, most particularly the 
Bahá'í, a sect that was strongly disliked by the Shia clergy.
450
 The Carter administration 
lamented such developments, but it was thought that it should perhaps “avoid publicly 
criticizing the new government on human rights grounds, but privately make our concerns 
clear”, as stated by an NSC staff member.451 Clearly, it was feared that this kind of criticism 
might only prove counter-productive. This dilemma recalls the administration’s human rights 
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policy toward the Shah, as Washington then too was worried about harming bilateral relations 
by engaging in overt public criticism.
452
  
The United States was not the only superpower wary of upsetting the new regime. The USSR 
had also gone out of its way to avoid conflict with Khomeini.
453
 This did not stop Washington, 
however, from cultivating its suspicions regarding Soviet intentions towards Iran. For instance, 
when a full rebellion broke out in the Kurdish areas of northwestern Iran in mid-March, 1979, 
there was some speculation within the NSC on whether it would be exploited by the USSR, or 
even that the Soviets might have orchestrated it, though no evidence surfaced in this regard.
454
 
Clearly, US policymakers still saw Iran through a Cold War prism, and Washington must thus 
have been pleased when Bazargan anticipated some sort of military arrangement with the 
United States in the future; he had even asked for some US military advisors to remain in Iran 
for the time being.
455
 
Still, there was much skepticism regarding the reliability of the Iranian government. 
Throughout February and March, therefore, US officials had cancelled outstanding arms sales 
to Iran and also attempted to buy back sensitive weaponry and equipment. The cancelled arms 
sales were worth billions of dollars that Iran was unable and unwilling to pay, given both the 
struggling economy and the revolutionaries’ resentment of the Shah’s exorbitant military 
spending. Despite the economic hit, Washington was greatly relieved to keep these weapons 
from falling into the wrong hands, either in Iran or elsewhere.
456
 
An Early Clash with the New Islamic Republic  
This skepticism towards the new decision makers in Iran was aggravated by events to come. 
On March 30-31, the Iranian people supported the creation of an “Islamic republic” by an 
overwhelming majority. A “yes/no” vote was the entirety of the referendum, and no other 
alternative forms of government were up for discussion, illustrating Khomeini’s continuing 
dominance. Yet there was little clarity as to what an Islamic republic actually entailed. No 
constitution had yet been written, and the provisional government of Bazargan would stay in 
place until a new government could be elected, even though the Islamic Revolutionary 
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Council, a loosely organized group set up by Khomeini in exile and largely dominated by his 
closest followers, virtually functioned as a second government. Hard-line supporters of the 
ayatollah would also begin to fill many government offices. Domestically, their agenda was 
focused on instituting strict interpretations of Islamic law and ridding Iran of any Western 
influence.
457
 At the same time, Iran’s anti-American atmosphere grew along with Khomeini’s 
increasing authority.
458
 
Nevertheless, Washington also saw some positive signs. The radical left in Iran had not 
proved to be as strong as it had feared. Its numerous splinter groups and various unclear 
agendas seemed too weak to directly challenge the religious forces in Iran, which commanded 
widespread popular support. Still, the US government allowed for the possibility that if the 
leftist groups ever united in a common strategy, they could prove an influential factor in Iran. 
Washington was also wary of the alleged threat of pro-Soviet leftists gaining positions in the 
Iranian government, and the US Embassy warned Iranian officials about this fear. The US 
government strongly wished to restore some sort of intelligence co-operation with Tehran, so 
that they could work together with the Iranians to keep track of Soviet machinations.
459
 
Clearly, the Cold War continued to cast it shadow and made Washington focus much of its 
attention towards alleged leftist threats, despite the relative weakness of the pro-Soviet groups. 
The Americans also lacked good sources for information in Iran, and it was thus seemingly 
hard for them to know what to make of the chaotic situation.
460
 
Anti-American sentiment in Iran, propped up by Khomeini’s frequent anti-American speeches, 
kept the Carter administration wary of pushing for these goals as spring advanced. US 
officials instead continued to tell their Iranian counterparts that they were ready for co-
operation in any sort of area when the Iranians were.
461
 
In this regard, the Bazargan government provided some promising signals. At a meeting on 
April 29 with US Embassy Deputy of Chief Charles Naas, Iranian Minister of Information 
Nasser Minachi seemed relatively friendly toward the United States. Minachi even offered to 
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set up a meeting between Khomeini and US officials, but Naas could not pursue it, because 
Washington had yet to approve a US meeting with the ayatollah.
462
 Despite the positive 
signals, Minachi did demonstrate the lingering distrust on the Iranian side of the table, even 
among relatively moderate ministers who were seemingly inclined towards normalized 
bilateral relations. Though he insisted that the government wanted a clean slate in US-Iranian 
relations, he indicated that the long-lasting, close American connections to the Shah were hard 
to move past. This skepticism regarding US intentions had not been improved by the recent 
widespread criticism in the US media against the executions and human rights violations in 
Iran, which Minachi claimed had been blown out of proportion.
463
  
The issue of human rights violations would cause much difficulty for the fragile US-Iranian 
relationship, in fact, and undermined Washington’s attempts to establish contacts with the 
new regime. On April 6, Ambassador Sullivan had left Iran, necessitating a replacement.
464
 
The Carter administration saw the appointment of a new ambassador as a good way to 
demonstrate its openness to the new Iranian regime, and Walter Cutler was nominated as 
Sullivan’s successor. Cutler would never actually assume this position, however, as a US 
Senate resolution raised an uproar in Iran. On May 17, 1979, the senators condemned the 
large numbers of executions in Iran, and especially the lack of proper judicial process. In 
response, Khomeini denounced the United States in strong terms, leading to a wave of anti-
American protests, and Iran then blocked the ambassadorial appointment.
465
  
The Carter administration emphasized to the Iranians that it did not control the actions of the 
Senate, and tried to make clear that the United States still wished for cordial relations. Yet this 
did not mitigate the anger of the Iranian government, which felt that the resolution was a 
rejection of the revolution and an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. Ebrahim 
Yazdi, now foreign minister, also accused Washington of hypocrisy, claiming that it had 
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looked the other way as far as the human rights abuses of the Shah were concerned.
466
 Yet 
again, the legacy of past US policy in Iran colored the attitude of the new regime towards the 
Carter administration. 
Moderate Friendliness, Moderate Amounts of Influence  
Despite the rejected ambassadorial appointment, the US Embassy continued to be run much 
as before, though it was now headed by a chargé d’affaires. But the burgeoning anti-
Americanism in Iran made things even more difficult for the embassy.
467
 In spite of the 
worsened relations, however, US officials still regularly met with those whom they saw as 
moderate and secular representatives of the Bazargan government. While these men too were 
deeply skeptical of the United States, and sometimes adapted their rhetoric to the anti-
American atmosphere that prevailed in Iran, they saw the need for Iran to normalize relations 
with the United States. First of all, Iran had use for US military and technological expertise, as 
Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Amir-Entezam cautiously implied in a press conference in 
June.
468
 
In addition, the Iranian economy continued to suffer from the turmoil of the past year, and a 
resumption of normal contacts with the United States may naturally have been seen as helpful, 
given its extensive economic ties to Iran. This would also be in Washington’s interest, as the 
revolutionary chaos in Iran had led to a loss in export revenue. The US Embassy had hesitated 
to encourage US businesses to resume their work in Iran, given that many American 
businessmen had suffered harassment after the revolution, and there was great concern for 
their safety.
469
 As such, a return to normal conditions, and a cooling of the anti-American 
rhetoric in Iran, was clearly in the shared interest of the Carter administration and the 
Bazargan government.  
The central challenge to any process of normalization was the fact that Iran did not speak with 
one voice, and Khomeini and his Revolutionary Council only increased their influence in 
Iranian politics over the spring. Bazargan tried to soften the effects of Khomeini’s more 
extreme views, but he had to adapt to them as well. His ministry had no real way to contain 
Khomeini’s influence, as Entezam confided to Charles Naas some weeks after the 
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ambassadorial rejection. The reason for his government’s action, he explained, was that it had 
to appease Khomeini, who had at first sought to break off all diplomatic relations with the 
United States in response to the resolution.
470
 Naas dutifully reported Entezam’s observation 
that “the political reality in Iran is that Khomeini makes almost all policy.”471 
Nevertheless, Iran later sent a conciliatory sign by encouraging the United States to announce 
a new ambassador. Foreign Minister Yazdi backtracked a bit on June 23, claiming that Cutler 
had been rejected because of his earlier “imperialist” roles in the Foreign Service and 
indicated that Washington was welcome to choose someone else for the position.
472
 This idea 
was not accepted by the Carter administration. The rejection of Cutler had disgruntled 
Washington, and appointing someone else would presumably be seen as bowing to the whims 
of Iran.
473
 The episode likely undermined weakened Washington’s belief that constructive co-
operation with Iran was possible at the moment, as the Iranian government seemed too weak, 
too erratic, and too dependent on Khomeini.
 
This would in turn explain why the embassy 
continued to lay low and largely followed a “wait-and-see” approach.474  
Insofar as Washington had any clear strategy in post-revolutionary Iran, it was centered on the 
attempt to establish contacts with the relative moderates of the Iranian government, like 
Bazargan. If these moderates came to run Iranian affairs more effectively, such contacts 
would be useful for improving relations. The Bazargan government’s relative friendliness 
towards the West, at least in comparison to Khomeini’s inner circles and the influential Shia 
clergy as a whole, and their expressed willingness to have some sort of military co-operation 
with the United States, made Washington place its hopes in their success.
475
  
On the other hand, the Americans did little to strengthen ties with the Khomeini camp and the 
clergy in general. Certainly, the clergy’s hostility to the United States made it very hard to 
establish such contacts.
476
 In many ways, the Carter administration therefore had few 
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alternatives in this matter. However, as illustrated by the American reluctance to meet 
Ayatollah Khomeini, this was also partly an active choice by the US government.
477
  
This reluctance had been caused by a fear that doing so could weaken the position of the 
relative moderates in the Bazargan government. In truth though, it appears that the moderates 
themselves believed that a real rapprochement with Washington was only possible if the 
United States acknowledged Khomeini, as indicated by Minachi’s earlier proposal. Several 
prominent US Embassy officials shared this belief, including Charles Naas. While he 
acknowledged that a meeting with Khomeini could well fail, perhaps only offering him an 
opportunity to berate and humiliate the US representatives, he still believed it was worth a try. 
Washington knew little about the motivations and inner workings of the Khomeini camp, and 
a direct meeting represented the best chance for the United States to influence the ayatollah, 
Naas argued.
478
 Such a meeting might be necessary, according to Naas, because “it is likely 
that Khomeini and his entourage see our non-relationship with him over these many months 
as continuing opposition to the revolution”, and given “the assumption that Khomeini will 
hold substantial power for the foreseeable future.”479  
The latter conclusion was backed by most of the reports the Carter administration received 
from Tehran. Iran was still in a disorderly state, and it was not easy to see what kind of 
political structure would emerge from their tumultuous process of writing a constitution.
480
 
Yet it seemed clear that whatever the precise outcome of this process, Khomeini would likely 
emerge with extensive powers, not only in religious matters but also as far as military affairs 
and foreign policy were concerned.
481
 For example, one article of the draft constitution 
forbade foreign bases on Iranian soil, which, the US military mission in Iran reported, “if 
enforced (and we assume it would be as long as Khomeini has power), would preclude 
reestablishment of U.S. pre-revolutionary operations.”482 
Yet the Carter administration did not try to arrange a meeting with Khomeini. While the 
embassy felt that this impeded the establishment of better relations with Iran, acknowledging 
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the ayatollah was still feared by Washington to further strengthen his position at the expense 
of the Bazargan government.
483
 While it is clear why the administration would want to stay 
low until things improved, due to the fierce anti-Americanism of the Khomeini camp, it can 
also be argued that Washington’s policy was based on its hopes, rather than adapting to the 
reality on the ground. Instead of protecting US interests by actively trying to make the best of 
a bad situation, with all the risks and compromises this would entail, the Americans remained 
passive. It cannot be known whether following Naas’ advice here would have made a 
difference, but given that the Bazargan government never prevailed, this “wait-and-see” 
approach towards Khomeini and Iran was clearly a failure in hindsight. 
A Helping Hand 
Still, this is not a complete picture of US policy towards the new Islamic republic. In cases 
where Iran sought co-operation and help from the Americans, Washington mostly responded 
positively. Though relations were still not normalized, such cases became more frequent 
throughout the late summer and fall of 1979, when much of the commotion caused by the US 
Senate resolution had apparently passed. Some of the support given by Washington was 
economic.
484
 In the autumn of 1979, the US government began “cautiously to encourage 
businessmen to return to Iran so that major projects could be continued.”485 It also agreed to 
accept the sale of heating oil to Iran, which was supplied by a company in the private sector. 
This sale was needed due to a shortage in Iran that had been caused by continuing problems in 
the oil sector, which still had not restored normal levels of production. It was clearly in the 
Carter administration’s self-interest to provide such assistance, as well, because it would 
increase the chances of Iran continuing to supply large amounts of oil to the United States.
486
  
Presumably, Washington also saw such actions as likely to increase Iranian goodwill towards 
the United States in general, which would be beneficial to the restoration of normal relations. 
US interest in economic recovery and stability in Iran must have been linked with the state of 
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the global economy as well. The lag in Iranian oil production had significantly contributed to 
oil prices being up by over 60 per cent in six months, which had led to a situation of great 
uncertainty in the world oil markets.
487
 There were thus several reasons why it was in the 
mutual interest of the United States and Iran that the latter’s oil sector and economy should 
return to normal, and the US Embassy believed it should emphasize that “American interests 
in access to Iranian oil are synonymous with Iranian interests in sustaining and financing its 
future industrial and agricultural development.”488 
The Carter administration also provided some assistance in military and intelligence matters, 
and from July onward, the Iranians sought such help on numerous occasions. Yazdi requested 
necessary spare parts to military equipment, and the Americans often granted such requests, 
likely in the interests of eventually reestablishing closer relations with Iran.
489
 As Yazdi 
emphasized in October, “[US] performance in the military supply field will continue to be an 
acid test of [its] attitudes toward the revolution.”490 Washington played along, though with the 
caveat that no sensitive equipment would be sold.
491
  
While the latter shows the existing distrust towards Iran, the sales in general indicates that 
Washington may have seen possibilities for eventually reestablishing some sort of military 
relationship. While it is evident why Iran would need US spare parts for weaponry bought 
from America, it may still seem surprising that Iranian officials were so eager to seek such 
assistance, considering that US-Iranian relations were still characterized by great hostility 
from Tehran. The Iranian regime’s deep skepticism towards the Soviet Union may help 
explain this turn of events.
492
 “While anti-US feeling is strong among the [decision makers in 
Iran], their basic foreign policy fear is of the USSR,” wrote William Griffith, a historian and 
political scientist who worked as an advisor to Brzezinski.
493
 This wariness arose from both 
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geographical proximity and antipathy towards the atheism and communism of the Soviet 
Union.
494
 American decision makers must have applauded this, still largely viewing Iran 
through a Cold War prism anyway. 
Washington demonstrated its desire for good relations by providing the Iranian government 
with classified intelligence reports throughout the fall of 1979.
495
 Iranian officials, including 
Deputy Prime Minister Amir-Entezam, had approached the US Embassy about this possibility, 
and in July the Carter administration agreed. Clearly still subscribing to the expertise of US 
intelligence, the Iranians particularly sought information on the actions of Iraq, a neighboring 
state with which revolutionary Iran already had hostile relations.
496
 While Iraq was the 
primary agenda item in the several meetings between US intelligence officers and ministers of 
the Bazargan government, the Americans had also provided reports on Soviet policy.
497
  
Despite all of this, the Iranian government was not necessarily becoming friendlier to the 
United States. While such intelligence-related meetings likely were at least tolerated by 
Khomeini, he continued to issue fiercely anti-American statements. Even officials like Yazdi, 
who had been involved in these meetings, still frequently clashed with Carter administration 
on the world stage.
498
 Such clashes arose from the ongoing doubts regarding whether the 
United States had accepted the revolution; the belief that Washington was interfering in 
internal Iranian conflicts; America’s largely pro-Israeli policy in the Middle East conflict; and 
disagreements over US criticism of human rights violations in Iran.
499
 A meeting between 
Yazdi and Vance on October 3—the first such meeting between leading members of the 
governments of revolutionary Iran and the United States—confirmed that the Iranian 
government was still deeply skeptical about Washington. In particular, the shadow of past US 
support for the Shah clearly still made it difficult for the Carter administration to restore 
normal ties.
500
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By late fall though, the United States apparently began considering a more active policy 
towards Iran and its religious leadership. In October, Washington was busy trying to find a 
new ambassador with whom to hopefully signal a new start.
501
 Equally significantly, the 
Carter administration planned to send Henry Precht, head of the State Department’s Iran desk, 
to Iran to meet with Islamic leaders “who have had no contacts with us for six months or 
more.”502 Yet the administration never got to see whether such steps would yield any results, 
as a crisis would soon cause the US-Iranian relationship to collapse entirely.  
The Return of the Shah, and the Start of a Long Crisis 
Ever since the Shah’s exile, his strongest American allies, like Brzezinski, had been pressing 
for the monarch to be allowed to enter the United States.
503
 President Carter had demurred, 
and the Shah had been living in other countries, including Egypt and Morocco. In early 
October, however, an unexpected piece of news made the president reevaluate the situation. 
Unbeknownst to Washington, the Shah had been diagnosed with cancer quite some time ago, 
and he was now in need of an operation that reportedly required the sort of advanced 
equipment that could only be found in the United States. Carter was faced with a dilemma. He 
could either reject the entry of a mortally ill longtime ally, with all of the political and moral 
complications that this would entail. Or he could let the Shah enter the US for medical 
treatment, knowing that there might be outrage from the Iranian government, which had long 
wanted the former monarch put on trial for his alleged crimes. Letting the Shah enter the 
United States was also feared to jeopardize the safety of Americans in Iran. Still, the president 
soon concluded that he couldn’t deny treatment to the Shah, and he reluctantly allowed him to 
come to the United States. The Shah arrived in New York City on October 22, 1979.
504
 
In an attempt to ensure the safety of American citizens in Iran, the Carter administration tried 
to explain the situation to the Iranian government. US officials stressed the Shah’s dire straits 
and emphasized that he would not use the visit for any political purposes. At first, the reaction 
of the Iranian public to the news of the Shah’s arrival in New York was relatively subdued, 
according to the US Embassy in Tehran.
505
 While the embassy had stepped up its security 
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measures, chargé d’affaires Bruce Laingen believed that “the U.S. will come through this 
latest development in our bilateral relationship with Iran relatively unscathed.”506 However, 
Laingen underestimated the sensitivity surrounding the longstanding US association with the 
Shah. The next few days saw rapidly increasing anti-Americanism in Iran, and on November 
1 there were reports that a massive demonstration was planned, with upward of one million 
participants.
507
  
On that same day, Zbigniew Brzezinski was in Algiers, representing the US government in 
the official celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Algerian revolution. This event 
was also attended by Bazargan and Yazdi. As Carter’s decision regarding the Shah had 
strained relations with Iran further, Laingen suggested to Bazargan he might use the event to 
talk personally with US representatives. The Iranian prime minister agreed to this and 
requested a meeting with Brzezinski, which was granted.
508
 Yazdi and Bazargan used the 
occasion to protest the Shah’s arrival in New York, with the Foreign Minister suggesting that 
this whole affair had only strengthened their doubts of whether the United States had truly 
accepted the fall of the Shah. Brzezinski denied any such accusations and emphasized again 
that Washington was prepared to expand contacts when and if this would be of interest. While 
the discussion with the Iranian leaders was more cordial than Brzezinski had expected, it was 
clear that anti-American sentiments in Iran had been aggravated.
509
  
Khomeini continued to fan the flames, saying that Iran should build “a Great Wall of China” 
between itself and the United States.
510
 Thousands of demonstrators had subsequently 
surrounded the US Embassy, shouting anti-American slogans. While these crowds were 
eventually dispersed, the situation was about to take a turn for the worse. On November 4, 
1979, the embassy was occupied, and its employees were taken hostage, all done by a group 
of students who proclaimed their allegiance to Khomeini but who seemed to be acting on their 
own. While this was clearly a serious matter, Washington expected that the Iranian 
government would promptly secure the release of the hostages, as had been the case during 
the February incident. This time, however, it would be a very different story. To 
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Washington’s surprise, Khomeini did not condemn the incident but rather gave it his tacit 
approval, removing the possibility of a straightforward solution. The result was a hostage 
crisis that effectively spelled the end of US-Iranian diplomatic relations.
511
   
*** 
The lengthy hostage crisis significantly influenced the future of US-Iranian relations. It 
directly contributed to anti-American and khomeiniist forces further consolidating their power 
in Iran, as men like Bazargan and Yazdi promptly resigned from their positions when the 
government failed to secure Khomeini’s support for the release of the hostages. The ayatollah 
used the incident to strengthen his internal position in Iran, which would be a dominant one in 
the years to come.
512
 The crisis also greatly affected the Carter administration, which 
immediately put all of its efforts into securing the release of the hostages. That release would 
not occur until January 20, 1981, the same day that Carter was succeeded as president by 
Ronald Reagan, his Republican opponent in the 1980 election. President Carter viewed the 
hostage crisis as one of the most important contributions to his defeat.
513
 The fate of his 
presidency and the fate of the US-Iranian relationship were thus closely connected in the end.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This study has analyzed the development of US policy towards Iran from January 1977 to 
November 1979, in order to answer three interlinked questions about that policy. What were 
the primary interests of the Carter Administration in Iran? How did the US Government 
attempt to further these interests during this period, and why? What factors in the US policy 
towards Iran contributed to Washington’s difficulties in protecting its interests there?   
A Traditional Foreign Policy Line, with a Twist  
US policy toward Iran had long been characterized by strong support for the rule of the Shah. 
The United States contributed to his dominance in Iran starting with its involvement in the 
1953 overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, an event that earned the United 
States much enmity in Iranian opposition circles. Later, the United States helped build up the 
strength of the Iranian regime by selling large amounts of weaponry, cooperating closely in 
the military and intelligence areas, and cultivating extensive economic contacts. 
A central US priority during the Cold War was to contain Soviet ambitions, and this anti-
Soviet focus became the primary element in the Iran policy of the United States. Washington 
certainly had strong motivations for building up Iran’s military strength. While it helped to 
ensure that Iran itself remained free of Soviet influence, the Shah would eventually also play a 
vital role in US foreign policy as the policeman of the Gulf. As the Americans saw it, he was 
helping to contain the threat of radical forces allied to the USSR and protect the steady supply 
of oil to the West. Oil had great economic and strategic significance to the United States and 
its allies. Less vital but still important were the Shah’s close ties to Israel and good relations 
with parties on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The incoming Carter administration 
inherited all of this longtime US policy toward Iran in 1977, and it regarded the Shah as the 
one element ensuring that Iranian policy would continue along these lines. 
That administration would therefore, by and large, prioritize the same interests in Iran as its 
predecessors, despite the fact that the new president had portrayed himself as a reformer 
regarding foreign policy, stressing arms reduction and human rights and advocating that US 
foreign policy be less Cold War–based than in the past. As Iran was the largest buyer of US 
weaponry and had a record on human rights that was much criticized globally, the Iranian 
government naturally feared that Carter’s convictions would complicate bilateral relations. 
However, the Carter administration was generally split in its foreign policy line, and when its 
humanitarian ideals came into conflict with US strategic interests, the latter would generally 
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win out. The containment of communism and the Soviet influence in Iran, as well as in the 
region at large, continued to be a primary motivator of Washington’s policy.  
As such, the United States continued to cultivate close ties to the Shah and sell Iran advanced 
weaponry. This was in line with ambitions of ensuring that Iran remained strong enough to 
play the role of a stabilizing and anti-communist force in Middle East, and the strategic 
importance of the Shah was simply too great to risk aggravating Tehran by denying such sales. 
The administration also considered it vital to bolster Iran’s defenses, and the president was 
thus personally involved in convincing the US Congress to approve the sale of technologically 
advanced AWACS military planes to Iran in 1977, even though this sale received criticism for 
seemingly contradicting his professed commitment to arms restraint.  
Similarly, Washington did not pressure Iran too strongly on human rights issues, as it feared 
damaging the close relations with the Shah, or possibly hurting his internal position by 
encouraging his domestic opponents. Yet the Carter administration was well aware of the 
existing criticism toward Iran on this matter, and the president still wanted to make the 
advancement of human rights a priority of his Iran policy. Therefore the United States did not 
hesitate to use some of its leverage to influence Iran on this matter, even if the aforementioned 
worries made for a careful balancing act. The administration encouraged the Shah to improve 
the standing of human rights in Iran, and its general human rights agenda played a 
contributory part towards the Shah’s liberalization reforms, directly or indirectly. Washington 
applauded such reforms, not only for humanitarian reasons but also for strategic ones. That is, 
if the Shah’s reputation were to be improved by such reforms, his close connection to the 
United States would not seem so inconsistent with Carter’s human rights agenda. US officials 
also hoped that reforms would contribute to the internal stability of Iran, hence their 
encouragement of liberalization in 1977.   
The human rights issue was not the only one that worried Washington as far as Iran was 
concerned. Oil-related matters also caused difficulties, even though the Carter administration 
recognized the Shah’s vital role as an oil supplier to the United States and its allies in Western 
Europe and Israel. Washington still saw the Iranian agenda on oil prices as problematic, and 
the president largely carried on his predecessor’s work in trying to mitigate the Shah’s “price 
hawk” approach. Officials feared that a proposed OPEC price increase in 1977 would hurt the 
Western economies, and Washington used all of its leverage with Tehran to convince the 
Shah to support a price freeze instead, which he eventually did. While the Shah had at first 
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caused difficulties for the United States over this issue, his turnaround surely strengthened 
Washington’s faith in the virtues of close ties to the Iranian monarch. 
Little Change in US Policy, Despite an Accelerating Crisis  
Starting early in 1978, an anti-Shah rebellion, led by the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, would 
emerge to eventually bring the Iranian government down. Throughout this crisis, the Carter 
administration would signal its clear support for the Shah, arguing that he was the best man to 
resolve this difficult situation. Given the generally complicated foreign policy of this 
administration, it is perhaps not surprising that it would follow an almost contradictory line at 
times. The administration would both encourage the Shah’s promises of liberalization and 
agree that he needed to take the opposite sorts of steps to restore order. While Washington 
would not express support for his various crackdowns, it would not condemn them either. 
It was clear that if any of the anti-Shah forces came to power, US interests would be 
endangered. Iran might cease being an ally of the West or otherwise abandon its vital regional 
role with regard to containing Soviet influence. The religious forces that dominated the 
rebellion were generally fiercely opposed to close ties with the United States, after all. This 
geopolitical aspect underpinned Washington’s support for the Shah throughout the crisis, and 
contributed to its emphatic line that order needed to be restored in Iran.  
Even as it worried about the developments in Iran, the Carter administration did not see the 
Shah’s rule as severely threatened until late in 1978, and bilateral relations were conducted 
normally. US policy continued to be informed by a Cold War focus, and by a wish to build up 
the Shah’s regional strength. Thus the United States mostly acceded to Iran’s large-scale arms 
requests in the summer of 1978, despite their controversial nature, particularly within the 
State Department. Again, the administration was faced with the contradictory goals of 
advancing the president’s arms restraint policy and strengthening Iran militarily, and the 
results at this time were mixed. On the one hand, Secretary of State Vance and President 
Carter did block the sale of advanced aircraft technology that was high on the Shah’s wish list, 
and the administration prepared plans for reducing arms sales over the long term. On the other 
hand, the administration granted most of Iran’s other arms requests, also in the hopes of 
ensuring the Shah’s goodwill and continued support for US policies. 
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Intelligence Failure, Infighting, and Inaction   
The perceived need to keep the Shah happy would soon lead to great difficulties for the 
United States. As the crisis in Iran metastasized in late 1978, the massive failure in US 
intelligence became obvious regarding the security of the Shah’s position and the severity of 
the threat posed by Khomeini. When looking for explanations for this failure, one pivotal 
factor must be emphasized. The United States had not developed many close contacts among 
opposition elements in Iran, due to the desire to maintain good relations with the Shah, and 
US officials had few sources of information outside his inner circles. This situation had 
improved since the start of the Carter presidency, but only somewhat. This then contributed to 
an overly positive view of the Shah’s position. Washington’s failure to make such contacts in 
Iran, and its unwillingness to meet with leading representatives of the Khomeini camp, 
generally made the opposition even more skeptical towards the United States. It would 
therefore also lead to further difficulties for the Americans after the fall of the Shah. 
Another reason for Washington’s struggle to grasp the extent and nature of the crisis in Iran 
was the Cold War prism through which it viewed the Middle East. This focus greatly 
contributed to US analyses of the situation in Iran, both before and after the revelation of a 
large intelligence failure. It is indeed remarkable that throughout 1978–79, US officials would 
continue to exaggerate the threat of relatively weak leftist revolutionary groups, or the 
potential Soviet exploitation of the Iranian chaos, particularly in relation to the fundamentalist 
and vehemently anti-American forces associated with Khomeini who were actually gaining 
power.   
As the state of affairs in Iran fell completely apart by late 1978, the Carter administration 
became desperate for stability for its vital ally. The Shah’s position was now clearly 
threatened, and massive, politically motivated strikes were causing havoc for the nation’s oil 
industry, which had obvious global ramifications as well. Due to Iran’s role as a significant 
supplier of oil to several US allies in Western Europe, Israel and Japan, the restoration of 
order would become even more of a priority for Washington. While American interests in Iran 
remained the same, it was much less clear how to protect them. The intelligence failure 
spurred infighting within the Carter administration and contributed to a vague and overly 
cautious policy even as the crisis in Iran reached its zenith. It had left the administration 
unprepared to deal with the crisis in late 1978, not having made any contingency plans.  
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Some US officials, including Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and veteran 
diplomat George Ball, held that Iran’s problems could best be alleviated if the Shah 
implemented reforms, such as agreeing to form a coalition government with moderate parts of 
the opposition or relinquishing some of his powers. As the crisis worsened and the Shah 
appeared unable to handle the situation, State Department officials began to call for the 
United States to make contacts with all parts of the opposition, including the Khomeini camp, 
and help negotiate a deal between the influential (oppositionist) clergy and the military as 
well. The idea that Washington should start to prepare for a post-Shah era had gained traction 
in the State Department, and Ambassador William Sullivan eventually reached the same 
conclusion, albeit cautiously. These calls for changes in US policy were not fully embraced 
by the head of the department, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, whose attention was for some 
time largely devoted to other issues, like the Israeli-Egyptian peace process. 
Most prominent among those who opposed such proposals of reform, and the leading 
proponent of the other line that characterized the administration’s internal debates, was 
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. He instead promoted a strong crackdown by 
the Iranian military, to restore order and prevent the overthrow of the Shah, seeing this 
solution as necessary due to the importance of retaining Iran as a key ally. While other 
prominent officials, such as Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, would sometimes 
sympathize with similar positions, no one pushed it like Brzezinski did. This led to conflict 
with Vance, the president’s other leading foreign policy advisor. 
President Carter, however, did not support any of these positions, and US policy would be 
characterized by its prudence and occasional vacillation. Washington would not push the Shah 
in any particular direction, even when he sought its advice. The Carter administration’s 
inaction was influenced by its internal divides, which made it difficult to set upon a clear and 
coherent course, again illustrating the administration’s split foreign policy line. While those 
who opposed Brzezinski’s line throughout the crisis argued that his proposals were unfeasible, 
it was also thought by Vance and the State Department that a crackdown would run counter to 
the humanitarian ideals of the administration, and the president’s would not back Brzezinski’s 
ideas regarding the viability of a military solution. However, the president was also unwilling 
to support proposals of reform that could weaken the Shah’s internal position, being 
disinclined to put pressure upon Washington’s longtime ally.  
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Forced Adjustments  
As the administration’s policy towards Iran continued to be characterized by infighting and 
indecision, the Shah’s situation deteriorated further. By late 1978, it was clear that the Shah’s 
“stick and carrot” approach to the opposition had failed. In a last ditch-attempt to save his 
position, the monarch announced in early January 1979 that he would temporarily leave the 
country. He also appointed a new prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar, to work with the Iranian 
military to try to restore order. The Carter administration had reached the point where it 
encouraged the Shah to go through with this plan, so that Bakhtiar would have some chance 
of success and perhaps even preserve Iran’s close relationship to the United States. 
The Carter administration likewise considered the Iranian military to be vital to its hopes of 
protecting US interests in Iran. This had also been a secondary motivation behind the large-
scale arms sales, as it had long been believed that good relations with the military leadership 
would be important if Western interests in Iran were ever threatened. The US Government 
sent General Robert Huyser to Iran, with the mission of convincing the military to remain 
loyal to Bakhtiar. This would be particularly important, it was believed, in the event that the 
Khomeini forces attempted to overthrow his government. 
Ambassador Sullivan may have thought this was too little, too late, as he feared that 
Khomeini’s strength was too overwhelming for the military to withstand. He advocated for 
direct contact with the Khomeini camp and for an initiative to compel the military and the 
clergy, the two most important institutions in Iran, to negotiate a solution. Unless this 
happened ahead of Khomeini’s anticipated return to Iran, Sullivan felt that there would be 
chaos and bloodshed, as well as the possibility of increased communist influence. He argued 
that since the military and the clergy were both anti-communist, they would have a mutual 
interest in a solution. The Carter administration rejected this proposal, believing that 
Khomeini would not be responsive and that the military might still be able to protect the 
Bakhtiar government. The administration did share Sullivan’s trepidation regarding 
Khomeini’s plans to return and went through intermediaries to try to convince him to wait. 
The Americans’ strongest argument was that communist and Soviet-backed forces would 
exploit the chaos following his return, which they sincerely feared, but the Khomeini camp 
correctly concluded that any communist forces in Iran were not strong enough to do so. 
As such, the US government could not prevent Khomeini’s return to Iran in February 1979, 
and the ensuing open conflict between his forces and those loyal to Bakhtiar ended in the 
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latter’s overthrow. Washington’s faith in the military proved to be misplaced, as it split apart 
and abandoned the government. After the revolutionaries took power, the Carter 
administration realized that it had little choice but to recognize the new regime. While US-
Iranian relations would never be the same, such recognition was seen as a prerequisite to the 
salvaging of any American interests at all. 
A Cautious Policy, under Chaotic Circumstances 
The new Iran could not act as a vital regional ally, as the Shah’s Iran had been. The anti-
American sentiments of the revolutionaries also meant that the close military relationship 
would change, and that vital US intelligence installations in Iran would have to go. Yet certain 
central priorities of Washington’s policy, both strategic and economic, remained the same. 
This was particularly true in relation to the perceived threat from Moscow and the pro-Soviet 
revolutionary groups, and American officials warned the Iranian government about the 
communist threat in private meetings as well. Moreover, the United States wished to retain its 
extensive economic relations with Iran and further ensure that it remained a significant 
supplier of oil. For this reason, and as the production shortage in Iran had caused instability 
and problems in the global oil market, it was vital that oil production went back to normal 
levels. In light of all of this, Washington was anxious to reestablish normal relations with Iran. 
In the chaotic atmosphere of revolutionary Iran, however, it was not easy for the United States 
to advance any of its interests. While the de jure government, led by Mehdi Bazargan, 
recognized the necessity of working relations with Washington, the fiercely anti-American 
Khomeini, who increasingly dominated Iranian politics, felt otherwise. In addition, even the 
relative moderates of Bazargan government were skeptical towards the United States, in large 
part because of its former close ties to the Shah. The past was never truly in the past, and the 
legacy of earlier US policy made it very difficult for the Carter Administration to establish a 
working relationship with revolutionary Iran.   
The US Embassy realized that it needed to lay low under these conditions and avoid 
provoking the new regime. Therefore, it did not press Tehran for closer co-operation or the 
restoration of normal relations but rather waited for the Iranians to come around. Yet they did 
not, in large part thanks to the virulent anti-Americanism of the Khomeini camp. The general 
skepticism towards Washington among the new decision makers in Iran was also aggravated 
by the continued US unwillingness to meet with Khomeini. Such a meeting was seen as 
potentially undermining to the Bazargan government, which was much less hostile toward 
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Washington. American officials instead tried to make contact with representatives of the 
Bazargan government, seeing better prospects for furthering US interests if these moderate 
officials increased their influence. Rather than adapt to the tough reality in Iran, then, US 
policy conformed to Washington’s enduring hope for a better tomorrow. 
While bilateral relations never normalized, the Iranian government did begin to seek US 
assistance in several areas by the summer of 1979. On such occasions, the Carter 
administration was generally eager to help. Iranian requests for military spare parts and 
intelligence information seemed to fit well with Washington’s interest in reestablishing closer 
co-operation in intelligence and military matters, which would be useful for the containment 
of Soviet ambitions. Assistance in economic matters served the goal of improving relations 
with Iran as well, and it was very important from a global perspective—the oil production 
shortage in Iran had brought great instability to the world oil markets throughout 1979. 
The United States thus had every desire to wish for the restoration of orderly conditions in 
Iran, even though the Iranian government persisted in its wayward suspicion that Washington 
had a hand in Iran’s enormous internal difficulties. This derived from the previous close 
American relations with the Shah, and when Carter decided to allow the mortally ill deposed 
leader into the United States for medical treatment, it bolstered anti-Americanism in Iran and 
led to the hostage-taking at the US Embassy in November 1979. Khomeini’s support for the 
hostage takers prolonged the crisis, which resulted in the termination of diplomatic relations 
Three Years of Difficult Balancing Acts 
The story of US-Iranian relations from 1977 to 1979 can be described as one of strong allies 
turning into sworn enemies, and the Carter administration was not able to prevent this from 
happening. Its policy toward Iran was often mixed or unclear, thanks to its generally 
complicated foreign policy line and its internal divisions. As noted, these findings fit the 
theories of bureaucratic politics developed by Graham T. Allison, which focus on the 
uncertainties and complexity of policymaking. Rather than being the result of long-term plans 
by key decision makers, foreign policy choices are often skewed by internal rivalries, a lack 
of solid information, and little clarity about the possible outcomes.
514
 Zarah Steiner’s research 
on US foreign policy-making also forms a relevant backdrop, evoking a complex process 
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 See Chapter 1, where this is discussed in greater detail.  
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where “Bureaucratic infighting is endemic […] and frequently produces conflicting and 
erratic policies.”515   
The administration’s split foreign policy line proved very significant in its Iran policy during 
these years, though clearly not all of its aspects can be explained by this. When things were 
relatively calm in Iran, this split line did not pose much of a problem, and the US-Iranian 
relationship generally remained solid. While policy on some issues, such as arms sales and 
human rights, could appear inconsistent, this did not significantly hurt relations with Iran, 
even when the administration walked a fine line to advance both its humanitarian and its 
strategic agendas. 
However, under more trying circumstances, the policy differences within the administration 
were too much to overcome. During the Iranian revolution, the Carter administration was not 
capable of leveraging its relationship with the Shah to influence the situation. Its caution, as 
emphasized, arose from both an intelligence failure and its internal divide. After the fall of the 
Shah, Washington lost most of its ability to impact the situation in Iran and was forced to 
follow an even more cautious policy line. Many of the events that led up to this situation were 
beyond US control anyway, and it cannot be known whether a different policy would have 
yielded different results. Yet it can be concluded that, when events in Iran went the way they 
did, the infighting and inaction of the Carter administration made it near to impossible to 
protect US interests.  
*** 
As it turned out, these events would have long-lasting ramifications. The United States 
severed diplomatic relations with Iran in April 1980, and thirty-five years later, they have yet 
to be restored. Just as preceding US policy influenced the path of events that led up to the 
hostage crisis, the memory of this crisis continues to impact US-Iranian relations to this day. 
The past is still present.    
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Appendix A: Directory of People  
 
Acheson, Dean – US Secretary of State (1949–1953).  
Amir-Entezam, Abbas – Iranian Deputy Prime Minister (March 1, 1979–November 6, 
1979). 
Atherton, Alfred – Officer in the US Foreign Service. Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
East Affairs (1974–1978).  
Azhari, Gholam Reza – Iranian general. Prime Minister of Iran (November 6, 1978–January 
4 1979).  
Bakhtiar, Shapour – Prime Minister of Iran (January 4, 1979–February 11, 1979).  
Bazargan, Mehdi – Prime Minister of Iran (February 1979–November 6, 1979).  
Ball, George – Veteran US Diplomat. Former Undersecretary of State (1961–1966) and US 
Ambassador to the United Nations (1968).  
Blumenthal, Michael – US Secretary of The Treasury (1977–1981). 
Brezhnev, Leonid – General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1964–
1982). 
Brown, Harold – US Secretary of Defense (January 21, 1977–January 20, 1981).  
Brzezinski, Zbigniew – US National Security Advisor (January 20, 1977–January 20, 1981). 
Christopher, Warren – US Deputy Secretary of State (February 26, 1977–January 20, 
1981).  
Cutler, Walter – US Diplomat. Ambassador-designate to Iran (1979).  
Culver, John –US Senator (1975–1981).  
Eagleton, Thomas – US Senator (1968–1987).  
Eisenhower, Dwight D. – President of the United States (1953–1961). 
Ford, Gerald – President of the United States (1974–1977). 
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Goldwater, Barry – US Senator (1953–1965, 1969–1987). Republican Presidential 
Candidate (1964).  
Dulles, John Foster – US Secretary of State (1953–1959). 
Carter, Jimmy – President of the United States (January 20, 1977–January 20, 1981). 
Homayoun, Daryoush – Iranian Minister of Information and Tourism (August 7, 1977–
August 27, 1978).  
Huntington, Samuel – Political scientist. Member of the National Security Council (1977–
1979). 
Huyser, Robert E. – Four-Star US General. Deputy Commander in Chief of the United 
States European Command (1975–1979).  
Johnson, Lyndon B.  – President of the United States (1963–1969). 
Kennedy, John F. – President of the United States (1961–1963). 
Khalatabari, Abbas – Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs (1971–1978).  
Khomeini, Ruhollah – Iranian Ayatollah. Supreme Leader of Iran (December 3 1979-June 3, 
1989).  
Kissinger, Henry – US National Security Advisor (1969–1973), Secretary of State (1973– 
1977). 
Laingen, Bruce – US Charges d’affaires in Iran (June 16, 1979–November 4, 1979 (de 
facto)). 
Minachi, Nasser – Iranian Minister of Information (1979–1980).  
Mossadegh, Mohammad – Prime Minister of Iran (April 28, 1951-July 16, 1952 and July 21, 
1952–August 19, 1953.  
Naas, Charles – Country Director for Iran in the State Department (1974-1978), Deputy 
Chief of Mission in Tehran (1978–1980). 
Nasser, Gamal Abdel – President of Egypt (1956–1970). 
Nixon, Richard – President of the United States (1969–1977). 
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Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza – Shah of Iran (September 16, 1941–February 11, 1979). 
Pahlavi, Reza – Shah of Iran (1925–1941).  
Precht, Henry – Country Director for Iran in the State Department (1978–1980). 
Reagan, Ronald – President of the United States (1981–1989). 
Rockefeller, David – US billionaire, banker and philanthropist.  
Sadat, Anwar  – President of Egypt (1970–1981).  
Schlesinger, James R. – US Secretary of Energy (August 6, 1977–August 23, 1979).  
Shariatmadari, Mohammad – Iranian ayatollah.  
Sharif-Emani, Jafar – Prime Minister of Iran (August 31, 1960–May 5, 1961, August 27, 
1978-November 6, 1978).   
Sick, Gary – National Security Council, staff member. Principal White House Aide for 
Persian Gulf Affairs (1976–1981). 
Simon, William E.  – US Secretary of the Treasury (1974–1977). 
Sullivan, William – US Ambassador to Iran (1977–1979).  
Turner, Stansfield – US admiral. CIA Director (March 9, 1977–January 20, 1981). 
Vance, Cyrus – US Secretary of State (January 20, 1977–April 28, 1980). 
Yazdi, Ebrahim – Deputy Prime Minister of Iran (4 February, 1979–1 March, 1979), Iranian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (April 12, 1979 –November 12, 1979). 
Young, Andrew – US Ambassador to the United Nations (January 20, 1977–23 September 
1979). 
Zahedi, Ardeshir – Iranian politician and diplomat. Ambassador to the United States (March 
7, 1973–February 11, 1979).  
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516 Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University in Texas at Austin. Map produced by the Central 
Intelligence Agency.  http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iran_rel_1973.jpg 
Accessed May 2, 2015.  
 
124 
 
 
The Middle East, 1976517 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
517
 Ibid. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/middle_east_pol_1976.jpg Accessed May 2, 
2015.  
125 
 
Bibliography  
 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Archives 
 
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia  
The sources gathered in the Carter Library were accessed using the library’s CIA Research 
Search Tool (CREST) machines. These documents are marked with the NLC codes listed in 
the footnotes, where the meaning of the codes is also explained. While all of this material can 
easily be found by using the CREST Machines, the equivalent documents exist in physical 
versions as well. For the benefit of other researchers, and as a way of showing the original 
locations of these sources, the collections containing the documents used for this thesis is 
listed here. 
 
Collection 1. NSA Files -- Brzezinski Mat’l:  President’s Daily Report File 
Collection 2. NSA Files -- Brzezinski Mat’l:  President’s Daily CIA Brief File 
Collection 4. NSA Files -- Brzezinski Mat’l: Trip File 
Collection 5. NSA Files -- Brzezinski Mat’l: VIP Visit File  
Collection 6. NSA Files -- Brzezinski Mat’l: Country File 
Collection 7. NSA Files -- Brzezinski Mat’l: Subject File 
Collection 10. NSA Files -- Brzezinski Mat’l:  Staff Evening Reports File 
Collection 15. NSA Files -- Brzezinski Mat’l: Brzezinski Office File 
Collection 16. NSA Files -- Brzezinski Mat’l: Cables Files 
Collection 17. NSA Files -- Staff Material:  Office 
Collection 20. NSA Files -- Staff Material:  Staff Secretary 
126 
 
Collection 21. NSA Files -- Staff Material:  FOI/Legal 
Collection 23. NSA Files -- Staff Material:  Europe, USSR, and East/West 
Collection 24. NSA Files – Staff Material: North/South  
Collection 25. NSA Files -- Staff Material: Middle East 
Collection 28. NSA Files -- Staff Material:  Global Issues 
Collection 39. WHCF (White House Central Files), Correspondence Tracking 
Collection 49. Council of Economic Advisors  
Collection 128. Plains File 
Collection 132. NSC, Institutional Files, 1977-1981 
Collection 133. Donated Historical Material – Mondale, Walter F. 
 
 
 
 
Digitized Collections, Accessible Online  
 
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS) series:  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments  
 
All FRUS collections were last accessed on May 7, 2015.  
 
 
Galpern, Steven G. (ed.). Foreign Relations of the United States - 1969-1976, VOLUME 
XXXVII: ENERGY CRISIS, 1974–1980: 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v37  
Ahlberg, Kristin (ed.). Foreign Relations of the United States - 1977-1980, Volume II, Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-
80v02   
127 
 
Taylor, Melissa Jane (ed.). Foreign Relations of the United States - 1977-80, Volume VI, 
Soviet Union:  https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v06  
Howard, Adam M. (ed.). Foreign Relations of the United States - 1977-1980, Volume VII, 
Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978: 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08  
 
 
National Archives and Record Administration (NARA): 
Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-1977: http://aad.archives.gov/aad/series-
description.jsp?s=4073  Accessed May 7, 2015.  
 
 
Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den:  
https://archive.org/details/DocumentsFromTheU.s.EspionageDen     
Accessed May 7, 2015.  
 
Vol. 13, Part 5. 
Vol. 34. 
Vol. 63. 
All of these volumes have been converted to PDF files and can be accessed through the above 
link.  
 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
 
 
 
Speeches and Statements  
 
The American Presidency Project: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/   
 
All documents from the American Presidency Project were last accessed on May 7, 2015.  
 
“UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME - Address at Commencement Exercises at the 
University”, May 22, 1977: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7552                 .  
“Toasts of the President and the Shah at a Dinner Honoring the Shah”, November 15, 1977, 
Washington D.C.: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=6938  
 
“White House Statement Issued Following the First Meeting Between the President and the 
Shah”, November 15, 1977: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6937  
 
“Toasts of the President and the Shah at a State Dinner”, December 31, 1977, Tehran: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7080  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 
 
 
Literature 
 
Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1982. 
Abrahamian, Ervand. A History of Modern Iran. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008. 
Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: 
Little Brown, 1971. 
Alvandi, Roham. “Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah: The Origins of Iranian Primacy in the 
Persian Gulf” in Diplomatic History. Vol. 36, Issue 2, April 2012. 
Ansari, Ali M. Modern Iran Since 1981: The Pahlavis and After. Essex: Longman, 2003. 
Avery, Peter, Hambly, G.R.G., et al. (eds). The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7: From 
Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.  
Bakhash, Shaul. “Iran’s Relations with Israel, Syria, and Lebanon,” in Iran at the Crossroads: 
Global Relations in a Turbulent Decade (Rezun, Miron, ed.). San Francisco: 
Westview Press, 1990. 
Bill, James A. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. 
Blake, Kristen. The U.S.-Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945-1962: A Case in the Annals of the 
Cold War. Maryland: University Press of America, 2009. 
Brown, Seyom. The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy 
from Truman to Clinton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-
1981. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983. 
130 
 
Buchan, James. Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and its Consequences. London: John 
Murray, 2012. 
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam Books, 1982. 
Carter, Jimmy. White House Diary. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2010.  
Christison, Kathleen. Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy. 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999. 
Chubin, Shahram. “Iran” in The Cold War and the Middle East (Sayigh, Yezid and Shlaim, 
Avi (eds.)). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.  
Cooper, Andrew Scott. The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran and Saudi Arabia Changed the 
Balance of Power in the Middle East. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012 ed..  
Cottam, Richard W. ”Goodbye to America’s Shah” in Foreign Policy, March 16, 1979. 
Emery, Christian. “United States Iran Policy 1979–1980: The Anatomy and Legacy of 
American Diplomacy” in Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 24, Issue 4, 2013.  
Farber, David. Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Meeting with 
Radical Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
Fawcett, Louise. “Revisiting the Iranian Crisis of 1946: How Much More Do We Know?” in 
Iranian Studies, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2014.  
Ganji, Babak. Politics of Confrontation: The Foreign policy of the USA and Revolutionary 
Iran. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006.  
Gasiorowski, Mark J. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah – Building a Client State in Iran. 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “US Intelligence Assistance to Iran, May–October 1979” in The Middle 
East Journal. Vol. 66, No. 4, autumn 2012. 
Hahn, Peter L. Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
1945-1961. Charlotte: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. 
131 
 
Heiss, Mary Ann. “The United States, Great Britain, and the Creation of the Iranian Oil 
Consortium, 1953-1954” in The International History Review. Vol. 16, No. 3, August 
1994. 
Hess, Gary R. “The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War” in Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 1, March 1974.  
Halliday, Fred. “The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War” in The Cold War and 
the Middle East (Sayigh, Yezigh and Shlaim, Avi (eds.)). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997. 
Huyser, Robert E. Mission to Tehran. London: Andre Deutsch, 1986.  
Jervis, Robert. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. 
New York: Cornell University Press, 2010. 
Kaufman, Scott. Plans Unraveled: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration. DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2008. 
Keddie, Nikki R.  Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1981. 
Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1979.  
Katouzian, Homa. State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of 
the Pahlavis. London: I.B. Tauris, 2000.  
Kurzman, Charles. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University 
Press, 2004. 
Levey, Zach and Podeh, Eli (eds.). Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to 
Junior Partner. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2008. 
Louis, Roger William. “Britain and the Overthrow of the Mossadeq Government” in 
Mohammed Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Byrne, Malcolm and Gasiorowski, 
Mark J. (eds)).  New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004. 
132 
 
Lundestad, Geir. Øst, vest, nord, sør: Hovedlinjer i internasjonal politikk. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 2010. 
Lytle, Mark H. The Origins of the Iranian-American Alliance 1941-1953. New York: Holmes 
& Meier, 1987.  
McCullagh, C. Behan. “Bias in Historical Description, Interpretation, and Explanation” in 
History and Theory, No. 39, 2000. 
Moens, Alexander. “President Carter's Advisors and the Fall of the Shah” in Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 2, summer 1991. 
Moin, Baqer. Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. London: I.B. Tauris, 2009 ed.. 
Njølstad, Olav. “Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US Strategic Planning in the Carter 
Years” in Cold War History, Vol. 4, No. 3, April 2004.  
Parsi, Trita. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 
Pollack, Kenneth M. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America. New York: 
Random House, 2005. 
Precht, Henry. “The Iranian Revolution: An Oral History with Henry Precht, Then State 
Department Desk Officer” in Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 1, winter 2004. 
Quandt, William B. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 
1967. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. 
Ramazani, R.K. “Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict” in Middle East Journal, Vol. 32, No. 4, 
autumn 1978. 
Ramazani, R.K. The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Aalphen aan Den Rijn: Sijthoff & 
Noordhoff, 1979.   
Rubin, Barry. Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1981. 
133 
 
Saikal, Amin. The Rise and Fall of the Shah. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. 
Salameh, Mamdouh G. “Oil crises. Historical perspective” in Concise Encyclopedia of the 
History of Energy (Cleveland, Cutler J. (ed.)). San Diego: Elsevier, 2009.  
Samhat, Nayef H. “Middle Powers and American Foreign Policy: Lessons from Irano-U.S. 
Relations, 1962-77” in Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000. 
Sayigh, Yezid and Shlaim, Avi. “Introduction” in The Cold War and the Middle East (Yezid, 
Sayigh and Shlaim, Avi (eds.)). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Shlaim, Avi. “The Middle East: The Origin of Arab-Israeli Wars” in Explaining International 
Relations since 1945 (Woods, Ngaire, (ed.)). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Shlaim, Avi. “Israel, the Great Powers, and the Middle East Crisis of 1958” in Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 27, No. 2, May 1999. 
Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America’s Fateful Encounter with Iran. London: I.B. Tauris, 1985. 
Skidmore, David. Reversing Course: Carter's Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the 
Failure of Reform. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996. 
Spiegel, Steven L. The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, 
from Truman to Reagan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.  
Steiner, Zara. “Decision-Making in American and British Foreign Policy: An Open and Shut 
Case” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1987. 
Sullivan, William H. Mission to Iran. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981. 
Summitt, April R. “For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran” in Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 4, autumn 2004.  
Tal, Lawrence. “Jordan” in The Cold War and the Middle East (Sayigh, Yezid and Shlaim, 
Avi (eds.)). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.  
Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983.  
134 
 
Ward, Steven R. Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces. Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009. 
Yaqub, Salim. Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East. 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2004. 
 
 
  
135 
 
Miscellaneous  
 
 
Newspapers and Magazines  
 
All articles were last accessed on May 7, 2015.  
 
 
 
Chicago Tribune 
 
“Oil Sale to Iran OKd by Carter”, August 23, 1979: 
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1979/08/23/page/7/article/nation  
 
 
The Guardian 
 
Cumming-Bruce, Nicholas. “US Embassy Stormed by Tehran Mob”, February 15, 
1979: http://www.theguardian.com/century/1970-1979/Story/0,,106889,00.html  
 
 
Dehghan, Saeed Kamali and Norton-Taylor, Richard. “CIA admits role in 1953 
Iranian Coup”, August 19, 2013: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-
coup   
 
 
Time Magazine 
 
“Jimmy Carter: Not Just Peanuts”, August 3, 1976: 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,879613,00.html  
 
 
Wilmington Star News 
 
“U.S. refuses planes to Shah”, August 17, 1978:   
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1454anddat=19780817andid=w7ssAAA
AIBAJandsjid=LBMEAAAAIBAJandpg=3481,3107385   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
Various Material Accessed Online 
 
All of these websites were last accessed on May 7, 2015.  
 
 
 
Gayner, Jeffrey B. “Limiting arms sales and the Iranian AWACS proposal”. Analysis for The 
Heritage Foundation, September 20, 1977. 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/1977/pdf/bg36.pdf   
 
Johnson, Toni. “Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy”, published by Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2013: http://www.cfr.org/united-states/congress-us-foreign-policy/p29871  
 
Kennedy, Charles Stuart. Interview with Bruce Laingen, January 1993: 
http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Laingen,%20L.%20Bruce%20.toc.pdf         
Sale of AWACS to Iran: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress, first session. 
Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. Digitalized version, belonging to the University of 
Michigan, 1977: http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015078615948;view=1up;seq=1  
Encyclopædia Iranica, online edition,“Industrialization”: 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/industrialization-ii  
 
 
 
 
 
